Band 1, Heft 2

On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings. Abstract Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16th December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty will replace Regulation 17/62 and the existing system of approval. Under the new enforcement regime, which will apply as from 1st May 2004, notifications by companies and exemption decisions by the European Commission are no longer possible. This reform is complemented by the decentralised enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the national competition authorities and courts as well as a convergence rule regarding the relationship between Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and national competition laws, which will result in a strong harmonization of competition law within the Common Market. The analysis of the general principles of the new Regulation 1/2003 as provided for in Articles 1 to 3 reveals, however, that it does not provide sufficient solutions to all the problems of Regulation 17/62, which made the reform necessary. The requirements of legal and procedural certainty will oblige the Commission as well as national competition authorities to provide extensive informal guidance, at least for an interim period after 1st May 2004, and will require a higher level of scrutiny of competition enforcement by the European Court of Justice by means of preliminary rulings under Article 234 EC.

Zusammenfassung Die Ausübung von Kaufmacht des Anbieters wie des Nachfragers unterliegt - wie die jüngste Judikatur des Kartellsenats des Bundesgerichtshofs deutlich gemacht hat - nach deutschem Recht auch unterhalb der Schwelle der Marktbeherrschung nicht nur theoretisch, sondern auch praktisch Restriktionen. Es geht darum zu zeigen, dass die vom Gesetzgeber getroffene Grundentscheidung zu akzeptieren ist und dass die neu gefassten Verbote auch praktisch handhabbar sind. Abstract During the process of legislation there has been a controversy, if small and medium-sized business enterprises are in particular need of protection in competition. Even after the enactement of the sixth amendment of the german Law against Restrictions on Competition/GWB this question is still under discussion. As the supporters of this approach have finally prevailed it is not permitted to hinder the effective application of the new regulations by establishing new obstacles and thus to disobey the legislative intent. The two aforementioned decisions of the cartel division of the german federal court of justice display the possibility-despite all difficulties - to apply the new regulation in a way that leads to a sufficient protection of small and medium-sized business enterprises in accordance with the parliament's will without restricting the necessary economic activities of market-dominating or powerful companies.

Zusammenfassung Das sich derzeit im Rechtsetzungsverfahren befindliche System eines EG-Emissionsrechtehandels gilt als Grundpfeiler einer kosteneffektiven Umsetzung der Kyoto-Verpflichtung. N ach dem Gemeinsamen Standpunkt des Rates vom 18. März 2003 werden die Emissionsrechte in einem gestaffelten Verfahren vergeben. Sollte dieser Kompromiss - wie erwartet - vom Europäischen Parlament bestätigt werden, erfolgt die Allokation von Emissionsrechten bis zum Jahre 2007 unentgeltlich. Ab dem Jahre 2008 sollen maximal 10 % der Emissionsrechte von den Mitgliedstaaten entgeltlich vergeben werden können. Der Gemeinsame Standpunkt des Rates über ein System für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionsberechtigungen in der EG (GS) sieht dabei vor, dass die Zuteilung und die Vergabe im Einklang mit dem EG-Vertrag und insbesondere den beihilfen-rechtlichen Vorschriften der Art. 87, 88 EG stehen müssen (Art. 11 Abs. 3 GS). Da mit einer Verabschiedung der Richtlinie bis Ende des laufenden Jahres zu rechnen ist, haben in den Mitgliedstaaten die Überlegungen hinsichtlich der Erstellung der nationalen Allokationspläne bereits begonnen. Welchen beihilfen-rechtlichen Anforderungen des EG-Vertrages die Mitgliedstaaten und die Kommission bei der Aufstellung bzw. Genehmigung der nationalen Allokationspläne genügen müssen, ist Gegenstand des folgenden Beitrags. Als Beispiel dient dabei die Allokation von Berechtigungen an ein Braunkohlekraftwerk. Abstract The Council's Common Position on the adoption of a Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC stipulates that all allowances are to be allocated free of charge for the trading period 2005 - 2007. For the trading period 2008 - 2012, Member States shall allocate at least 90% of the allowances free of charge. Allocation must be in accordance wit h the requirements of the EC Treaty, in particular of the Articles 87 and 8 8 thereof. By considering, as an example, a brown coal combustion installation, the article discusses from a stat e aid law perspective the problems associated with this allocation method. To begin with, allowances are tradable and, therefore, represent a gratuitous advantage. Their function as a "protective screen" that blocks the regulatory burden as provided by Council Directive 96/6 1/EC of 24th September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, even increases the value of this gratuitous advantage. Second, the aid is granted by a Member State or through State resources, as Member States waive their revenues from public dues or taxes for using scarce resources. Third, restricting the trading scheme to the activities listed in Annex I to the Common Position discounts other COT-intensive sectors. Therefore, the advantage of the allowances favours only certain undertakings. Fourth, allocation free of charge presents the danger of distorting competition, e.g. by discriminating against early action or by discriminating against new entrants. Though the EC Commission has discretionary power to approve state aids under Article 87 (3) EC, the state aid must in any case be necessary to attain the objectives specified in Article 87 (3) lit. a) -d) EC. Other allocation methods - e. g. auctioning the allowances or allocating them by way of a beauty contest - do not confer a gratuitous advantage upon certain undertakings and promise comparable results from an ecological point of view. Therefore, the state aid cannot be declared compatible with the Common Market. If the planned allocation method is not replaced in the last minute by an allocation scheme compatible with EC state aid law, the EC Commission, the Member States and the undertakings will face numerous state aid cases.

