Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
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Ansgar Seide
Abstract
In their interpretations of the two introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Juliet Floyd and Henry Allison argue that Kant’s account of the reflecting power of judgment can be read as his vindication of inductive inference and as an answer to Hume’s worries concerning induction. Paul Guyer, on the other hand, argues that Kant’s account in these passages falls short of providing an adequate answer to Hume’s arguments. In this paper, I want to show that the strongest account of Kant’s vindication of inductive inference appears when we combine a reading of Kant’s account of the reflecting power of judgment in the first introduction along the lines suggested by Floyd and Allison with Guyer’s interpretation of Kant’s account in the second introduction. As we will see, Kant’s vindication of inductive inference is stronger than Guyer suspects, although it does not amount to a straightforward refutation of Hume’s worries concerning the uniformity of nature.
© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Contents
- Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements
- Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility
- Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma
- Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
- Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency
- Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today
- List of Contributors
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2014, 2015 and 2016
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Contents
- Is Kant (W)right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements
- Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility
- Kant versus the Asymmetry Dogma
- Kant on Empirical Knowledge and Induction in the Two Introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment
- Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency
- Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today
- List of Contributors
- Topics of the Kant Yearbook 2014, 2015 and 2016
