A State of the Art on Emotions in the Context of Public Policymaking

4.2.1.1 Emotions in Voting and Support for (Far-Right) Populists

Existing research on the effect of emotions on voting behaviour is concentrated on the question of turnout. Most studies investigate whether feeling emotional about candidates, parties, voting or politics in general (de Kadt 2017; Dinas et al. 2014; Wang 2019) as well as feeling specific emotions such as anger, fear and enthusiasm (Phillips and Plutzer 2023) lead to higher electoral participation. This strand of literature has indeed found affect as well as discrete emotions to have a positive effect on people’s motivation to vote. Looking at electoral support for specific parties, happiness proves to be a strong predictor for voting for incumbent parties (Ward 2019). Having before been considered to be empirically untestable, scientific results like these verify tacit assumptions about the strong influence that emotions exert on voting behaviour. Studies about the role of emotions in predicting voting behaviour are however often conflated with other concepts, such as populism, partisan identity and polarisation (Arceneaux and Vander Wielen 2013; Diermeier and Li 2019).

In addition to studies that explore the effect of emotions on electoral turnout, there is much research that identifies positive associations between feeling a variety of discrete emotions and voting for far-right populists. Populism in fact constitutes a major area in emotion research, in which especially negative emotions take centre-stage. Looking at fear and anger, Vasilopoulos and colleagues (2019) demonstrate that different emotions may have the opposite effect on the same group of voters. While anger motivates authoritarian and far-right voters to cast their vote for the populist Rassemblement National in France, fear reduced such inclination. Jacobs et al. (2024) confirm the effect of anger on voting for radical parties, but contrary to Vasilopoulos et al. (2019), they find fear (and positive emotions) to have no effect on voting for said party family. Differentiating between different targets of anger, Marx (2020) shows that individuals convert their self-directed anger about their own socio-economic situation into a more enjoyable form of collective anger, which allows them to identify an external actor who becomes the target of negative sentiment and blame. Complementary to purely negative emotions, Versteegen (2024) studies group-based nostalgia which proves a potent predictor for voting for the populist far-right party in the Netherlands. Various discrete emotions have thus been identified as having a positive effect on populist voting even though this is not unequivocally corroborated across different studies.

Other research identifies voters’ perceived proximity to a party to significantly grow in case of an affective shock, i.e. the death of an electoral candidate (Dinas et al. 2014). This underlines the complexity of human attitude formation and behavioural tendencies, as an emotional experience, entirely unrelated to the profile of a certain party, may result in an increase in their public support. There are also more stable patterns of emotional disposition which can be observed in voting behaviour. Generally anxious people prefer politicians who promise them protection and push for policies aimed at eliminating threat and providing safety (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 101f., 136; cf. Wagner and Morisi 2019). Anxiety can even override partisanship as citizens more strongly support protective policies when afraid, regardless of the party advocating for them (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 136). At the same time, Albertson and Gadarian (2015) present empirical evidence that specific parties are regarded as more competent in certain areas, which endows them with increased credibility if it is in their field of expertise where a threat is identified (p. 99). These findings indicate that individuals’ overall voting behaviour, their political attitudes and preferences for politicians are all influenced by emotional dispositions as well as incidental emotional states. In this regard, policymakers can successfully propose policy solutions by recognising, addressing and even manipulating emotional reactions to threats, societal groups or problems.

