Volume 15, Issue 2

Political campaigns have long been financed by people with well above average incomes, but the balance has tilted dramatically since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC . A number of jurisdictions have been looking to rebalance the incentives through new (or updated) public financing programs. Much of the discussion about their potential effects, however, has been sweepingly generic. But we know that these programs do differ from each other and have good reason to expect that “success” or “failure” will depend both on their goals and the programs’ details. This article focuses on one type of program that has become a model in recent years. Until recently New York City was the only jurisdiction with a multiple matching system explicitly designed to increase the role of small donors.Previous studies noted apparent successes, but it has been difficult to feel comfortable with only one jurisdiction to test. After Los Angeles revised its system in 2013, serious comparisons became possible. This article finds that New York City’s campaign finance matching fund program increased the number, proportional role, and diversity of small donors in city council elections but that the Los Angeles program was substantially less effective. The findings were confirmed through a difference-in-differences procedure that tested each city council over time against state legislative districts representing the same geographical space. A series of explanations relating to the programs’ details were tested, leading us to conclude that the policy details were affecting the results. The results were also different in both cities for mayoral and city council candidates. This suggests alterations may be needed if one were to consider the model for offices with larger constituencies, such as Governor or the US Congress. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of major arguments for and against increasing small donor participation as a goal for public policy.

In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision on Citizens United v. FEC , fueled public outcry about the growth of the cost of the political campaign and the influx of outside money in the form of independent expenditures. President Barack Obama seemed to agree with this speculation calling independent expenditures, “dark money” that “pulls our politics into the gutter” [Obama, Barack. 2015. “The Citizens United Decision was Wrong.” (Press Release). Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/statement-president.]. Indeed, signs pointing to the increase in the cost of campaigns are correct, as 2014 saw the most expensive congressional elections in history. In this paper, we examine the effects of outside group spending on Senate races in 2010, 2012, and 2014. We find that outside group spending does play a significant, though small role in determining the vote share of a candidate. We also find that outside group spending in support of a candidate is generally more effective than outside group spending against a candidate, especially for the incumbent. Still, outside group expenditures pale in comparison to campaign expenditures for the challenger in terms of overall effect.

Outside groups now represent a major voice in US Senate campaigns, but it remains unclear to what degree outside groups are independent actors or are simply performing the same role once filled almost entirely by the parties. This article investigates whether independent groups distribute media expenditures in ways that mirror the objectives of parties, or if divergent interests cause independent groups to allocate these funds differently. Using a large original dataset of media spending in Senate campaigns from 2010 through 2014, this study specifies how a seat-maximizing strategy will go beyond simply directing money to the most competitive contests; that within similarly competitive races outside groups spend more on media when the candidates spend less. The observed pattern of outside group resource allocation reveals that outside group activity in the aggregate is consistent with the seat-maximizing strategy expected from parties, but one subgroup of outsiders, issue-based independent groups, are less sensitive to these considerations.

In recent years the politics of Kansas, with its strong historic ties to the Republican Party, have taken a hard right turn. This political environment mirrors many other states in which one political party effectively dominates the policymaking process. But while political dominance may aid incumbency it can also contribute to the kinds of political excess that tend to promote electoral backlashes. In this paper, we use a survey of likely Kansas voters during the 2014 midterm elections to examine opinions and voting preferences related to two state-wide races in which incumbent overreach played a prominent role. In particular, we examine the reelection campaigns of Governor Brownback, as his remarkably austere and highly unpopular budget left him ideologically out of step with most voters, and Senator Roberts, as his lack of residence in the state after years of serving in the Senate left him out of touch with a disgruntled electorate. Although both Republicans survived reelection, their actions ensured an unusually competitive midterm in an otherwise deep red state.

Conventional wisdom suggests that Donald Trump’s rhetoric – aggressive, insulting, often offensive – would be counterproductive to electoral success. We argue that Trump’s surprising victories in both the primary and general campaigns were partly due to the positive effects of his appeals grounded in the intersection of threat and absolutism. The content of Trump’s rhetoric focused on threats to personal safety (terrorism), personal status (economic decline), and group status (immigration). The style of Trump’s rhetoric was absolutist, emphasizing non-negotiable boundaries and moral outrage at their violation. Previous research has shown perceived threat to motivate political participation and absolutist rhetoric to bolster impressions of positive character traits. Trump employed these two rhetorical psychologies simultaneously, melding threat and absolutism into the absolutist threat as an effective rhetorical strategy. Analysis of Trump’s debate language and Twitter rhetoric, as well as original data from political elites at the Republican National Convention and ordinary voters at rallies in New Hampshire confirm the unconventional efficacy of Trump’s rhetorical approach.

Donald J. Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 presidential election cast a long shadow over the American welfare state. With continued Republican control of the House and Senate, Trump’s occupancy of the Oval Office removed a critical constraint on Republican efforts to dismantle key Democratic social policy achievements—both old and new. Despite the absence of these important institutional veto-points, the policies that were first identified and targeted by Republicans during the Trump era have proved to be more robust than many observers and policymakers initially believed. By applying the theoretical insights and methodological tools of American Political Development, this article explores how long-running policy processes have altered the political landscape in often underappreciated ways to narrow the prospects for large-scale policy reform. More specifically, this article examines the political dynamics of Medicare and the Affordable Care Act in the early days of the Trump administration. The pressures exerted on both programs by an unpredictable president and unified Republican control of Congress provides a unique opportunity to differentiate between and assess the prospects for policy sustainability and policy stability.

In his first months as president, Donald Trump has demonstrated an unprecedented aversion to expert-oriented decision making. This essay examines how Trump’s presidency exposes tensions in what Skowronek and Orren (2016) refer to as the “policy state”, especially within institutions that produce expert analyses of presidential action. While an absence of policy expertise has hampered Trump’s agenda, his administration has also taken steps to discredit unfavorable analyses, subvert rules requiring the use of objective analysis, and construct new institutions to promote ‘alternative facts’. By deepening public division and distrust, such activities may restructure the political environment in which the Trump presidency itself is judged.

In this essay, President Donald Trump’s policies are evaluated in terms of their impact on American federalism. Rather than producing an era of significant devolution, the paper argues that the Trump administration will primarily result in very typical policy changes to American federalism. In particular, the Trump administration will redirect state resources away from policy areas that undercut Trump’s political agenda while placing more support behind programs that advance the president’s agenda. The one significant change that the Trump administration could bring about is an even greater centralization of political power in the executive, perhaps to a degree that undermines the traditional checks and balances of American federalism.