The annotated decision is a landmark case on joint ventures under German competition law. The court confirmed that rules on merger control and on the prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour are two separate sets of rules which might both apply to joint ventures. Joint ventures are therefore submitted to a two stage test under sections 1 and 36 et seq. GWB as long as they are cooperative in nature. The distinction between cooperative and concentrative joint ventures is regarded to be a "helpful tool" to limit the scope of application of section 1 GWB (prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour). For practical purposes the BGH considers section 1 GWB to be blocked by the rules on merger control if a joint venture' is concentrative. The BGH’s definition of concentrative joint ventures uses criteria similar to those applied in the Commission's 1994 notice on concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. The court rightly held that the joint ventures autonomy is not material for distinguishing cooperative and concentrative joint ventures. In the present case, the parents were actual competitors in the product and geographical markets of the joint ventures under formation. It was therefore likely that competition between the parents would be reduced. Nevertheless, the court is criticized for relying only on the cost reduction intended by the parents to deduce their interest in coordinating competitive behaviour. Possible use of the joint venture as a device for coordination was held to be sufficient to constitute an infringement of section 1 GWB. The decision raised specific procedural questions as the court of appeal had issued separate decisions dealing with the respective application of merger control rules and the prohibition of cartels. The BGH held that a decision prohibiting the joint venture on both grounds could not form the object of separate court decisions. Actual german competition rules do not provide for both sets of rules to be applied in the same proceedings. However, under Regulation 1/2003 the Bundeskartellamt will be forced to apply Article 81 EC and German merger control rules simultaneously within the time frame for merger cases. The current reform of german competition law should provide for simultaneous application in purely national cases as well.

Zusammenfassung Im Zusammenhang mit dem Ministererlaubnisverfahren „E.ON/Ruhrgas“ hatte das OLG Dusseldorf über eine Reihe von Beschwerden zu befinden, die sich gegen Entscheidungen des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft über Antrage auf Beiladung zum Ministererlaubnisverfahren richteten. Im Folgenden werden drei dieser Entscheidungen (betreffend die Beiladungsbegehren von Greenpeace e. V., des Zweckverbands Gasversorgung Oberschwaben und der Dynergy Europe Ltd.) herausgegriffen, weil ihnen die vergleichsweise selten gebliebene Beurteilung zugrunde liegt, dass eine Beiladung- aus jeweils unterschiedlichen Gründen - nicht ausgesprochen werden durfte oder musste. I n einer vierten Entscheidung (betreffend die ares Energie AG) war der Antragsteller zwar im Ergebnis beizuladen, doch steht auch sie für eine bestimmte Fallgruppe, in der eine Beiladung typischerweise zu versagen ist. Abstract The E.ON/Ruhrgas case illustrates the importance of procedural issues, which were often neglected in the past. Apart from important rulings on jurisdiction and the right to a hearing the Court of Appeals (OLG) of Dusseldorf had to decide on various questions concerning the summons to interested parties (section 54 paragraph 2 of the German Act against the Restraints of Competition (ARC): „Beiladung“). In four of the ancilliary proceedings concerning the summons of interested third parties the court delivered judgments of major importance for the development of this area of law. Third parties interested to be admitted to the administrative proceedings have to show that their interests will be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings. The court kept its former approach of a wide definition of ,interest". According to the traditional approach even indirect effects may suffice as long as they have any relevance concerning competition law. While keeping this wide approach the court set up a high standard of substantiation in relation to the affected interests. As far as the typical affected interests of competitors, customers or suppliers are concerned these third parties will easily be able to establish the effect of a merger on their interests. However, for parties representing general interests (e.g. Greenpeace or consumer protection associations) the establishment of affected interests according to this high standard might be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless the court accepts in principle that these interests might suffice to grant admittance to the proceedings. In another judgment the court maintained the position established before the last reform of the ARC that the admittance is within the discretion of the cartel authority even if all preconditions for an admittance are fulfilled. This is of relevance if two third parties apply for summons and both parties represent similar interests. In this case the cartel authority may just grant admittance for one of the parties. This has to be pointed out as rights of third parties to challenge merger control decisions have been improved and linked with the admittance to the administrative proceedings by the last reform of the ARC. Two other judgments concerned temporal aspects of summons to interested parties. The court held that in case that the affected interests become irrelevant because of a bankruptcy etc. of the third party, the summons become unlawful and can be challenged by the other parties of the proceedings. In yet another case the court confirmed earlier rulings that in principle admittance cannot be granted after the decision of the cartel authority has been challenged by one of the parties of the proceedings.