Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms
-
George Klosko
Abstract
This paper examines Laura Valentini’s attempt to explain political obligations through her account of social norms, her ‘Agency-Respect View’ (ARV). A great strength of ARV is preserving the ‘content-independence’ of political obligations. However, ARV does not mesh well with the moral phenomenology of political obligations. ARV is able to generate moral requirements that are strikingly weak. Accounting for the far stronger moral force of requirements to obey the law requires appealing to law-independent considerations. Valentini’s account of these factors suggests greater explanatory force of an alternative view she dismisses, to which she refers as the ‘deflationary view.’ In addition, among alternative theories that Valentini rejects is one based on the principle of fair play. I respond to Valentini’s criticisms, thereby demonstrating the continuing applicability of fair play.
References
Adams, N. P. 2017. “In Defense of Content-Independence.” Legal Theory 23: 143–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/s135232521700009x.Suche in Google Scholar
Arneson, Richard. 1982. “The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems.” Ethics 92 (4): 616–33. https://doi.org/10.1086/292379.Suche in Google Scholar
Brinkmann, M. 2020. “Legitimate Power Without Authority: The Transmission Model.” Law and Philosophy 39 (2): 119–46. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-019-09369-z.Suche in Google Scholar
Christiano, Thomas. 2008. The Constitution of Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198297475.001.0001Suche in Google Scholar
Dagger, Richard. 2018. Playing Fair: Political Obligation and the Problems of Punishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780199388837.003.0005Suche in Google Scholar
Dagger, Richard, and David Lefkowitz. 2013. “Political Obligation.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation/ (accessed May 1, 2020).Suche in Google Scholar
Garthoff, Jon. 2010. “Legitimacy is Not Authority.” Law and Philosophy 29 (6): 669–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-010-9080-z.Suche in Google Scholar
Green, Leslie. 1988. The Authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Green, Leslie. 1999. “Who Believes in Political Obligation?” In The Duty to Obey the Law, edited by William Edmundson. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Suche in Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1955. “Are There Any Natural Rights?” Philosophical Review 64 (2): 175–91. https://doi.org/10.2307/2182586.Suche in Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1958. “Legal and Moral Obligation.” In Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by A. I. Melden. Seattle: University of Washington Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. 1982. “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons.” In Essays on Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198254683.003.0011Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 1990. “The Moral Force of Political Obligations.” American Political Science Review 84: 1235–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963261.Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 1992. The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 1994. “Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23: 251–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1994.tb00013.x.Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 2005. Political Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/0199256209.001.0001Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 2011. “Are Political Obligations Content Independent?” Political Theory 39: 498–523. https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591711408247.Suche in Google Scholar
Klosko, George. 2023. “Content-Independence and Political Obligation: Scope-Limitations of Content-Independent Moral Reasons.” Political Studies 71: 30–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720932132.Suche in Google Scholar
Locke, John. 1988. Two Treatises of Government, Student ed, edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511810268Suche in Google Scholar
Lyons, D. 1965. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198241973.001.0001Suche in Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Schauer, Frederick. 2015. The Force of Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Simmons, A. John. 1979. Moral Principles and Political Obligations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9780691213248Suche in Google Scholar
Smith, M. B. E. 1973. “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?” The Yale Law Journal 82: 950–76. https://doi.org/10.2307/795537.Suche in Google Scholar
Tyler, Tom. 2006. Why People Obey the Law, Revised ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400828609Suche in Google Scholar
Valentini, Laura. 2023. Morality and Socially Constructed Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/9780191938115.001.0001Suche in Google Scholar
Wolff, R. P. 1970. In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper & Row.Suche in Google Scholar
© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium
- Moralism and Realism in Theorizing Social Norms
- Two Types of Social Norms
- Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms
- Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
- Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account
- General Part
- Moral Paradigms of Intergenerational Solidarity in the Coronavirus-Pandemic
- The Weight of History After October 7 and the Gaza War: Shaping a New Future
- Germany, Israel’s Security, and the Fight Against Anti-Semitism: Shadows from the Past and Current Tensions
- Kantian Rights and the Zionist Settlement in Palestine
- War and Self-Defense: Some Reflections on the War on Gaza
- Discussion
- What is Classical Realism?
- Do We Learn Anything from Kirshner?
- Classical Realism is not ‘Everything, Everywhere, All at Once’
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium
- Moralism and Realism in Theorizing Social Norms
- Two Types of Social Norms
- Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms
- Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
- Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account
- General Part
- Moral Paradigms of Intergenerational Solidarity in the Coronavirus-Pandemic
- The Weight of History After October 7 and the Gaza War: Shaping a New Future
- Germany, Israel’s Security, and the Fight Against Anti-Semitism: Shadows from the Past and Current Tensions
- Kantian Rights and the Zionist Settlement in Palestine
- War and Self-Defense: Some Reflections on the War on Gaza
- Discussion
- What is Classical Realism?
- Do We Learn Anything from Kirshner?
- Classical Realism is not ‘Everything, Everywhere, All at Once’