4.2.1.2 Emotions in Political Communication

We do not only feel emotions, we also frequently express them through mimics and gestures as well as by communicating them verbally or in written form. Our individual experience of emotion is thus unarguably shaped by language (Durnová 2022; Schmidt-Atzert et al. 2014, 218). That is why scholars increasingly analyse the use of emotive rhetoric as a useful strategic tool for politicians (cf. systematic review, Section 4.1). We can identify a considerable number of studies that again deal with populism, especially in Europe and the US. These frequently explain populist success through the usage of a type of language that is more emotional than that of their non-populist counterparts (Hopkins in Huddy et al., 2023; Wirz 2018; Verbalyte et al. 2022). Populist far-right parties, thereby make use of social media platforms to increase mobilisation usually in terms of user engagement (Klein 2024). Besides resentment (Abts and Baute 2022) and fear (Flinders and Hinterleitner 2022 ^[16]), anger is the recurring emotional ingredient in populist communication and considered a key factor for its success (Erhardt et al. 2023; Vasilopoulos et al. 2019). This is not to claim though that positive emotions are absent from populist rhetoric (Tolbert et al. 2018; Wirz 2018, 1128f.). Widmann (2021) thereby stresses that emotions of different valence are appealed to by far-right populists for different purposes, such as the construction of the in-group making appeals to positive emotions and the out-group using negative emotions (p. 176). Especially with regards to policy-related communication, populist rhetoric certainly has an impact on other parties’ communication and on the overall culture of political debate (e.g. Valentim and Widmann 2023). When populist members of parliament make increased use of negative sentiment, their non-populist counterparts resort to oppose this by focussing on positive emotions (ibid.). In general, they appeal to emotions of the opposite valence (Widmann 2022). Mechanisms of emotional adaptation to populists in the context of policies might lead to a mismatch between the emotional quality of a policy proposal and the mood of the target population, which can impede a policy from being implemented (see Cox and Béland 2018; Section 4.2.2.1). Emotions in populist communication indeed appear to be more readily available for analysis and thus comparatively easy to study. However, it must be noted that populist rhetoric is generally more researched than non-populist communication which might lead to a bias in characterising it as naturally more emotional.

Moving on to political science literature which precisely looks at emotional appeals and their strategic use in political communication more broadly, scholars argue that political actors are generally aware of the strategic benefits emotional appeals can have for them in certain contexts and with regards to certain issues (cf. Widmann 2022). That is why they use them in deliberate variation (ibid., 25). More concretely, politicians generally communicate more emotionally in front of an audience of potential voters compared to situations in which they interact with colleagues or experts (Osnabrügge et al. 2021, 897). Emotions thereby function to make a statement or a policy solution more compelling. Besides the type of audience, a politician’s positioning (Yildirim 2024), voter uncertainty and party programme similarities constitute further determinants that make party elites more likely to use emotive rhetoric, especially when addressing the public (Kosmidis et al. 2019). They can furthermore establish what Stapleton and Dawkins (2022) refer to as “affective linkages”. If a member of the preferred party expresses anger or disgust, the electorate as well gets angrier or more disgusted (p. 760, 762). These affective bonds strengthen voters’ support. Research moreover shows that party identification increases when politicians use emotional language (Osnabrügge et al. 2021, 887), a factor that is linked to a growing body of literature on affective polarisation. This development of growing affective partisanship, makes compromise and thus policy compromise less likely. We can therefore note multiple contextual factors that contribute to a political actor’s likeliness of using emotive rhetoric in front of different audiences.

In light of the recent crises and ongoing war and conflict, political crisis communication, as a qualitatively distinct form of communication, has enjoyed increasing scholarly interest. In terms of style, political leaders use more simple and less complex language during crisis (Eisele et al. 2022, 966f.). While presenting scientific evidence remained a powerful strategy to gain authority and trust in times of COVID-19, leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel also opted for more emotionally driven frames which predominantly appealed to empathy and solidarity (Kneuer and Wallaschek 2023). In a cross-country comparison, studies however show that there is considerable variation in how political actors make use of emotions as well as in their overall rhetorical style (Boussaguet et al. 2021; Wodak 2021). Political executives do not always attempt to allay fears in threatening times (Eisele et al. 2022, 965). Instead, using anxious rhetoric, they might aid maintaining a momentum of crisis, perhaps due to the uncertainty of the overall situation or possible strategic benefits. Fear appeals in fact represent a double-edged sword that can either let policymakers to be conceived as overwhelmed with crisis management or exactly the opposite, as leaders who are competent to address a given threat (Dingler et al. 2024, 1). In regard to political communication on the issue of terrorism, emotional content including fear, anger, hate, pride and patriotism frequently appeared in political speeches in the US context of post 9/11 (Loseke 2009; De Castella and McGarty 2011). They were rarely contested and, when used in combination with respective symbols, proved to be powerful tools to convey the speaker’s message (Loseke 2009, 517). While political leaders might resort more extensively to emotive rhetoric during crisis, they do not do so at the expense of evidence-based framings or by exclusively appealing to negative emotions. Emotional appeals are thereby considered a strategic tool to be utilised with caution.

