Volume 4, Issue 1 -

Global justice or the lack thereof has internal connections with global poverty. Global justice is an ideal pursuit of cosmopolitanism, which regards basic human needs as its rightful object. The right to life, from the point of view of global justice, is the most fundamental in the list of Human Rights. International anarchy and the current international economic order, however, cast a utopian shadow on the realization of this right when we consider the de facto institutions and the ostensible goal of impartial love for everyone. Humanitarian aid is another approach to the problem of contemporary global poverty. Its difficulty lies first in people’s different conceptions of obligation and donation. They consider the former as duty while the latter is seen to lie beyond the call of duty. Second, in terms of a correlation between right and duty, since everyone has the right to life, the duty falls accordingly upon organizations or individuals. Meanwhile, donation as duty is not perfect obligation, thus is not compulsory either. Finally, international humanitarian aid is constrained by nationalism and partial love. Hence, in the light of either government or individual, the humanitarian aid approach is beset with challenges. Global justice has gained academic importance worldwide since John Rawls’ later works. By contrast to domestic justice, it is a theory of justice that proposes to include all human beings. Global justice stands for a kind of utopian justice in regard to both the institutional path and the humanitarian aid approach. I shall examine the theory of global justice under these two aspects.

Contemporary global justice theories could be introduced and reduced to three kinds: the deontological approach, the theory of obligation, and the theory of self-interest. Our analysis finds that only the theory of obligation and the theory of self-interest provide strong enough justifications for developed states and their people to assist underdeveloped states and their people. However, the theory of obligation requires some special preconditions, and the theory of self-interest cannot proceed in the name of justice, so we conclude that contemporary global justice theories are not tenable.

This article applies the idea of political reconciliation (and with it the rationale of restorative justice) to current debates on global injustices. My underlying thesis is that the idea of reconciliation fits better to the nonideal circumstances of global exploitation and domination. Originally, political reconciliation defines a transitional process from a state of severe injustice to a state of renewed social peace and cooperation under conditions of serious disagreement and in the absence of a well-ordered social structure. What the theory of political reconciliation has to add to nonideal theorizing is that political stability and unity (both domestically and globally) are to be based on a societal healing process that depends on institutional measures of trust-building, truth telling and forgiveness.

This article focuses on the challenge of determining the relative weight of domestic and global justice demands. This problem concerns a variety of views that differ on the metric, function, scope, grounds and fundamental interpretation of justice norms. I argue that domestic and global economic justice are irreducibly interdependent. In order to address their exact relation, I discuss and compare three theoretical models: (i) the bottom-up-approach, which prioritizes domestic justice; (ii) the top-down-approach, which prioritizes global justice; and (iii) the horizontal framework, according to which both domestic and global principles pose equally stringent demands that are to be implemented horizontally, without attributing a simple priority to one over the other. I argue that the third model represents the best overall framework, although more complex normative criteria need to be elaborated on the basis of this approach, affecting issues such as justice in climate change mitigation and adaption, development cooperation, trade, finance, taxation and immigration.

This paper offers a novel reading of Immanuel Kant’s mature political philosophy. It argues that Kant’s doctrine of right is best understood as dealing with the question of how to justify practices of social power. It thereby suggests that the main object of Kant’s doctrine of right should be read in terms of individuals’ higher order power of free choice and action (“Willkür”). It then argues that the main normative problem Kant discusses in the doctrine of right is the problem of domination. While Kant must allow persons the exercises of their capacities for free choice and action for reasons of freedom, the structural upshots of such exercises by a multitude of empirically interconnected persons leads to a structure of private right, which is normatively problematic. This paper suggests interpreting this problem as one of structural domination. This reading sheds new light on Kant’s institutional theory of global justice. It enables us to better understand Kant’s theory of global institutionalization, particularly with regard to the question of why national and global institutionalization are so important in Kant’s theory and with regard to the question of what type of law cosmopolitan law is.

