Startseite Patents versus rewards: the implications of production inefficiency
Artikel
Lizenziert
Nicht lizenziert Erfordert eine Authentifizierung

Patents versus rewards: the implications of production inefficiency

  • Aniruddha Bagchi und Arijit Mukherjee ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 29. Oktober 2020

Abstract

It is believed that if there is no informational asymmetry between firms and the government, firms could be remunerated for innovation using optimal taxation rather than patents. We show that under reasonable conditions (such as the government’s inability to customise the tax rate for each firm), patent protection is preferable to a tax/subsidy scheme if the marginal costs of the imitators are sufficiently higher than that of the innovator. Otherwise, the tax/subsidy scheme is preferable. These results hold under Cournot and Bertrand competition with product differentiation, but not for the case of Bertrand competition with homogeneous products. We rationalise these findings as the results of a trade-off between the distortions induced by monopoly under patents and production inefficiency under the tax/subsidy scheme.

Keywords: Patent; Tax; Welfare
JEL Classification: D43; H25; L13; O34

Funding statement: Aniruddha Bagchi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bagwell Center for the Study of Markets and Economic Opportunity at Kennesaw State University for this paper.

Acknowledgment

We thank two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions, which helped to improve the paper significantly. We also thank Sugata Marjit, Timothy Mathews, Matthew Mitchell and Peter Neary for helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

Abramowicz, M. 2019. “Prize and Reward Alternatives to Intellectual Property.” In Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1: Theory; Vol. 2: Analytical Methods, edited by B. Depoorter, P. Menell, and D. Schwartz. Ch. 13, 350–375. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 10.4337/9781789903997.00019Suche in Google Scholar

Arrow, K. J. 1962. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions.” In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, edited by R. R. Nelson. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 10.1515/9781400879762-024Suche in Google Scholar

Bagchi, A., and A. Mukherjee. 2014. “Technology Licensing in a Differentiated Oligopoly.” International Review of Economics and Finance 29:455–465. 10.1016/j.iref.2013.07.005Suche in Google Scholar

Chari, V. V., M. Golosov, and A. Tsyvinski. 2012. “Prizes and Patents: Using Market Signals to Provide Incentives for Innovations.” Journal of Economic Theory 147:781–801. 10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.004Suche in Google Scholar

Clarke, R., and D. Collie. 2003. “Product Differentiation and the Gains from Trade Under Bertrand Duopoly.” Canadian Journal of Economics 36:658–673. 10.1111/1540-5982.t01-2-00007Suche in Google Scholar

Cornelli, F., and M. Schankerman. 1999. “Optimal Patent Renewals.” Rand Journal of Economics 30:197–213. 10.2307/2556077Suche in Google Scholar

Coşgel, M. M. 2006. “Taxes, Efficiency, and Redistribution: Discriminatory Taxation of Villages in Ottoman Palestine, Southern Syria, and Transjordan in the Sixteenth Century.” Explorations in Economic History 43:332–356. 10.1016/j.eeh.2004.06.006Suche in Google Scholar

Dasgupta, P., and J. Stiglitz. 1980. “Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D.” Bell Journal of Economics 11:1–28. 10.2307/3003398Suche in Google Scholar

Faulí-Oller, R., and J. Sandonís. 2002. “Welfare Reducing Licensing.” Games and Economic Behavior 41:192–205. 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00513-4Suche in Google Scholar

Faulí-Oller, R., and J. Sandonís. 2003. “To Merge or to License: Implications for Competition Policy.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 21:655–672. 10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00122-4Suche in Google Scholar

Galasso, A. 2020. “Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights When Commitment is Limited.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 169:397–411. 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.027Suche in Google Scholar

Galasso, A., M. Mitchell, and G. Virag. 2016. “Market Outcomes and Dynamic Patent Buyouts.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 48:207–243. 10.3386/w20197Suche in Google Scholar

Galasso, A., M. Mitchell, and G. Virag. 2018. “A Theory of Grand Innovation Prizes.” Research Policy 47:343–362. 10.1016/j.respol.2017.11.009Suche in Google Scholar

Gallini, N. 1992. “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation.” Rand Journal of Economics 23:52–63. 10.2307/2555432Suche in Google Scholar

Gandal, N., and S. Scotchmer. 1993. “Coordinating Research Through Research Joint Ventures.” Journal of Public Economics 51:173–193. 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90083-6Suche in Google Scholar

Gilbert, R., and C. Shapiro. 1990. “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth.” Rand Journal of Economics 21:106–112. 10.2307/2555497Suche in Google Scholar

Heady, C. 1993. “Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: a Survey.” Fiscal Studies 14:15–41. 10.1111/j.1475-5890.1993.tb00341.xSuche in Google Scholar

