Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression
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Jesús Padilla Gálvez
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work and to contrast it with the corresponding proposals made by Moritz Schlick. According to Wittgenstein, an expression (Ausdruck) is everything that essentially determines the sense of a proposition. Expression presupposes the form of all propositions in which it is found, and it is considered the characteristic feature that all kinds of propositions have in common. The expression is represented by the form that requires subsequent corrections and improvements. Wittgenstein considered the form of the expression to remain constant whereas everything else is variable. Expressions are represented by a variable whose values are determined by the propositions of which they form part. Therefore, the expression only makes sense when expressed in propositions. Schlick took a different approach by recognizing that the symbolic relation of designation or attribution characterizes the essence of knowledge. As such, designation is always a symbolic expression or representation. In his view, expression plays a crucial role in the cognitive process as it allows us to relate a sign to a state of affairs. On the one hand, statements or what Schlick called “constatements” stand for propositions about “what is currently perceived”, and on the other hand, they have the function of “confirming hypotheses, in verification”. This knowledge must always be communicable. Both philosophers coincide that knowledge begins where something is expressed and communicated. What is communicable can be expressed by means of symbols, be it words or other signs. Contrasting the two positions allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the concept of “expression”.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of expression in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work and to contrast it with the corresponding proposals made by Moritz Schlick. According to Wittgenstein, an expression (Ausdruck) is everything that essentially determines the sense of a proposition. Expression presupposes the form of all propositions in which it is found, and it is considered the characteristic feature that all kinds of propositions have in common. The expression is represented by the form that requires subsequent corrections and improvements. Wittgenstein considered the form of the expression to remain constant whereas everything else is variable. Expressions are represented by a variable whose values are determined by the propositions of which they form part. Therefore, the expression only makes sense when expressed in propositions. Schlick took a different approach by recognizing that the symbolic relation of designation or attribution characterizes the essence of knowledge. As such, designation is always a symbolic expression or representation. In his view, expression plays a crucial role in the cognitive process as it allows us to relate a sign to a state of affairs. On the one hand, statements or what Schlick called “constatements” stand for propositions about “what is currently perceived”, and on the other hand, they have the function of “confirming hypotheses, in verification”. This knowledge must always be communicable. Both philosophers coincide that knowledge begins where something is expressed and communicated. What is communicable can be expressed by means of symbols, be it words or other signs. Contrasting the two positions allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the concept of “expression”.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
- Editorial 1
-
I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
- Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
- ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
- “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
- Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
- Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
- Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
- The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
- Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
- Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
- Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
- Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
- Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
- Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
- Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
- „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
- About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
- An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
- “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
- The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
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II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
- “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
- Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
- Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
- Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
- Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
- A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
-
III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
- The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
- Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
- Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
- Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
- Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
- Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
- Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
- Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
- „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
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IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
- “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
- Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
- The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
- Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
- Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
- Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
- Index 633
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
- Editorial 1
-
I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
- Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
- ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
- “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
- Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
- Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
- Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
- The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
- Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
- Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
- Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
- Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
- Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
- Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
- Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
- „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
- About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
- An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
- “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
- The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
-
II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
- “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
- Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
- Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
- Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
- Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
- A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
-
III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
- The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
- Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
- Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
- Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
- Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
- Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
- Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
- Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
- „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
-
IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
- “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
- Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
- The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
- Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
- Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
- Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
- Index 633
