Band 64, Heft 6

B-time, i. e. the temporal scale of the B-series of events, is one and the same for all times, while A-times (the temporal scales of A-series) are as many as there are moments of time. This means that A-theorists will have to consider one-dimensional time two-dimensionally: as changing within itself at every moment. The two-dimensional view is here put to service for a meta-compatibilist theory of freedom, a theory, that is, which reconciles freedom, determinism and their first order incompatibility at the second order. Kant’s position is interpreted as meta-compatibilist as well, but as having the drawback of separating time and freedom. In order to appreciate the connection of time and freedom, one has to acknowledge that in free acts the future is determined further according to plan, while at the same time the past is (with nomological necessity) co-determined further in countless unclear and inscrutable ways. A free act thus consumes its own range of freedom by positing retroactively the sufficient causal antecedents for its taking place: It was free before it occurred and is part of nature after.

The paper deals with the philosophical key concepts of Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), elaborating on the initial settings and further development of his philosophy till the middle of the 1930s. Based also on new biographical research, the analysis presents an innovative systematic approach to the influence of German neo-Kantian philosophers on his philosophical thinking, bearing in mind, particularly, the huge impact of German neo-Kantianism in Spain owing to cultural transfers effected by the famous cultural journal Revista de Occidente , which was edited by Ortega y Gasset between 1923 and 1936. As a central working hypothesis, the paper assumes that the development and distribution of Ortega y Gasset’s philosophical key concepts can be understood as a re-semanticised adoption in the light of a transformation process “From Kant to Aristotle”. The investigation uses a combined methodological approach of discourse analysis and cultural transfer studies.

The notion of ‘forgetting’ has assumed a new dimension in the digital age. Here I will examine a particular kind of forgetting as reflected in a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). What the ruling of the ECJ of May 13, 2014 (C-131/12) formulates and invokes as a “right to be forgotten” encompasses the right to co-determine whether certain personal data in the Web should immediately show up or not when a first name and surname is entered as part of a search. When a user has invoked the “right to be forgotten”, and it is determined that it applies, information is, however, not made irretrievable. It continues to remain possible to find this information in a roundabout way, i.e., by means of more precise search queries, although the information should not immediately become visible the moment a person’s full name is typed into a search engine. I will argue that this ruling can be seen as corroborating the fundamental rights of the individual. The idea of the “right to be forgotten” is to give a person a second chance in society. Not all forms of forgetting and remembering can be subsumed under this idea. As will be expounded, this court decision offers a useful normative fundament for the distinction between (1) legitimate attempts at reintegration, (2) legitimate attempts at rehabilitation and (3) unjustified recourse to a right to be forgotten.

Thanks to fortunate historical circumstances, Leibniz’s manuscripts have been preserved in exceptional completeness. With regard to the vast dimensions and the many fields of learning this legacy comprises, among them philosophy, mathematics, physics, politics, law, history, linguistics, technical engineering, and medicine, the complete edition of Leibniz’ “Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe” represents a unique editorial challenge. After a short historical overview on the older editions up to the early 20th century when the Leibniz Akademie-Ausgabe was initiated in 1901, a sketch is given of the “varia fortuna” of that edition and its thematic structuring in eight different series. A list of the online material, the various tools, and databases the edition offers to its readers is followed by a description of how to use the most characteristic feature of the edition, i. e. the particular form of variant apparatus, the so called “Stufenapparat”. Finally, some comparative advantages for the reader of the historical-critical Akademie-Ausgabe over the older editions are noted.

It’s only recently that an edition of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s work may be judged appropriate to his philosophical significance, which was emphasized by Fichte and Hegel but later misjudged. Apart from one volume of commentary, the complete edition of Jacobi’s writings has been compiled. Following a long break the complete edition of his correspondence is currently entering its final phase. Both editions will be accompanied by an online dictionary of Jacobi’s key concepts that also take into account his influence on the epoch of Classical German Philosophy.

In his paper, Bernard Bosanquet deals with ‘a problem or a paradox’ which he takes to be raised by Rousseau’s conception of the general will, but not properly solved by Rousseau: namely how a will can emerge that aims at the general interest, which nonetheless arises out of the will of individuals who are concerned with their own interests. Proceeding in what he thinks are psychological terms that give some reality to a broadly ‘organic’ picture of society, Bosanquet argues against an excessively individualistic view of the mind, arguing instead that ‘community of life and experience’ can provide a ‘common element’ in the ideas of individuals, out of which a general will can emerge. Bosanquet also explores the institutional and policy implications of his view – for example, that the general will should not be identified with a vote upon a single issue. In his introductory essay, Robert Stern places Bosanquet’s paper in context and sets out its main themes.

This article discusses the status of animal rights, and more particularly whether these rights may be defended from a natural rights perspective or from an ethical perspective. I argue that both options fail. The same analysis applies in the case of humanity. ‘Humanity’ does not bring with it the acknowledgement of such rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably characteristic of humanity, namely, reason. Reason is decisive, though, in another respect, namely, the fact that reasonable beings can claim and lay down rights. It does not follow from this that animals should have no rights, since human beings may be motivated to constitute such rights, thus providing the most solid basis for them.