Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents v
3. Preface vii
4. 1 Rival Approaches in the Philosophy of Content
5. 1 The Pre-philosophical Characteristics of Content 1
6. 2 Strategic Choices for the Philosophical Elucidation of Content 10
7. 3 The Representationalist Orthodoxy 14
8. 4 The Wittgensteinian Alternative 26
9. Further Reading 29
10. 2 Wittgenstein's Destructive Criticisms of Explanations of Content
11. 1 The Connection Between Content and Normativity 30
12. 2 Wittgenstein on Linguistic Content 34
13. 3 Wittgenstein on Mental Content 48
14. 4 The Generality of Wittgenstein's Critical Arguments 52
15. 5 Wittgensteinian Arguments Against Representationalism 54
16. Further Reading 68
17. 3 Sceptical, Constructivist and Minimalist Interpretations of Wittgenstein
18. 1 Scepticism 69
19. 2 Constructivism 80
20. 3 Minimalism 88
21. Further Reading 99
22. 4 Wittgenstein and the Theory of Content
23. 1 Wittgenstein and Theories 100
24. 2 Wittgenstein's Account of the Pre-philosophical Characteristics of Content 101
25. 3 Wittgenstein's Theory of Content and Externalism Further Reading 123
26. Further Reading 138
27. 5 Wittgenstein and Davidson on Content
28. 1 Davidson's Theory of Interpretation 139
29. 2 Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Distinction between Scheme and Content 156
30. 3 Davidson and Wittgenstein on the Rejection of Internal Mental Objects 165
31. 4 Davidson, Wittgenstein and McDowell on the Connection of Thought and the World 171
32. Further Reading 174
33. 6 Content and Causality
34. 1 Wittgenstein on Physicalism 176
35. 2 Davidson's Causal Theory of Mind 180
36. 3 A Non-causal Theory of Mind? 186
37. 4 An Objection to Anomalous Monism 197
38. 5 Concluding Remarks 202
39. Further Reading 204
40. Bibliography 205
41. Index 210