Related to this, emotional narratives are also part of communication surrounding conflicts. Terrorist attacks stimulate political speeches containing a multitude of references to fear and anger (Loseke 2009; De Castella and McGarty 2011). Verhoeven and Metze (2022) identify a general pattern according to which discourses around conflict temporally develop from eliciting anxiety to more concrete fear to anger and finally to contempt connected with growing political distrust (p. 233). Given the heightened potential of rising distrust in times of crisis, political figures must be very careful in their choice of alarming as opposed to appeasing rhetoric. Deliberately evoking threat through public communication can indeed successfully mobilize individuals to compliance as well as foster social cohesion (Dingler et al. 2024, 1). Besides a perhaps natural emphasis on negative emotions during times of conflict and insecurity, appeals to positive emotions, such as pride, hope or empathy, are also part and parcel of political leaders’ rhetorical repertoire (Gross 2008). These can promote patriotism and resilience and hence be conducive for political goals. Especially in situations of conflict, politicians therefore strategically communicate emotions though language in a way that makes them appear as most competent to take the needed actions to address a perceived threat.

A heightened use of emotional language cannot however be exclusively observed in the rhetoric of policymakers. Instead, issues of societal relevance are communicated emotionally by a variety of different actors. With regards to debates on late-term abortion, Andsager (2000) demonstrates how a deliberate emotional messaging by activists can set the tone in media discussions. Particularly pro-life activists’ framing of the issue dominated the narratives adopted by journalists, thus determining the terminologies constitutive to the overall debate. When specific negative emotions get associated with the target group of a policy this can indeed complicate policy adoption (cf. Maor 2016, 197). According to another study, climate activists are found to use hope to send a positive message and attract attention and support for their cause (Kleres and Wettergren 2017). Anger, on the other hand, was not universally appealed to but rather dependent on the region, in this case, being used by activists from the Global South (ibid.). In addition to activists lobbying for a specific cause, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates that emotional language is part of the repertoire of politicians and scientists alike (Dingler et al. 2024, 15). This is particularly interesting in challenging the assumption that emotions are only appealed to in order to manipulate the audience. Rather, it appears inherent to all kinds of human interaction, especially those with the purpose of convincing others of a certain goal. Although persuasion and manipulation might be considered quite close in meaning, there is a clear difference in power when it comes to the various actors that strategically attempt to elicit emotions.

In regard to emotion and framing, studies generally investigate which emotions are elicited by which frames.^[17] This strand of research concludes that the way in which a political topic is framed impacts which emotions are triggered among its recipients (Gross 2008). However, emotions evoked by certain frames need to ideally be congruent with the receiver’s prior beliefs and attitudes on the respective topic in order to lead to a change in (policy) opinion (Brewer 2001, 60; Gross 2008, 181). Drawing conclusions regarding disruptions in politically relevant behaviour can thus not exclusively be inferred from eliciting emotion. Other studies (Aarøe 2011; Brewer 2001; Clifford 2018; Druckman and McDermott 2008) investigate the effect of certain emotions on the strength, that is the persuasiveness, of different frames. These findings however remain highly context-bound depending on the topic, the distinction between different frame types and between emotions. The selected parameters thereby impact the study which can thus generate inconsistent results about the same emotion.^[18] The increase of polarisation has also been positively linked to emotional responses to frames. Clifford (2018) claims that persuasive frames cannot only elicit emotions among its recipients, most importantly anger and disgust, but these can in fact lead to moralization of the recipients’ political attitudes which makes fruitful grounds for polarisation. The strand of literature that deals with emotions in framing bears insightful implications for the process of public policymaking, yet, there is a lack of studies that explicitly study emotional frames, for example, in the communication aimed at defining a problem or setting the agenda for a specific policy solution.

In the context of electoral campaigning, much research has been conducted to examine emotive rhetoric in public communication by electoral candidates. Scholars have identified temporal patterns in the way in which different candidates use emotional rhetoric that appeals to anger, fear, pride and enthusiasm during distinct times of a campaign (Ridou and Searls 2011). While positive emotions, predominantly hope, have a reinforcing effect of support for a person’s preferred candidate, negative sentiment in campaign rhetoric at the same time increases a negative appraisal of the opponent (Just et al. in Marcus, 2007, 252). Eliciting differently valanced emotions can therefore have a double benefit for an electoral candidate of promoting oneself while degrading the opposite candidate. Emotions analysed in campaign rhetoric are often conceptualised and measured in connection to other concepts. While emotional appeals are found to work through candidates’ heightened and strategic usage of moral language (Lipsitz 2018), they also play part in the phenomenon of campaign negativity (Maier and Nai 2020). Maier and Nai (2020), for example, find that campaign rhetoric is most successful, measured in terms of media coverage and reception, when it is “tonally consistent”, that is combining positive messages with enthusiasm and negativity with fear (p. 600). Interestingly, they also show that, by itself, emotional content has a strikingly more pronounced positive effect on media coverage than campaign negativity (ibid.). Even though increased media coverage is not congruent with electoral success, these findings at any rate sit well with the fact that emotions are potent drivers of human action.