Hopenhayn, H., G. Llobet, and M. Mitchell. 2006. “Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts.” Journal of Political Economy 114:1041–1068. 10.1086/510562Suche in Google Scholar

Klemperer, P. 1988. “Welfare Effects of Entry Into Markets with Switching Costs.” Journal of Industrial Economics 37:159–165. 10.2307/2098562Suche in Google Scholar

Klemperer, P. 1990. “How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?” Rand Journal of Economics 21:113–130. 10.2307/2555498Suche in Google Scholar

Kremer, G. 1998. “Patent Buyouts: a Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:1137–1167. 10.1162/003355398555865Suche in Google Scholar

Lahiri, S., and Y. Ono. 1988. “Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare.” Economic Journal 98:1199–1202. 10.2307/2233727Suche in Google Scholar

Lancaster, K. J. 1966. “A New Approach to Consumer Theory.” Journal of Political Economy 74:132–157. 10.1007/978-3-642-51565-1_34Suche in Google Scholar

Langinier, C., and G. Moschini. 2002. “The Economics of Patents.” In Intellectual Property Rights and Patenting in Animal Breeding and Genetics, edited by S. Newman and M. Rothschild, 31–50. CAB International. 10.1079/9780851996417.0031Suche in Google Scholar

Leffler, K., and C. Leffler. 2004. “Efficiency Trade-offs in Patent Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray.” USFL Rev. 39:33. Suche in Google Scholar

Leahy, D., and P. Neary. 2009. “Multilateral Subsidy Games.” Economic Theory 41:41–66. 10.1007/s00199-008-0384-2Suche in Google Scholar

Loury, G. C. 1979. “Market Structure and Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 93:395–410. 10.2307/1883165Suche in Google Scholar

Minehart, D., and S. Scotchmer. 1999. “Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information.” Games and Economic Behavior 17:114–131. 10.1006/game.1998.0682Suche in Google Scholar

Mukherjee, A. 2017. “Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure.” Journal of Industrial Economics LXV:220–234. 10.1111/joie.12110Suche in Google Scholar

Mukherjee, A., and S. Mukherjee. 2005. “Foreign Competition with Licensing.” Manchester School 73:653–663. 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00470.xSuche in Google Scholar

Muto, S. 1993. “On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition.” Games and Economic Behavior 5:257–267. 10.1006/game.1993.1015Suche in Google Scholar

Nordhaus, W. D. 1969. Inventions, Growth and Welfare: a Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Suche in Google Scholar

O’Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer, and J.-F. Thisse. 1998. “Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 7:1–32. 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00001.xSuche in Google Scholar

O’Donoghue, T., and J. Zweimuller. 2004. “Patents in a Model of Endogenous Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 9:81–123. 10.1023/B:JOEG.0000023017.42109.c2Suche in Google Scholar

Ordover, J. A. 1991. “A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:43–60. 10.1257/jep.5.1.43Suche in Google Scholar

Penin, J. 2005. “Patents Versus Ex Post Rewards: a New Look.” Research Policy 34:641–656. 10.1016/j.respol.2005.02.005Suche in Google Scholar

Rockett, K. 1990. “The Quality of Licensed Technology.” International Journal of Industrial Organization 8:559–574. 10.1016/0167-7187(90)90030-5Suche in Google Scholar

Roin, B. N. 2014. “Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate.” The University of Chicago Law Review 81:999–1078. Suche in Google Scholar

Scherer, F. M. 1972. “Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: a Geometric Reinterpretation.” American Economic Review 62:422–427. Suche in Google Scholar

Scotchmer, S. 1999. “On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System.” Rand Journal of Economics 30:181–196. 10.2307/2556076Suche in Google Scholar

Shavell, S., and T. V. Ypersele. 2001. “Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights.” Journal of Law and Economics XLIV:525–4547. 10.3386/w6956Suche in Google Scholar

Shubik, M., and R. Levitan. 1980. Market Structure and Behaviour. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 10.4159/harvard.9780674433403Suche in Google Scholar

Spulber, D. F. 2015. Public Prizes Versus Market Prices: Should Contests Replace Patents? Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 97:690–735. Suche in Google Scholar

Weyl, E. G., and J. Tirole. 2012. “Market Power Screens Willingness-to-pay.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127:1971–2003. 10.1093/qje/qjs032Suche in Google Scholar

Wright, B. 1983. “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts.” American Economic Review 73:691–707. Suche in Google Scholar

Yang, L., Y. Tsai, and A. Mukherjee. 2016. “Intellectual Property Rights and the Quality of Transferred Technology in Developing Countries.” Review of Development Economics 20:239–249. 10.1111/rode.12218Suche in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2020-10-29
Published in Print: 2021-05-04

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 16.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/ger-2019-0092/html
Button zum nach oben scrollen