Abstract
Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E[X 2] ≥ E 2[X] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E[X r+s ] and E[X r ]E[X s ]. We also provide its economic application.
1 Introduction
While Chebyshev’s inequality is one of the most widely used inequalities in many fields, some other inequalities of Chebyshev are less commonly known or used. Chebyshev’s algebraic inequality is introduced in Simonovits (1995), yet Chebyshev’s sum inequality may not have received enough attention, especially in social sciences.[1] For instance, as also quoted in Marinescu and Monea (2018), Fink (2000) says,
The most obviously important named inequalities are those of Hölder and Minkowski; but the watershed paper, in my estimation, is the paper of Chebyshev.
From the fact that variances are nonnegative, we have an inequality: Var(X) = E[X 2] − E[X]E[X] ≥ 0. While it is a natural step to generalize this inequality into the one with higher order moments or general combinations of moments, to the best of our knowledge, the generalized version has not received attention, which may be because potential applications are not clear.
We generalize E[X 2] ≥ E[X]E[X] by comparing E[X r+s ] and E[X r ]E[X s ] by using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, and provide its economic application. We first recall Chebyshev’s sum inequality (or Chebyshev’s order inequality (Chebyshev 1882)).[2]
1.1 Chebyshev’s Sum Inequality
Let f 1 and f 2 be increasing functions, and X be a real random variable with a probability density function f. Then,
where (1) holds with equality only when f 1 or f 2 is constant on the support of f. It can easily be shown that the inequality is reversed if one of f 1 and f 2 is increasing and the other is decreasing.
Note that (1) can also be stated as Cov(f 1(X), f 2(X)) = E[f 1(X)f 2(X)] − E[f 1(X)]E[f 2(X)] ≥ 0, which provides an intuitive interpretation: if f 1 and f 2 are both increasing, the covariance of f 1(X) and f 2(X) is nonnegative, but if one of f 1 and f 2 is increasing and the other is decreasing, the covariance is nonpositive.
2 Results
We state the result with continuous random variables, but the result also holds for discrete random variables by the discrete version of Chebyshev’s sum inequality.
Proposition 1
Let X be a nondegenerate nonnegative random variable with a probability density function f. For any
Proof
Note that x
k
is increasing (decreasing, resp.) in
where each (weak) inequality holds by Chebyshev’s sum inequality.□
Proposition 1 can be understood more intuitively with the covariance interpretation. When rs > 0, r and s have the same signs; thus, Cov(X r , X s ) > 0.
We state a corollary below, as the case of s = 1 often appears in applications, e.g. Proposition 5.
Corollary 1
Let X be a nondegenerate nonnegative random variable with a probability density function f. For any
When X is not a nonnegative random variable, a moment inequality (2) may not hold. This is because x k may not be monotone any more, e.g. x 2. For instance, in Corollary 1, either E[X α ] > E[X α−1]E[X] or E[X α ] < E[X α−1]E[X] is possible as below.
Example 1
Consider α = 0 so to compare E[X −1 X] = 1 and E[X −1]E[X]. If X is 1 or −1 with equal probability, then E[X] = 0. Thus, E[X −1 X] = 1 > 0 = E[X −1]E[X]. More generally, if X is a or b with equal probability, then E[X −1 · X] > E[X −1]E[X] if ab < 0, and E[X −1 · X] < E[X −1]E[X] if ab > 0.□
Nevertheless, there are some useful cases when the moment inequality holds for real-valued (i.e. not necessarily nonnegative) random variables. For instance, when r and s are both even or odd natural numbers, i.e. when r + s is an even number, we have an inequality below.
Proposition 2
Let X be a real random variable with a probability density function f. For any
Proof
If
Note that r and s should be natural numbers rather than integers. For instance, x −1 is not monotone, as illustrated in Example 1. Proposition 2 can also be understood more intuitively with the covariance interpretation: x k is increasing for odd k; thus, when both r and s are odd, Cov(X r , X s ) > 0. When both r and s are even, for intuition, assume that X is discrete. Then, X r and X s can be rearranged in the nondecreasing order with the same permutation of the indices. Thus, the covariance of the two nondecreasing rearranged random variables is positive.
