Startseite Philosophie “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹
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“So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹

  • Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

Abstract

Any philosopher interested in the view of ethics presented in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early writings, is met by the challenge that Wittgenstein wrote only little on ethics and that he, in his most sustained engagement with ethics in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, writes that “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42). In this article, I argue that even if Wittgenstein seems to present a plea for silence in ethics, the matter is rather more complicated. My interpretation of TLP 6.42 is developed by combining attention to the general method of elucidation of the Tractatus with attention to Wittgenstein’s strikingly untraditional conception of ethics as tied to questions of value and meaning in life. I further emphasize how Wittgenstein, in “A Lecture on Ethics”, presents enquiries into ethics as resulting in nonsense in a way similar to the way that he presents the philosophical sentences of the Tractatus as nonsensical. This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein - exclusively - rejects philosophical “propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42), that is, attempts to express the very possibility of ethics: how life can come to have value and meaning. The ethical silence recommended in the Tractatus thus concerns only philosophical enquires into moral life, not moral life itself. Wittgenstein nowhere ties the plea for silence to the practical, everyday endeavor of talking about value and meaning as part of living a moral life. Furthermore, as the recommendation of silence is tied to the Tractarian idea of a general method of elucidation, this means that when Wittgenstein later gives up the idea of a generalized philosophical method, he also gives up the idea that philosophical enquires into moral life must end in silence.

Abstract

Any philosopher interested in the view of ethics presented in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early writings, is met by the challenge that Wittgenstein wrote only little on ethics and that he, in his most sustained engagement with ethics in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, writes that “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42). In this article, I argue that even if Wittgenstein seems to present a plea for silence in ethics, the matter is rather more complicated. My interpretation of TLP 6.42 is developed by combining attention to the general method of elucidation of the Tractatus with attention to Wittgenstein’s strikingly untraditional conception of ethics as tied to questions of value and meaning in life. I further emphasize how Wittgenstein, in “A Lecture on Ethics”, presents enquiries into ethics as resulting in nonsense in a way similar to the way that he presents the philosophical sentences of the Tractatus as nonsensical. This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein - exclusively - rejects philosophical “propositions of ethics” (TLP 6.42), that is, attempts to express the very possibility of ethics: how life can come to have value and meaning. The ethical silence recommended in the Tractatus thus concerns only philosophical enquires into moral life, not moral life itself. Wittgenstein nowhere ties the plea for silence to the practical, everyday endeavor of talking about value and meaning as part of living a moral life. Furthermore, as the recommendation of silence is tied to the Tractarian idea of a general method of elucidation, this means that when Wittgenstein later gives up the idea of a generalized philosophical method, he also gives up the idea that philosophical enquires into moral life must end in silence.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
  4. Editorial 1
  5. I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
  6. Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
  7. ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
  8. “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
  9. Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
  10. Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
  11. Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
  12. The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
  13. Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
  14. Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
  15. Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
  16. Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
  17. Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
  18. Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
  19. Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
  20. „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
  21. About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
  22. An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
  23. “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
  24. The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
  25. II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
  26. “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
  27. Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
  28. Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
  29. Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
  30. Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
  31. A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
  32. III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
  33. The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
  34. Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
  35. Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
  36. Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
  37. Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
  38. Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
  39. Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
  40. Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
  41. „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
  42. IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
  43. “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
  44. Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
  45. The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
  46. Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
  47. Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
  48. Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
  49. Index 633
Heruntergeladen am 1.12.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783111453040-005/html
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