Volume 64, Issue 1

We examine theoretically and empirically how wage subsidies and minimum wages interact regarding to employment opportunities, and how these interactive effects vary across different groups of workers. Assuming a neoclassical labor market and heterogeneous work, subsidized low-skilled worker displace less-skilled workers. The effect on non-subsidized low-skilled workers remains theoretically open. The empirical examination for the US shows that increasing minimum wages decreases less-skilled employment, haven’t an effect on non-subsidized low-skilled employment and induce a hump-shape of subsidized low-skilled employment. For Germany, however, several simulation studies indicate that the provided minimum wage and existing wage subsidies do not cause substitution effects, but lower employment of all workers in the low wage sector regardless of a grant funding. Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag geht auf theoretischer und empirischer Ebene der Frage nach, wie Lohnsubventionen und Mindestlöhne in Bezug auf Beschäftigungschancen interagieren und wie diese Interaktionseffekte zwischen einzelnen Arbeitnehmergruppen variieren können. Unter der Annahme eines neoklassischen Arbeitsmarktes und heterogener Arbeit verdrängen subventionierte Berufserfahrene berufsunerfahrene Arbeitnehmer. Der Effekt auf nicht subventionierte Berufserfahrene bleibt theoretisch offen. Die empirische Überprüfung für die USA ergibt, dass mit steigendem Mindestlohn die Beschäftigung an Berufsunerfahrenen sinkt, an nicht subventionierten Berufserfahrenen konstant bleibt und an subventionierten Berufserfahrenen buckelförmig verläuft. Für Deutschland hingegen zeigen mehrere Simulationsergebnisse, dass die Einführung des Mindestlohns in Höhe von 8,50 Euro in Verbindung mit bestehenden Lohnsubventionen keine Substitutionseffekte auslöst, sondern die Beschäftigung aller Arbeitnehmer im Niedriglohnsektor unabhängig von deren Förderberechtigung senkt.

Claus Schnabel discusses the reasoning and the consequences of the recent parliamentary draft bill, which intends to restore the traditional principle of one collective bargaining agreement per business in Germany that has been overturned by the Federal Labour Court. The author argues that the empirical evidence on the effects of allowing multiple bargaining agreements and of the recently emerged occupational unions on strikes, wages and transaction costs is weak and does not justify the encroachment on the freedom of association associated with this bill. Ronald Bachmann and Christoph M. Schmidt argue that since 2010, when the Federal Labour Court eased restrictions on multi-unionism, hardly any signs of adverse effects of this court ruling can be observed. Furthermore, the draft bill would have strong negative consequences for small, mainly occupation-based, unions in Germany. Therefore, the bill does not seem to be a good instrument for regulating labour relations in Germany. Martin Henssler welcomes the plans of the German Government to clarify the legal questions arising from a collision of collective labour agreements caused by a revised jurisdiction. Companies need clear guidelines on how to handle the demands of several trade unions. Reciprocally, the trade unions, too, need legal security shown, for example, by the high compensation claims against the Air Traffic Controllers’ Union (GDF) jeopardizing its existence. The legislator should no longer allow the collective labour system in the field of essential services to suffer from a growing discontent of the affected citizens being the main sufferers from the strikes.

This paper critically discusses the reasoning and the consequences of a recent parliamentary bill which intends to restore the traditional principle of one collective bargaining agreement per business in Germany that has been overturned by the Federal Labour Court. It argues that the empirical evidence on the effects of allowing multiple bargaining agreements and of the recently emerged occupational unions on strikes, wages and transaction costs is weak and does not justify the encroachment on the freedom of association associated with this bill.

This article examines the likely effects of a draft bill of the German government which aims at restraining multi-unionism in Germany. We argue that since 2010, when the Federal Labour Court eased restrictions on multi-unionism, hardly any signs of adverse effects of this court ruling can be observed. Furthermore, the draft bill would have strong negative consequences for small, mainly occupation-based, unions in Germany. Therefore, the bill does not seem to be a good instrument for regulating labour relations in Germany.