In dealing with the problem of war, how should one seek a proper middle path between absolute pacifism and extreme realism? How can a proper ethics of war be adhered to? Is “just war”, when used as a term for the moral evaluation of war, somewhat vague and ambiguous? This paper argues that in the analysis of various types of war ethics, it is necessary to put forward an “ethical constraints of war”. Such constraints should be valid in wartime, including in the lead-up to war, during the war, and even post-war. Politicians and all the relevant agents are asked to consider not only the motives and intentions behind the war but also the actions and the means of warfare and even the long-term consequences. One should take into account not only the contents but also the grounds of the ethical constraints of war, which directly involves the basic principle of life.

On the level of existential structure, “Shengsheng Buxi” unfolds an existential structure different from Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world”. This paper calls it “being-between-the-generations”. Through this existential structure, it reveals many aspects which Heidegger ignored in his existential analysis. The existence of “I” between generations is, first of all, a conjunction of generations, “this body” has its own origin. Its original facing the Other is to love his/her parents, and showing the structure of “being-together-with-the-generations” in filial piety; family implements the existence of “inheritance”, thus gaining its ontological status in this structure. The state of mood in generations shows the “Enjoyment-at-home” of this-body; at the same time, being-between-the-generations also makes “learning” and “teaching” indispensable and essential moments in the existential structure, and makes the “Project” of “trans-generations” possible. The “historicity” formed by “generations” has an impact on this. Ultimately, in the memorial ceremony of “death of parents and ancestors”, it builds the structure of “being-together-with-the-generations” within a family, and maintains the dimension of transcendence, in the way of filial piety, whose nature is revealed in The Analects as “Tribute to the death of parents and keeping memory of ancestors” (慎終追遠).

The phenomenological conception of “life-world” lays the theoretical foundation for the openness of the world. The founding relationship between the individual and the world, the interactive relationship among different cultural worlds on the intersubjective level, the free nature of truth and its presence in the open world, the “ek-sistent” characteristics of the human-being, the structural constitution of the life-world – all these topics demonstrate the open nature of the world in a phenomenological way. Based on these ideas, “reflective judgment” as “phronesis” and “fear” as ethic sentiment based on family experience become the practical stance, which is consistent with the “life-world” conception of phenomenology; the characteristics of publicness and intersubjectivity of the open world are thus maintained. In the face of the multicultural world, this attitude presents as a brand-new practice of intercultural philosophy, which is different from the centralism found under the framework of monism and the comparative philosophy under the framework of dualism. Such a practice of intercultural philosophy is “polylog”, i.e. based on the principles of difference and equality and searching for the “overlapping consensus” in full multi-participatory discussion. Through polylog, a harmonious life of human community is constructed. This paper attempts to derive a set of practical principles for maintaining the openness of the world and intercultural polylog in the era of globalization from the theoretical view of the phenomenological life-world.

John Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.

The discourse on freedom that Kant unfolds in his writings on the history of philosophy, especially in his essay Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), is a constitutive component of the moral perspective whose key concept is the notion of freedom. This is why critical philosophy, as Kant says, has its own “chiliastic expectation”, and the critical philosopher is a prophet who himself “occasions und produces the events he predicts”. Questions concerning the proper use of freedom – how does freedom position itself in the individual ethics of each person when he/she wants to act morally, how does it position the community in legal ethics when it merges in a liberal state through the peacemaking function of the law, or how does the community of states position itself in international law when, with cosmopolitan intent, freedom devotes itself to a utopian peace mission – these are always questions concerning the concept of freedom which has emerged from a critical process of arbitration.

Historical progress is a core belief of the Enlightenment and modernity, also a spiritual catalyst of human emancipation in the past centuries. However, due to the naive understanding of scholars and its misuse by political power, the idea of progress has fallen from a realistic political belief in the pursuit of liberty and democracy to a metaphysical faith and a one-sided ideology. Instead of abandoning the concept itself, this paper will provide a new version for progress. In this version, supported theoretically with ideas from a Marxian critique of the paradox of progress in capitalist society and a Habermasian reconstruction of social evolution and progress, progress shall not be understood as an intrinsic trend of history itself, but a “historical-practical project” of humanity. The intent of rewriting progress is to transcend the dilemma between progressivism and catastrophism while at the same time preserving its positive meaning.

