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Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
25. Juni 2003
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing incentive schemes under bounded rationality. It starts from a standard principal-agent model and then superimposes an assumption of boundedly rational behavior on the part of the agent. Boundedly rational behavior is modeled as an explicit optimization procedure, which combines gradient dynamics with imitation and experimentation. The results predict the underprovision of optimal incentives and deviation from a standard sufficient statistics result from the agency literature. It also allows us to address the question of creating the optimal incentives in a multicultural environment.
Published Online: 2003-6-25
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Topics Article
- Non-robustness of some economic models
- Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
- On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
- Contributions Article
- Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy
- A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game
- Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis
- Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
- Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
- Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders
- Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation
- Advances Article
- The Generalized Linear Production Model: Solvability, Nonsubstitution and Productivity Measurement
- Contagion and State Dependent Mutations
- Rationalization and Incomplete Information
- Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
- Market Research and Market Design
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Topics Article
- Non-robustness of some economic models
- Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
- On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
- Contributions Article
- Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy
- A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game
- Upgrading, Degrading, and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis
- Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
- Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
- Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders
- Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation
- Advances Article
- The Generalized Linear Production Model: Solvability, Nonsubstitution and Productivity Measurement
- Contagion and State Dependent Mutations
- Rationalization and Incomplete Information
- Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria
- Market Research and Market Design
