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What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money?

  • Nikos Psarros
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Realism - Relativism - Constructivism
This chapter is in the book Realism - Relativism - Constructivism

Abstract

The received view defines money by four basic functions: unit of account, store of value, a medium of exchange, and standard of deferred payment. The two main grand views on the nature of money regard either its function as a unit of account (chartalism), or its function as a general medium of exchange (metallism) as the fundamental characteristic of money and try to derive the other functions of money from the proposed fundamental characteristic. Both chartalism and metallism fail to see, however, that all four accepted functions of money are rather necessary expressions of the nature of money and not elements of its definition. My thesis is that all four basic functions of money can be explained by regarding money as an instrument for measuring an extensive magnitude of things and poietic actions that is called commonly ‘value’. However, value is not a fundamental magnitude, but is in a certain way the representation of human freedom in the material world. Thus money is in fact an indirect instrument for determining and measuring at least an aspect of human freedom. From this definition of the nature of money also the obligation for the institution of a conditionally guaranteed minimal income can be defended.

Abstract

The received view defines money by four basic functions: unit of account, store of value, a medium of exchange, and standard of deferred payment. The two main grand views on the nature of money regard either its function as a unit of account (chartalism), or its function as a general medium of exchange (metallism) as the fundamental characteristic of money and try to derive the other functions of money from the proposed fundamental characteristic. Both chartalism and metallism fail to see, however, that all four accepted functions of money are rather necessary expressions of the nature of money and not elements of its definition. My thesis is that all four basic functions of money can be explained by regarding money as an instrument for measuring an extensive magnitude of things and poietic actions that is called commonly ‘value’. However, value is not a fundamental magnitude, but is in a certain way the representation of human freedom in the material world. Thus money is in fact an indirect instrument for determining and measuring at least an aspect of human freedom. From this definition of the nature of money also the obligation for the institution of a conditionally guaranteed minimal income can be defended.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface v
  3. Table of Contents vii
  4. 1. Constructivism and Beyond
  5. Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? 3
  6. On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks 17
  7. Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? 31
  8. Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel 45
  9. Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? 59
  10. Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung 73
  11. Two Ways of Exploring the World 83
  12. 2. Epistemology/Epistemological Relativism
  13. The Truth of Social Constructivism 103
  14. The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion 117
  15. Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality 129
  16. Angelina’s Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible 137
  17. 3. Realism versus Relativism
  18. Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? 153
  19. Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus 167
  20. Relativisms and Their Opposites 187
  21. When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian’s Antirelativism 203
  22. Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn 215
  23. Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus 233
  24. Realism without Foundation 241
  25. 4. Ontology/Ontological Relativism
  26. Constructed Reality 255
  27. Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism 269
  28. Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings 279
  29. What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? 293
  30. 5. Values and Value Relativism
  31. Relativism about Morality 301
  32. Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins 313
  33. A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism 327
  34. Zum Wert von Vertrauen 339
  35. Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie 353
  36. Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? 365
  37. 6. Wittgenstein
  38. The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics 381
  39. Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the “Person” from the Writings of Wittgenstein? 397
  40. Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke 409
  41. Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence 425
  42. Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 435
  43. Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 449
  44. Index of names 459
  45. Index of subjects 465
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110524055-022

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter i
  2. Preface v
  3. Table of Contents vii
  4. 1. Constructivism and Beyond
  5. Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? 3
  6. On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks 17
  7. Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? 31
  8. Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel 45
  9. Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? 59
  10. Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung 73
  11. Two Ways of Exploring the World 83
  12. 2. Epistemology/Epistemological Relativism
  13. The Truth of Social Constructivism 103
  14. The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion 117
  15. Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality 129
  16. Angelina’s Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible 137
  17. 3. Realism versus Relativism
  18. Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? 153
  19. Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus 167
  20. Relativisms and Their Opposites 187
  21. When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian’s Antirelativism 203
  22. Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn 215
  23. Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus 233
  24. Realism without Foundation 241
  25. 4. Ontology/Ontological Relativism
  26. Constructed Reality 255
  27. Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism 269
  28. Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings 279
  29. What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? 293
  30. 5. Values and Value Relativism
  31. Relativism about Morality 301
  32. Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins 313
  33. A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing ‘Truth’ in Moral Relativism 327
  34. Zum Wert von Vertrauen 339
  35. Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie 353
  36. Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? 365
  37. 6. Wittgenstein
  38. The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics 381
  39. Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the “Person” from the Writings of Wittgenstein? 397
  40. Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke 409
  41. Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence 425
  42. Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 435
  43. Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 449
  44. Index of names 459
  45. Index of subjects 465
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