The paper clarifies first a critical understanding of “progress”. Progress implies a development for the better, the comprehensive definition of which must be a conception of justice if progress is to justify global developments and political rule. Therefore a somewhat minimal but complex definition of “human rights justice”, as formulated in the international human rights pacts since 1948, is explained. Through this, the different but systematically interrelated human rights (liberty rights, justice rights, political rights, economic, cultural and social rights) can allow for reflected and more comprehensive assessments of progress in different areas of development. But it is also necessary to integrate the specific progress developments into a comprehensive conception of human rights justice, the precise definition of which requires not only the observance of social but ultimately of all human rights, and in particular political participation rights. In the final section some problems of this approach will be discussed.

The idea of global justice faces a serious challenge. We live in one global society and many regional and local societies at the same time. The existing plurality of institutional as well as cultural levels of social connection leads to this general question: what is the right site for addressing different questions of justice? Some philosophers argue that the paramount place for thinking about justice is the global level, but other philosophers claim that questions of justice presuppose a certain institutional structure. It is therefore only at the local level, preferentially in the form of sovereign states, where questions of justice arise. I want to argue that it is possible to understand some issues of justice as global in an irreducible way, while other issues are best addressed on a local level not only for pragmatic reasons, but also for reasons that have to do with the normative significance of local institutions, cultural connections and social identities.

It has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

Current scholarship has widely neglected how moral progress is conceived of in contemporary Chinese moral theory. This article ventures into a first exploration of that topic, restricting itself to one conception of moral progress. Given that no fully-fledged Chinese accounts of moral progress are available, its first goal consists in showing how we can even approach and get a grip on the issue of moral progress in the first place. Having identified a specific conception of moral progress, it secondly sets out to problematize and assess that conception. It will become apparent that the emerging account of moral progress is fraught with a specific tension that threatens to undermine the cogency of the whole account. Instead of abandoning the account altogether, I suggest in the end that we have reason to follow its lead. How it is to be further developed will however not be further elaborated.

Over the last years, the debate over global justice has moved beyond the divide between statist and cosmopolitan, as well as ideal and non-ideal approaches. Rather, a turn to empirical realities has taken place, claiming that normative political philosophy and theory need to address empirical facts about global poverty and wealth. The talk argues that some aspects of the earlier “Critical Theory” and its notions of negativity, praxis, and communicative power allow for a non-empiristic link between normative theory and a well-informed social science analysis that is based on experienced injustice. The analysis of border politics and housing politics will serve as an example for a critical theory of global injustice that addresses regressive as well as emancipative developments in society.

This text offers a critique of a certain development in political discourses on progress, namely the “decoupling” of notions of moral from notions of technological progress. This decoupling yields fatal social, economic and ecologic consequences in practice that ultimately amount to a virtual perversion of progress. The second part of the paper reflects upon the psychosocial drivers of this dynamic. I venture that the only motive that may explain why we reproduce this dynamic even as we increasingly suffer from its consequences is a compulsive avoidance of limitation, i.e. non-satisfaction of needs. Finally, I offer some tentative suggestions as to what a mature approach towards limitation would entail.

Die beiden Begriffe „Subjekt“ und „Person“ repräsentieren zwei verschiedene Weisen, wie der abendländische Mensch zum Verständnis seines eigenen „Selbst“ gelangt. Während „Subjekt“ auf eine Selbstzentrierung hindrängt, bedeutet „Person“ von Anfang an eine „selbst-lose“ Einfühlung in den Anderen. Nach der Explikation dieser beiden Schlüsselbegriffe sollen einige weiterführende Reflexionen auf das Problem des „Selbst“ aus der Sicht der chinesischen Philosophie sichtbar machen, wie das Problem von einer post-europäischen Perspektive aus betrachtet werden kann.

In this article, the importance of the namelessness of language will be firstly explained through an analysis of authenticity in Heideggerian philosophy, and will be further clarified by way of the phenomenon of “profound boredom” from his Freiburg lecture. As the exploration of namelessness in Heideggerian philosophy plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between East and West, a brief comparison concerning the idea of namelessness and its underlying philosophy of language between the Heideggerian and the madhyamaka Buddhist tradition will also be discussed.