APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS vii
3. LIST OF FIGURES xi
4. LIST OF TABLES xiii
5. PREFACE xv
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix
7. CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner 1
8. CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency 15
9. CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency 30
10. CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency 38
11. CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk 47
12. CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency 64
13. CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules 79
14. CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting 89
15. CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems 96
16. CHAPTER 10. Conclusions 104
17. APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency 109
18. APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function 114
19. APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 117
20. APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules 121
21. APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies 125
22. APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System 130
23. GLOSSARY 133
24. BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
25. INDEX 145
26. Backmatter 150