Band 16, Heft 1 - Financial Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance

This Article discusses why a “corporate governance movement” that commenced in the United States in the 1970s became an entrenched feature of American capitalism and describes how the chronology differed in a potentially crucial way for banks. The Article explains corporate governance’s emergence and staying power by reference to changing market conditions and a deregulation trend that provided executives with unprecedented managerial discretion as the twentieth century drew to a close. With banking the historical pattern paralleled general trends in large measure. Still, while the “imperial” CEO who achieved prominence in the 1980s became outmoded for the most part after corporate scandals at the start of the 2000s, this was not the case with large financial companies. The continued boldness of “star” CEOs in the financial services industry plausibly contributed to the market turmoil of 2008, but the financial crisis emphatically ended the corporate governance “free pass” banks had enjoyed.

This Article explores several meanings of a regulatory preference for government inaction. It explains the rise to dominance of this inaction preference in the United States and its distorting influence on the perception and understanding of regulation. Specifically, the Article demonstrates how basic terms in regulation, such as “government failure,” “regulatory capture,” and “deregulation,” acquired misleading connotations suggesting that government inaction is always superior to government action. The Article further explains how, through government inaction, the U.S. legal system accommodates rent extraction - the profitable exploitation of market imperfections and favorable laws. Several developments in recent decades have considerably improved the capacity of very small groups in society to collect rents, namely, use talent and positional advantages to gain increasing levels of earnings. The Article argues that the parallel rise of the inaction preference has contributed to this trend, primarily because the availability of rent extraction opportunities draws talent that utilizes them with growing effectiveness. The purpose of the Article is to clarify several aspects of the relationships between regulation and rent extraction or, more precisely, to emphasize that government inaction may entail undesirable income effects.

The liability regime for officers and directors of German companies combines strict and lenient elements. Officers and directors are liable for simple negligence, they bear the burden of proof for establishing diligent conduct, and they are liable for unlimited damages. These elements are worrisome for the reason that managers are confronted with the full downside risk of the enterprise even though they do not internalize the benefits of the corporate venture. This overly strict regime is balanced by other features of the regime, namely comprehensive insurance and systematic under-enforcement. Even though the authority to enforce claims against the management is divided between three different actors - the supervisory board, the shareholders assembly, and individual shareholders - enforcement has remained the exception. Furthermore, under the current system of Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, board members do not feel the bite of liability as they are protected by an insurance cover that is contracted and paid for by the corporation. Thus, the current German system may combine the worst of two worlds, i.e., the threat of personal liability for excessively high amounts of damages in exceptional cases, and the practical irrelevance of the liability regime in run-of-the-mill cases. The present Article analyzes the shortcomings of the present regime and submits proposals for reform.

This Article investigates the determinants of dividend policy in firms with concentrated ownership structures. A review of the empirical literature shows that dividend payout ratios are lower in firms with controlling shareholders. We explain this finding as a consequence of the legal rules governing cash distributions, which leave the dividend decision in the hands of the firm insiders, and the lack of monitoring mechanisms for checking the power of controlling shareholders. The analysis of the empirical evidence on dividend policy points to the existence of an unresolved agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors. We conclude that controlling shareholders are currently using the dividend policy to expropriate minority shareholders.

This Article discusses the impact of the international financial crisis on Brazilian capital markets. While the banking industry was not severely affected, leading nonfinancial corporations experienced severe financial turmoil. Two Brazilian corporations cross-listed in the United States - Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose S.A. - suffered billion-dollar losses when the Brazilian real unexpectedly plummeted in relation to the dollar. Despite earlier disclosure that these companies had engaged only in pure hedging activity, these great losses were found to be the result of their highly speculative trading in currencyderivatives. Consequently, several private lawsuits were filed both in the United States and in Brazil. This Article takes a novel approach to the transnational securities litigation debate by examining the particular consequences of private litigation in a developed and in an emerging country. It compares the types of lawsuits filed and their final outcomes. Despite substantially similar alleged wrongdoing, the outcomes for securities holders in each jurisdiction contrast strikingly. Only U.S. investors of both companies were able to obtain substantial financial recoveries; Brazilian investors obtained none. This Article examines the reasons behind these discrepant results and the consequent economic distributional effects on global securities markets after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Morrison. The Article argues that Morrison aggravates such (i) shareholder cross-border non pro rata compensation and (ii) transfers of company value from foreign to U.S. investors. It identifies a set of costs borne by foreign investors, and so far neglected by scholars, as a consequence of the current status of U.S. and international securities law regimes. These costs are the result not only of the typical “circularity problem” in securities litigation, but also of a “double circularity problem” as they fall on foreign shareholders who also suffered equivalent damages to those experienced by the U.S. class being compensated. The Article then discusses potential policy reforms for fixing transnational securities litigation.