3 Application
Jeong and Kim (2021) study a procurement, where the total cost of the procurement is proportional to the number of bidders. In particular, they compare bidding strategies in two cases depending on the presence of uncertainty—whether bidders know the exact number of bidders n (no uncertainty); or bidders do not know n but they believe E[N] = n (uncertainty) where N is the random variable that denotes the number of bidders. They show that bidders bid more aggressively without uncertainty than with uncertainty, under a certain condition (which is (5) in Proposition 3).
More specifically, bidder i’s unit cost c
i
is independently drawn from an identical distribution F, with density f that is continuously differentiable and positive on
Proposition 3
(Theorem 2 of Jeong and Kim (2021)) If
then
That is, if (5) holds, the desired result—bidders bid more aggressively without uncertainty than with uncertainty—holds. Note that, in procurements,
Proposition 4
(Proposition 2 of Jeong and Kim (2021)) Condition (5),
There are some special cases where (6) can be shown easily. For instance, when c ∼ U[0, 1] and ρ(n, α) = n α , by using the main result, Proposition 1, or more specifically, Corollary 1, we can further characterize the relationship between (5) and (6).
Proposition 5
If c is distributed according to U[0, 1] and ρ(n, α) = n α , then the condition (5) holds if and only if α ≤ 1. More specifically,
Proof
Note that
□
Funding source: British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grants
Award Identifier / Grant number: SRG21\211503
Funding source: National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF), Korea Government (MSIT)
Award Identifier / Grant number: RS-2022-00166647
Acknowledgment
I thank Ken Binmore and Dong-Hyuk Kim for their valuable comments.
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Research funding: This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. RS-2022-00166647). This work was also supported by the British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grants SRG21/211503 when I was at the University of Bristol.
References
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Chebyshev, P. 1882. “Sur les expressions approximatives des integrales definies par les autres prises entre les mêmes limites.” Proceedings of the Kharkov Mathematical Society 2: 93–8.Suche in Google Scholar
Fink, A. 2000. “An Essay on the History of Inequalities.” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 249: 118–34. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmaa.2000.6934.Suche in Google Scholar
Jeong, S. E., and D.-H. Kim. 2021. Uncertainty Paradox: When You Should (Not) Lie. Working Paper. Also available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944677.10.2139/ssrn.3944677Suche in Google Scholar
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© 2023 the author(s), published by De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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- Screening with Privacy on (Im)persistency
- Quality, Shelf Life, and Demand Uncertainty
- Transfers and Resilience in Economic Networks
- Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects
- Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict
- Financial and Operational Creditors in Bankruptcy Resolution: A General Equilibrium Approach Under Three Game-Theoretic Division Rules with an Application to India
- Product Differentiation and Trade
- A Theoretical Analysis of Collusion Involving Technology Licensing Under Diseconomies of Scale
- Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries
- How the Future Shapes Consumption with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
- Notes
- The Strategic Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility with Network Externalities
- Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) Certification and Endogenous Market Structure
- A Note on a Moment Inequality
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Screening with Privacy on (Im)persistency
- Quality, Shelf Life, and Demand Uncertainty
- Transfers and Resilience in Economic Networks
- Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects
- Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict
- Financial and Operational Creditors in Bankruptcy Resolution: A General Equilibrium Approach Under Three Game-Theoretic Division Rules with an Application to India
- Product Differentiation and Trade
- A Theoretical Analysis of Collusion Involving Technology Licensing Under Diseconomies of Scale
- Product Quality and Product Compatibility in Network Industries
- How the Future Shapes Consumption with Time-Inconsistent Preferences
- Notes
- The Strategic Adoption of Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility with Network Externalities
- Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) Certification and Endogenous Market Structure
- A Note on a Moment Inequality