Emotional content in political communication has unarguably been studied most extensively, concentrating on populist rhetoric and electoral campaigns, and to a lesser extent, particularities of crisis communication and specific debates. A diverse set of emotions is thereby detected in different forms of language and by different politically relevant actors. Notwithstanding such variety, fear and anger dominate the reviewed literature which naturally leads to identifying a higher salience of these emotions. This, in turn, runs risk of painting a biased picture of reality and perpetuates the overrepresentation of studies on negative affect and emotions (for exception: van Zomeren 2021). A connection to policy studies can here be drawn especially with regards to the strategic use of emotive rhetoric by political actors, the influence of populism on political and policy debate as well as the role of activists in associating specific emotions to certain societal groups.

4.2.2.1 Emotions in Policy Theories

Public policy theories have indeed a lot to say about rationality in policymaking as well as its limitations. While the approach to decision-making in policy analysis is largely knowledge-centric (Knaggård et al. 2019; Paul and Haddad, 2019, 310), and emotion continues to be an understudied concept, this has been subject of notable criticism from within the discipline. Addressing the limitation of human attention, Baumgartner and Jones (2005, 45ff.) argue that policy change can be hampered by the emotional attachment of a person to existing policy solutions, even though they do not benefit them and policy change would actually improve their situation. Looking at human behaviour driven by emotion thus bears considerable analytical power for policy failure that cannot be explained by models based on rationality. As a response to such critique, emotions have begun to be conceptualized in certain policy frameworks, mainly in the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF). Public policy scholars have most extensively attended to the integration of emotion into the MSF. According to Zahariadis (2015), the MSF is in fact the only framework “that pays explicit attention to emotion via the concept of national mood” (p. 467). Introduced by John Kingdon, this framework finds at its foundational level two notions that pave the conceptual way for the integration of emotion, hence making the MSF so popular in this regard. First, as argued by several scholars (Knaggård et al. 2019; Kuhlmann in Zohlnhöfer and Rüb, 2016; Zahariadis 2015), the notion of ambiguity does not only allow for something beyond certainty but already considers the aspect of affect. Secondly, the concept of bounded rationality, which is also present in many decision-making models, describes a characteristic of actors involved in the policy process referring to their imperfect cognition of decision-making as well as imperfect understanding of context and time constraints (Cairney and Weible 2017, 620; Cairney and Jones 2016, 42). This means that policymakers may have a goal in mind without exactly knowing how to achieve it. Even more so, from the very beginning of policy research, comprehensive rationality was rejected as practically impossible which underscores the necessity to better understand emotional reactions to information in general, and policies in particular, and to develop more viable strategies that cast aside “the myth of comprehensively rational action” (Cairney and Weible 2017, 625). Both underlying concepts of ambiguity and bounded rationality render possible a profound integration of emotion into the MSF.

In the context of the MSF, Maor and Gross (2015) have concentrated on conceptualising the “emotional entrepreneur” as a central actor involved in emotion regulation, in determining the dominant feelings of a culture or nation at a specific time (p. 3). The core argument is that policymakers who are aware and willing to strategically use emotion regulation are more successful in their impact on the policy process than those reluctant to do so. Zahariadis (2015) presents empirical support for his argument that, under certain circumstances, fear strongly and consistently impacts the phase of the policymaking process in which, according to the MSF, specific problems are coupled with respective policy solutions (p. 466, 477). Knaggård (2015), on the other hand, concentrates on the stage in which a problem is framed as such. According to her, specific actors may prioritise the emotional aspect of a problem frame whenever knowledge is limited (p. 457). Similar to the framing of a certain problem, Cox and Béland (2018) have focussed on the emotional quality, what they term valence, of a specific policy idea. They argue that policy change is more likely when there is congruence between the valence of a policy idea and the public mood, which can both be manipulated by policymakers. Methodologically, the authors underline the benefit of borrowing from other disciplines, such as social psychology, in enriching the research designs in policy analysis (p. 324).