While corporate fiduciary duties in many jurisdictions are generally understood to be owed to shareholders, recent Canadian Supreme Court cases have held that directors owe their duties to the corporation, period, not to shareholders or any other stakeholders. This development has introduced significant indeterminacy to the law since it is not clear what such a conception of the duty requires. The Supreme Court did, however, make one clear statement: it held that directors owe a fiduciary duty to ensure that their corporations obey statutory law. Such a duty encourages compliance with law, but may over-encourage compliance: individual directors do not necessarily gain personally from legal breaches, but may lose personally from them because of fiduciary liability, so they will have excessively strong incentives to avoid such breaches. The Article connects the fiduciary duty to obey law with recent developments in financial regulation that have increased the obligations on directors of financial institutions to oversee risk. By requiring directors to be engaged with risk at a governance level, regulators have enhanced the probability that directors will face liability under their fiduciary duties if their institutions do not comply with financial regulations. As the Article explains, the policy tradeoff between enhanced compliance benefits and over-compliance costs of fiduciary liability is different in the context of financial regulation from that in other settings. For example, significant corporate penalties, as opposed to penalties borne by individual directors, may be inconsistent with the prudential goals of regulation, perhaps because of toobig- to-fail concerns. The fiduciary duty to cause the corporation to obey financial regulation, and a stricter application of this duty than the highly deferential standard that exists in Delaware law, has advantages that do not exist in other legal and regulatory contexts.

After a crisis, broad and sweeping reforms are enacted to restore trust. Following the 2007-2008 Great Financial Crisis, the European Union has engaged in an ambitious overhaul of banking regulation. One of its centerpieces, the 2013 Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), tackles, amongst other things, the perceived pre-crisis failings in the governance of banks. We focus on the provisions that are aimed at reshaping bank boards’ composition, functioning, and their members’ liabilities, and argue that they are unlikely to improve bank boards’ effectiveness or prevent excessive risk-taking. We criticize some of them for mandating solutions, like board diversity and the separation of chairman and CEO, that may be good for some banks but are bad for others, in the absence of any convincing argument that their overall effect is positive. We also criticize enhanced board liability by showing that it may increase the risk of herd behavior and lead to more serious harm in the event of managerial mistakes. We also highlight that the push towards unfriendly boards will negatively affect board dynamics and make boards as dysfunctional as when the CEO dominates them. We further argue that limits on directorships and diversity requirements will worsen the shortage of bank directors, while requirements for induction and training and board evaluation exercises will more likely lead to tick-the-box exercises than under the current situation in which they are just best practices. We conclude that European policymakers and supervisors should avoid using a heavy hand, respectively, when issuing rules implementing CRD IV provisions with regard to bank boards and when enforcing them.

The purpose of this Article is to consider a novel framework for institutional shareholders’ activism in the United States. This new activism framework would be aimed at improving, at minimal costs, the performance of the portfolio companies in which institutional shareholders invest. The Article begins by laying out this new activism framework and then compares the proposed framework with the prevalent mode of activism through hedge funds. The Article concludes with a discussion of certain implementation challenges, and calls for future research into the proposed activism framework.

Organizations with multiple stakeholders typically make decisions by following the will of the majority of some subset of stakeholders that are entitled to vote. This Article examines an alternative decisionmaking mechanism - the “pivotal” mechanism developed by Vickrey, Groves and Clarke. Unlike voting, the pivotal mechanism produces efficient outcomes in the presence of heterogeneous voter preferences. Moreover, the mechanism allows control rights to be allocated more widely, reducing the costs of opportunism when a controlling class of stakeholders has interests adverse to another class. These benefits come with costs. The pivotal mechanism’s efficiency diminishes in the presence of collusion between voters and requires the creation of “pools” that disperse revenues created by the mechanism. The mechanism is therefore most attractive when the costs of heterogeneity are large and the risks of collusion are small. As a result, I propose the development of a legal basis for the pivotal mechanism as a menu option for organizational decision-making.

Firms’ choice of legal regime is not uniform. Despite Delaware’s significant advantages and success in attracting corporations, many firms still choose to incorporate in their home state, and some firms incorporate in a third state, most notably Nevada. Several factors - lawyers’ advice, political influence in the home state, and relative costs of out of state incorporation - were identified as contributing to these patterns. Yet none of these factors neither their combination, fully account for firms’ choices. This Article suggests that unidentified heterogeneity, potentially in managers’ preferences for legal protection, might have contributed to, and could help in explaining, these patterns. Among other factors, this heterogeneity could result, for example, from variations in market forces and, in turn, private benefits that managers extract. Introducing heterogeneity in managers’ preferences, this Article suggests that managers that share a relatively strong preference for insider protection should be less inclined to incorporate in Delaware, and more inclined to incorporate in their home state where they have political clout, or in Nevada if their strong preference for protection is not satisfied in their home state. The analysis is too preliminary for normative implications to be derived, rather the Article suggests that more research into firms’ heterogeneity and their choice of law could prove valuable.