Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
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Gerard Hertig
Abstract
Governments in Europe and the United States have recently acquired significant stakes in a number of financial institutions, raising fears that they will use their investments to pursue interventionist goals. The comparative analysis of sixteen major bailouts in Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States provides evidence to the contrary. Fiscal and political considerations have prompted governments to generally avoid common stock investments, limit direct managerial involvement and favor early exits. While this investment strategy may prove detrimental to other stakeholders, it resembles the approach distressed asset investors would adopt under the circumstances.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Introduction
- Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
- Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
- Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
- Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
- Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
- The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
- Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
- Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
- State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
- Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
- Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Introduction
- Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
- Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
- Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
- Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
- Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
- The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
- Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
- Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
- State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
- Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
- Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds
