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CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS vii
- LIST OF FIGURES xi
- LIST OF TABLES xiii
- PREFACE xv
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix
- CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner 1
- CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency 15
- CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency 30
- CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency 38
- CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk 47
- CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency 64
- CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules 79
- CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting 89
- CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems 96
- CHAPTER 10. Conclusions 104
- APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency 109
- APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function 114
- APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 117
- APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules 121
- APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies 125
- APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System 130
- GLOSSARY 133
- BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
- INDEX 145
- Backmatter 150
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- CONTENTS vii
- LIST OF FIGURES xi
- LIST OF TABLES xiii
- PREFACE xv
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix
- CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner 1
- CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency 15
- CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency 30
- CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency 38
- CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk 47
- CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency 64
- CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules 79
- CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting 89
- CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems 96
- CHAPTER 10. Conclusions 104
- APPENDIX A. A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency 109
- APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function 114
- APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 117
- APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules 121
- APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies 125
- APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System 130
- GLOSSARY 133
- BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
- INDEX 145
- Backmatter 150