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Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices
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Joshua S Gans
Published/Copyright:
July 12, 2004
A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. We find, however, that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structure. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented, patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.
Published Online: 2004-7-12
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
- Backward Induction and Model Deterioration
- Contributions Article
- Search and Bargaining in Large Markets With Homogeneous Traders
- To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention
- A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
- Optimal Dynamic Portfolio Risk with First-Order and Second-Order Predictability
- Uniform Proofs of Order Independence for Various Strategy Elimination Procedures
- Players With Limited Memory
- Precedents and Timing: A Strategic Analysis of Multi-Plaintiff Litigation
- Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry
- Topics Article
- Multiple-Object Auctions Around a Circle
- Market Size and Vertical Equilibrium in the Context of Successive Cournot Oligopolies
- Trade and Linked Exchange; Price Discrimination Through Transaction Bundling
- A Sequential Signaling Model of the Sale of an Invention to an Oligopolist
- Vertical Differentiation, Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Bank Screening
- Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices
- Imitation and Long Run Outcomes
- Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games
- Unraveling of Information: Competition and Uncertainty
- A Theory of Vague Expected Utility
- Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
