Imitation and Long Run Outcomes
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Jayasri Dutta
In a number of evolutionary models the presence of mutations, or random components of choice, serve to refine predictions of long-run behavior. We analyze the effects of mutation rates that vary because of the presence of imitation. A full characterization of long-run outcomes is provided for familiar coordination and congestion games, and also a number of other games not previously considered within the evolutionary framework. Our results are often quite distinct from those in the literature. We apply these tools to a series of economic applications, including market games, where imitation can explain excess volatility of prices, and location games, where it leads to greater uniformity in choices.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- Advances Article
- Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
- Backward Induction and Model Deterioration
- Contributions Article
- Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders
- To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention
- A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
- Optimal Dynamic Portfolio Risk with First-Order and Second-Order Predictability
- Uniform Proofs of Order Independence for Various Strategy Elimination Procedures
- Players With Limited Memory
- Precedents and Timing: A Strategic Analysis of Multi-Plaintiff Litigation
- Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
- Topics Article
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- Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies
- Trade and Linked Exchange; Price Discrimination Through Transaction Bundling
- A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist
- Vertical Differentiation, Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Bank Screening
- Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices
- Imitation and Long Run Outcomes
- Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games
- Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty
- A Theory of Vague Expected Utility
- Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
- Backward Induction and Model Deterioration
- Contributions Article
- Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders
- To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention
- A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
- Optimal Dynamic Portfolio Risk with First-Order and Second-Order Predictability
- Uniform Proofs of Order Independence for Various Strategy Elimination Procedures
- Players With Limited Memory
- Precedents and Timing: A Strategic Analysis of Multi-Plaintiff Litigation
- Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
- Topics Article
- Multiple-Object Auctions Around a Circle
- Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies
- Trade and Linked Exchange; Price Discrimination Through Transaction Bundling
- A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist
- Vertical Differentiation, Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Bank Screening
- Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices
- Imitation and Long Run Outcomes
- Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games
- Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty
- A Theory of Vague Expected Utility
- Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
