The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the “Double Circularity” Problem in Transnational Securities Litigation
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Érica Gorga
Abstract
This Article discusses the impact of the international financial crisis on Brazilian capital markets. While the banking industry was not severely affected, leading nonfinancial corporations experienced severe financial turmoil. Two Brazilian corporations cross-listed in the United States - Sadia S.A. and Aracruz Celulose S.A. - suffered billion-dollar losses when the Brazilian real unexpectedly plummeted in relation to the dollar. Despite earlier disclosure that these companies had engaged only in pure hedging activity, these great losses were found to be the result of their highly speculative trading in currencyderivatives. Consequently, several private lawsuits were filed both in the United States and in Brazil.
This Article takes a novel approach to the transnational securities litigation debate by examining the particular consequences of private litigation in a developed and in an emerging country. It compares the types of lawsuits filed and their final outcomes. Despite substantially similar alleged wrongdoing, the outcomes for securities holders in each jurisdiction contrast strikingly. Only U.S. investors of both companies were able to obtain substantial financial recoveries; Brazilian investors obtained none. This Article examines the reasons behind these discrepant results and the consequent economic distributional effects on global securities markets after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Morrison.
The Article argues that Morrison aggravates such (i) shareholder cross-border non pro rata compensation and (ii) transfers of company value from foreign to U.S. investors. It identifies a set of costs borne by foreign investors, and so far neglected by scholars, as a consequence of the current status of U.S. and international securities law regimes. These costs are the result not only of the typical “circularity problem” in securities litigation, but also of a “double circularity problem” as they fall on foreign shareholders who also suffered equivalent damages to those experienced by the U.S. class being compensated. The Article then discusses potential policy reforms for fixing transnational securities litigation.
© 2015 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis
- A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality
- Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German Law — A Potemkin Village
- Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders
- The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the “Double Circularity” Problem in Transnational Securities Litigation
- Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions
- Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive
- Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control
- Self-Selection and Heterogeneity in Firms’ Choice of Corporate Law
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis
- A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality
- Officers’ and Directors’ Liability Under German Law — A Potemkin Village
- Dividend Policy with Controlling Shareholders
- The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nonfinancial Firms: The Case of Brazilian Corporations and the “Double Circularity” Problem in Transnational Securities Litigation
- Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions
- Quack Corporate Governance, Round III? Bank Board Regulation Under the New European Capital Requirement Directive
- Brave New World: A Proposal for Institutional Investors
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control
- Self-Selection and Heterogeneity in Firms’ Choice of Corporate Law