One basically has to welcome the plans of the German Government to legally clarify the questions arising from a collision of collective labour agreements caused by a revised jurisdiction. Companies need clear guidelines on how to handle the demands of several trade unions. Reciprocally, the trade unions, too, need legal security shown, for example, by the high compensation claims against the Air Traffic Controllers’ Union (GDF) jeopardising its existence. The legislator should no longer allow the collective labour system in the field of essential services to suffer from a growing discontent of the affected citizens being the main sufferers from the strikes. However, the current suggestion of the German Government by far exceeds the extent allowed by the Constitution. Procedural regulations combined with strictly limited constraints of the right to strike on the sector of essential services would be preferable. The political problem consists in the fact that - owing to the current distribution of power - a legal regulation might only be possible on the basis of a most fragile compromise between the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) and the Confederation of German Employers (BDA). Thus, Germany only has the choice of preserving this law quickly submitted to a constitutional examination or of not having a unity of collective bargaining agreements at all. Considering this background, should one not simply try to ask the Federal Constitution Court to reliably outline the frame of a legal regulation consistent with the Constitution? Contrary to the perspective of a scientist, this question can certainly be answered with “yes” from a point of view of the federations and politicians.

This paper examines theoretical and empirical aspects of the employment in Germany from 2000 - 2013. Inspired by Krelle’s (1996) discussion paper relevant German labor market data are traced and it is analyzed to which extend some theoretical employment considerations and labor market reform issues are compatible with the development in Germany. Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag wurde angestoßen durch ein Diskussionspapier von Krelle (1996) und befasst sich theoretisch sowie empirisch mit der Entwicklung der Beschäftigung in Deutschland in der Zeit von 2000 bis 2013. Es wird der Verlauf relevanter Größen des Arbeitsmarktes nachgezeichnet und analysiert, inwieweit einige beschäftigungstheoretische und arbeitsmarktpolitische Überlegungen mit der Entwicklung in Deutschland seit dem Jahr 2000 kompatibel sind.

In December 2014, the German Federal Government adopted a draft law on the exclusive applicability of collective agreements - the so-called Tarifeinheitsgesetz. Critics see this as an unacceptable interference to the freedom of association. They point out, that despite multi-unionism you can neither observe a substantial increase in new trade unions being set up nor an increase in labor disputes. Proponents of the legal regulation argue that the industrial peace obligation would be jeopardized by competing unions. Craft unions negotiated twice as intense as industrial unions. In industries with union competition, risk of conflicts would accumulate. In addition, the public interest would be harmed if unions battled out their rivalries during collective bargaining negotiations. The proposed law tackled these problems by providing stronger incentives for cooperation between competing unions. Zusammenfassung Die Bundesregierung hat im Dezember 2014 ein Tarifeinheitsgesetz verabschiedet. Kritiker sehen darin einen unzulässigen Eingriff in die Koalitionsfreiheit. Sie weisen darauf hin, dass trotz Tarifpluralität keine Welle von Gewerkschaftsneugründungen und auch kein Anstieg der Arbeits kämpfe beobachtbar sind. Befürworter einer gesetzlichen Regelung führen an, dass die tarifliche Friedenspflicht durch rivalisierende Gewerkschaften gefährdet würde. Spartengewerkschaften verhandelten doppelt so konflikt-intensiv wie Branchengewerkschaften. In Branchen mit Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz würden sich Konfliktrisiken kumulieren. Außerdem würde das Gemeinwohl geschädigt, wenn Gewerkschaften ihre Rivalitäten im Rahmen von Tarifverhandlungen austragen. Das geplante Tarifeinheitsgesetz gehe diese Probleme gezielt an, weil es die Kooperationsanreize zwischen rivalisierenden Gewerkschaften erhöhe.