Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility
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Alix Cohen
Abstract
This paper shows that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. Whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility. It is because we have direct control over our capacity to judge as well as the epistemic principles that govern belief-acquisition that we have indirect control over the beliefs we thereby acquire.
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Contents
- Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements
- Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility
- Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma
- Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
- Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency
- Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today
- List of Contributors
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2014, 2015 and 2016
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Contents
- Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements
- Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility
- Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma
- Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
- Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency
- Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today
- List of Contributors
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2014, 2015 and 2016