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We present a political sociological analysis of the social bases of support for Donald Trump during the critical phase of his victory in the Republican nominating contest. In particular, we test the widely voiced hypothesis that a critical source of Trump’s support in the GOP primaries came from his appeal to working class and/or downwardly mobile and insecure middle class voters responding to a “populist” message. Drawing on both the ANES January 2016 pilot survey and exit poll data, we argue that Trump’s rise to the GOP nomination was facilitated by a broad-based appeal that centered on voters who have levels of education and income that are well above national and primary state averages.

The conventional wisdom is that class divisions once prevailed but in recent decades have gradually declined. Indeed, many now suggest that the working class has been voting Republican since the 1980s. The historical evidence on voting in presidential elections does not indicate that there was a decline since the 1950s. If anything, the well-off and more educated have moved somewhat more Democratic, lessening class divisions. There has, however, been a change since the 2008 election, with the working class – whether only whites or all – moving away from the Democrats. This may not mean a decline of the working class voting their interests. It may be that the economic recovery of recent years has done little to help the working class and they have taken a gamble that a businessman will help their job prospects more.

This paper uses original survey data to explore the landscape of support for a number of aspects of what might be called “the American Dream:” the notion that hard work is rewarded, and individuals succeed and fail due primarily to their own efforts. In general, I find that Americans generally endorse the idea that hard work leads to success and that economic mobility is possible for those willing to put in the effort, but that there is significant individual and contextual variation in support for those beliefs. I find that most variation in support for meritocratic belief is a function of simple partisan politics: differences between liberals and conservatives, and between Democrats and Republicans, are far more important to explaining meritocratic belief than any other sociodemographic factor. But attributes of the context in which one lives matter as well. Among other things, this paper highlights the importance of local economic decline as an important topic for future research: those who live in communities that have seen their relative economic fortunes drop over the past decade are less likely to believe in meritocracy than those who have seen their communities thrive.

Scholars have long been interested in examining how race and class each shape citizens’ political attitudes. To date, however, there have been few efforts to untangle how race and class intersect to shape Americans’ political identities and attitudes about public policies. We argue that it is important to investigate attitudes inter-sectionally. Pooling the 2012 and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies to obtain large numbers of observations of non-whites and individuals with high incomes, we observe patterns of partisan identity, beliefs about racial prejudice, and attitudes about public policies. Our results suggest that race and class intersect in different ways for different groups in society. Increasing income erodes differences in attitudes between Latinos and whites, but has no effect on the large gap in attitudes between African Americans and whites.

Common markers of social class include income, wealth, education and family background. Though these capture staple pedestrian elements of class, they understate something substantial – social class is produced by political experiences. Building on this observation, I argue that social class is constructed and reinforced via political institutions that differentially affect the daily experiences and life trajectories of Americans. Viewing class through this lens (instead of more simply as a function of income or education) enables clarity on two critical features of the American political system: (1) its deeply racialized institutional practices (2) its dual inclusionary/exclusionary governance structures. Most broadly, this essay pushes us beyond a view of class as a set of variables that affect political outcomes and towards inquiry into the ways that political institutions produce class. Ultimately, such a conceptual pivot illuminates additional pathways for transforming economic and political relations in the United States.

The United States has a divided social welfare state split between public programs and tax subsidies for private benefits. Moreover, this separation is mapped onto divisions of political party and socioeconomic class. Democratic elites prefer creating and expanding public programs that assist the working poor and Republicans prefer using tax subsidies to help wealthier citizens pay for social services and benefits. Are these relationships among partisanship, socioeconomic class, and patterns in social spending reflected in public opinion? Do Democratic voters and the working poor favor public social programs over private? Are Republican voters more likely to support tax subsidies for private welfare over public spending? My analysis shows that while both public spending and tax breaks enjoy similar levels of support in the aggregate, there are partisan and class differences in support for direct social spending versus tax subsidies for social welfare.

Compared to other affluent democracies, class conflict has not been very intense nor as much of an organizing principle in American politics. However, as wages stagnate for the working class and economic inequality grows, class conflict is becoming increasingly salient. Yet, reviewing recent political science studies, I argue that rather than politics becoming a clearer class “war” between the upper and lower classes, the growing class bias in political mobilization and participation, and the resulting overrepresentation of upper class actors, has prevented a clear articulation of lower class interests or the development of broad policies that benefit virtually all Americans, leading to policies that increasingly benefit upper class individuals and organizations.

Politicians in the US tend to be vastly better off than the people they represent. But why, and does it matter? In the last decade, scholar of US politics have revived an old line of inquiry into the causes and consequences of government by the privileged, or what I call white-collar government. This article briefly reviews what scholars have learned, and what we still need to know. Most research to date has focused on the effects of government by the privileged; just as the shortage of female politicians seems to bias policy on gender issues, the shortage of politicians from lower-income and working-class backgrounds appears to tilt economic policy in favor of the more conservative positions typically favored by more affluent Americans. Why, then, do so few lower-income and working-class Americans go on to become politicians? On this point, scholars have more hunches than hard evidence.

In this essay, we contribute to the growing national discussion about the future of minimum wage policy and its implications for working class Americans. First, we discuss the politics of the minimum wage in the United States, with special attention to the sizable and rich variation across the fifty American states and the importance of federalism. Second, we examine competing theoretical arguments (and, when available, empirical evidence) about the advantages and the disadvantages of increasing the minimum wage, particularly as it pertains to workers’ well-being. Third, as a case study of the potential effects of raising the minimum wage, we present preliminary results from an original empirical analysis that assesses how state minimum wage increases impact the quality of life that working class citizens experience.