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Chapter 9. Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness and enactivism

The harmonizing argument
  • Yaron M. Senderowicz
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Abstract

In this article, I single out the characteristics of a polemical type of argument that I dub “the harmonizing argument”. Contenders that use the harmonizing argument aim to persuade their audience that it is possible to harmonize two opposed positions. My case study is the enactivists’ attempt to naturalize Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. I first present Husserl’s account of time-consciousness. I clarify why absolute subjectivity cannot be naturalized. I continue by interpreting the enactivists’ attempt to naturalizes absolute subjectivity as exemplifying the harmonizing argument. I present the limitations of this attempt, and I conclude by pointing out the possible positive epistemic results of using this type of argument.

Abstract

In this article, I single out the characteristics of a polemical type of argument that I dub “the harmonizing argument”. Contenders that use the harmonizing argument aim to persuade their audience that it is possible to harmonize two opposed positions. My case study is the enactivists’ attempt to naturalize Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. I first present Husserl’s account of time-consciousness. I clarify why absolute subjectivity cannot be naturalized. I continue by interpreting the enactivists’ attempt to naturalizes absolute subjectivity as exemplifying the harmonizing argument. I present the limitations of this attempt, and I conclude by pointing out the possible positive epistemic results of using this type of argument.

Heruntergeladen am 28.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1075/cvs.16.09sen/html
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