Another policy framework which has been used to study the role of emotion in policymaking is the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The concept of the devil shift and its antonym angel shift refer to the distorted, affective perception of political opponents as well as coalition members during the process of policymaking (Vogeler and Bandelow, 2018, 718). Albeit not being explicitly about emotions, they are indeed at the conceptual basis of these ideas (cf. Fullerton and Weible 2024, 372). Based on the ACF, Fullerton and Weible (2024), for example, examine the communication by activities during legislative hearings about a specific bill. They find that activists are more successful in convincing policymakers when using negative emotional appeals contrary to positive ones and as long as they were congruent with core beliefs. Another study (Gabehart et al. 2023), also looking at US state-level legislative hearings, finds both anti and pro advocacy groups to successfully tap into emotions, with negative emotional appeals being more potent in persuasion.

There is furthermore literature using the Narrative Policy Framework in their analysis of the role of emotions in policy change. Some however treat emotions in the analysed communication rather superficially (McBeth and Lybecker 2018) or investigate policy cases like agri-food legislation which is characterised by less emotional rhetoric (Vogeler et al., 2021). Whilst the latter constitutes an interesting finding in itself, showing that certain topics appear to stir less affective reactions than others, these studies tend to focus on other aspects of the selected frameworks, in this case elements of policy narratives, at the cost of researching emotions. Addressing this shortcoming, certain scholars advocate for a more thorough integration of affect into policy models like the NPF (Pierce et al. 2024). What can be derived from these contributions is that emotions are no longer seen as alien to the process of public policymaking. While the MSF enjoys particular focus by policy scholars and has been more thoroughly refined at the conceptual level, the ACF and the NPF more often form the theoretical basis in empirical studies. We thus have a flexible framework open for conceptual adjustments on the one hand and two frameworks with specific elements that are particularly helpful in empirical appliance on the other.

4.2.2.2 Emotions in the Process of Public Policymaking

As demonstrated in the previous section, the process of adopting a policy bears multiple opportunities to study emotions. Especially in light of the various steps that include deliberation and communication of problems and possible solutions, policymakers and other actors have a chance to push for their policy idea by, amongst other strategies, using and appealing to emotions (Maor 2024, 930f.; see also Emotional Policy Discourse, Paterson 2019). With regards to policy conflict, Verhoeven and Metze (2022) have analysed emotional storylines in Dutch newspapers to demonstrate how discrete emotions are elicited at different times during the policy process, which can potentially lead to an escalation when nurturing especially anger storylines. Besides literature on how emotions affect human behaviour, earlier literature related to policy conflicts presents similar findings (Verhoeven and Duyvendak 2016). In the broader context of climate change and energy policies, Widmann (2024) shows that different policymakers appeal to discrete moral emotions depending on whether they oppose or support the local construction of wind turbines.

Besides political actors, communication by citizen initiatives and other interest groups has certainly been researched and shown to make use of emotions in public policy consultations aimed at convincing policymakers of their stance on a certain issue (Fink et al. 2023; Fullerton and Weible 2024; Gabehart et al. 2023; Pierce et al. 2024). A comparative analysis of different policy areas indicates that the choice of emotions in interest groups’ communication during legislative hearings is dependent on various factors (Gabehart et al. 2023). For example, advocacy groups seeking policy change rather than continuation use a wider range of different emotions regardless of their stance and the policy area (p. 16). Comparing public consultations to a policy proposal for a power line construction, Fink et al. (2023) find that the communication included more emotive appeals when referring to concrete power lines, with a dominance of negative emotions. Looking more closely at the different speakers involved, citizens’ consultations comprised higher levels of affective language than those of organisations, which could also be seen in the greater variety of emotions to which citizens appealed (p. 489). Yet, in both types of public consultations, emotive rhetoric was present. In the special case of Swiss public policymaking, Kühne and colleagues (2011) find that political communication prior to a popular vote on a supposedly dry and complex topic, such as corporate taxation, successfully incorporated emotionally appealing language. In contrast, Vogeler and colleagues (2021) found that emotive rhetoric was less popular among members of the EU-parliament in debates on agri-food policies. A comparison between these two studies is however complicated given the lack of empirical findings showing causality as well as evident differences in policymaking level.

Moving away from policy communication to policy reactions, Maor (2016) introduces the concept of emotion-driven negative policy bubbles to underline the role that emotions play in the systematic underinvestment in a policy instrument. When negative emotions get attached to a policy’s target group, this can lead to policymakers insufficiently investing in policy solution to address an important societal risk, as visible in the AIDS legislation during the 1980s in the US (p. 194). Regarding policy design, Durnová and Hejzlarová (2018) make another interesting contribution to emotions and target groups. Using an interpretivist survey, they work out specific emotional tensions of Czech single mothers that result from public policies affecting them. The authors therefore argue that emotions of target groups need to be recognised in the policy design in order to avoid poor policy outcomes.

The key point made in this subsection is that research with an explicit focus on the policymaking process is highly limited and by and large analyses institutionalised deliberative procedures in which problems and respective policy solutions are debated. Scholars thereby concentrate more on interest groups’ contribution than policymakers’ rhetoric or media communication.^[19]

4.2.2.3 Emotions and Policy Preferences

As also illustrated in the systematic review (see 4.1), studying the relationship between emotions and policy preferences can be identified as the most prominent object of research in regard to public policy. Assessing a central argument of Affective Intelligence Theory, a few studies focus on a topic indirectly related to policy preferences. The idea of ‘policy learning’, which describes an individual’s motivation and action to acquire new information about an issue, is understood to be promoted by anxiety given that this emotion is triggered by the surveillance system (cf. Marcus in Sears et al., 2003, 203). Policy learning allows for conclusions about which topics appear salient and significant for a person as one can argue that the more important an issue is, the more likely is the formation of an attitude about it. In literature on policy learning, anxiety is indeed found to be a driver of policy learning (Lablih et al. 2024), whereas disgust has the opposite effect (Clifford and Jerit 2018). In addition to analyses on these indirect linkages, there is a considerable number of studies published on the relationship between experiencing certain emotions and having certain policy preferences. Already touched upon in the previous section on political communication, an emotional framing of a problem has the potential to lead to policy change. Investigating discrete emotions, anger is frequently found to be associated with a preference for stricter, more punitive policies (Pierce et al. 2024; Renström and Bäck 2021). With regards to foreign policy, Gadarian (2010) shows how emotionally charged messages prime individuals to be more supportive of hawkish foreign policies. This is corroborated by research on increased anger which is positively linked to a hardline foreign policy attitude (Kupatadze and Zeitzoff 2019). Both studies also see emotions working through and mediating the threat perception of individuals, which is a very important predictor for attitudes on protective policies. This mediating role of emotion does however tend to complicate singling out the effect of, for example, anger. Certain studies therefore specify that emotions only indirectly impact distinct policy opinions and behaviour by mediating the effect of other factors (Brader et al. 2008; cf. Jacobs et al. 2024, 22f. on voting). Other research stresses that findings are conditional on belief congruence (cf. Brewer 2001, 60; Gross 2008, 181). Similar to voting for candidates perceived as protectors, anxiety makes people more supportive of policies that they deem protects them from imminent threat (Albertson and Gadarian 2015, 101; cf. Wagner and Morisi 2019). When it comes to inter-group threat, often framed or perceived regarding migrant groups, anger can as well predict stronger support for policies limiting immigration (Cottrel et al. 2010). Comparing anger and sadness, Small and Lerner (2008) find that incidental emotions, the personal experience of feeling something at the time of opinion formation, indeed spill over to one’s policy preference, in this case social welfare preference. While anger decreases favouring such policy measures, sadness makes people more supportive of it.

Small and Lerner’s article (2008) in fact shares a methodological measurement with the majority of studies in the sense that emotions are examined by priming these through images or short bodies of text that stimulate participants’ imagination. There are some exceptions in the reviewed literature in which not incidental emotions are studied but emotional disposition, in other words, a person’s general sensitivity towards feeling specific emotions. For example, Aarøe and colleagues (2017) find that people with dispositional disgust more often oppose immigration, hence favour stricter migration policies. In fact, disgust is found to be linked to a variety of different policy attitudes ranging from health issues (Clifford and Jerit 2018; Georgarakis 2023) and various other issues of state protection (Kam and Estes 2016) to issues of morality, i.e. gay marriage or abortion (Cottrel et al. 2010; Inbar et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2011). These analyses highlight that dispositional as well as incidental emotions unrelated to a specific political topic might nonetheless impact the opinion an individual forms about said topic. In addition to this, Jefferson (2023) investigates the effect of shame, an emotion rarely studied, on social policies. He shows that black US citizens, who are generally more ashamed of their race, are more supportive of punitive policies targeting their own racial group. Shame and other emotions that are deemed more complex have a huge unused potential in generating novel knowledge in the multifaceted dimension of affect in public policymaking. Such emergent studies mark an interesting avenue for further investigation into this direction.