On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
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Pierre-Henri Morand
In common value models, it is possible that the full information efficiency and the incentive constraint require the quantity of full and asymmetric information to move in opposite directions with the type. This conflict is called non-responsiveness. Most of those models share the features that when there is conflict, the optimal contract is pooling otherwise it is separating. In this note, we will show that, in fact, the robustness of the links between the conflict and separating contracts is not a general consequence of the common value models: it depends crucially on the assumption made in all those models that the principal's marginal benefit from trade with full information is not distorted by the presence of informational rents.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Topics Article
- Non-robustness of some economic models
- Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
- On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
- Contributions Article
- Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy
- A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game
- Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis
- Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
- Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
- Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders
- Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation
- Advances Article
- The Generalized Linear Production Model: Solvability, Nonsubstitution and Productivity Measurement
- Contagion and State Dependent Mutations
- Rationalization and Incomplete Information
- Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
- Market Research and Market Design
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Topics Article
- Non-robustness of some economic models
- Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
- On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
- Contributions Article
- Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy
- A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game
- Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis
- Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
- Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
- Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders
- Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation
- Advances Article
- The Generalized Linear Production Model: Solvability, Nonsubstitution and Productivity Measurement
- Contagion and State Dependent Mutations
- Rationalization and Incomplete Information
- Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
- Market Research and Market Design
