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Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium

  • Laura Valentini EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: May 27, 2024
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Abstract

Do not chew with your mouth open! Take your hat off when you enter a church! Do not skip the queue! Pay your taxes! Do not cross on a red light! These are familiar imperatives, and their immediate source are ‘socially constructed norms’: norms that exist as a matter of social fact. These range from informal etiquette and politeness norms to the complex norms making up our legal systems. While we often feel bound by these norms, we are also aware that they can be pernicious: the product of injustice and vehicles for its perpetuation. The question thus arises: when and why, if ever, does the fact that a socially constructed norm requires us to perform a certain action place us under a genuine moral obligation to comply? In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, I answer that such an obligation, when it exists, is grounded in a broader, familiar duty, namely the duty to respect people’s permissible and authentic exercises of agency. This is what I call the ‘Agency-Respect View.’ The first part of the book outlines and defends the view, the second part considers relevant applications.


Corresponding author: Laura Valentini, Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft, LMU Munich, Munich, Germany, E-mail:

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Published Online: 2024-05-27
Published in Print: 2024-05-27

© 2024 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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