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Players With Limited Memory
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Steffen Huck
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
28. September 2004
This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. We introduce the notion of a Limited Memory Equilibrium (LME) and show that play converges to an LME in every generic normal form game. Our characterization of the set of LME suggests that players with limited memory do (weakly) better in games than in decision problems. We also show that agents can do quite well even with severely limited memory, although severe limitations tend to make them behave cautiously.
Published Online: 2004-9-28
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
- Backward Induction and Model Deterioration
- Contributions Article
- Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders
- To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention
- A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
- Optimal Dynamic Portfolio Risk with First-Order and Second-Order Predictability
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- Precedents and Timing: A Strategic Analysis of Multi-Plaintiff Litigation
- Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
- Topics Article
- Multiple-Object Auctions Around a Circle
- Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies
- Trade and Linked Exchange; Price Discrimination Through Transaction Bundling
- A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist
- Vertical Differentiation, Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Bank Screening
- Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices
- Imitation and Long Run Outcomes
- Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games
- Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty
- A Theory of Vague Expected Utility
- Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
