Startseite Ist Vertrauenswürdigkeit das formale Objekt des Vertrauens?
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Ist Vertrauenswürdigkeit das formale Objekt des Vertrauens?

  • Hans Bernhard Schmid EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 8. März 2016
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Abstract

To say that trustworthiness is the formal object of trust is to claim that trust is an intentional attitude that is determined in its mode and made intelligible by the fact that the trusting person ascribes to the person she trusts the property of being trustworthy with regard to the good entrusted to her. This view is attractive because it seems to offer an easy way to characterise trust as a specific attitude, and it opens up a perspective regarding the place of trust in practical reason. This paper argues against this view. It is claimed that trustworthiness is a social status. Where people are recognised as trustworthy, you can rely on them rather than having to trust them.


Kontakt: Hans Bernhard Schmid, Universität Wien, Institut für Philosophie, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, Österreich,

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Published Online: 2016-3-8
Published in Print: 2016-2-1

© 2016 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

Heruntergeladen am 12.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/dzph-2016-0006/html
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