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This paper looks at constructions with non-clitic auxiliaries in Old Romanian, which precede the generalized option for clitic auxiliaries in the same language. We argue that non-clitic auxiliaries belong to a grammar with genuine SVO, scrambling to Spec, AspP, and subject-auxiliary inversion (SAI as AUX-to Fin). The generalization of the clitic auxiliary entails the loss of these properties, while triggering a parametric shift in word order to VSO, discourse oriented fronting of constituents (to CP only instead of Spec, AspP), and Long Head Movement (LHM through V-to-Focus) instead of SAI. Implicitly, this analysis supports the distinction between A (AUX-to-Fin) and A-bar (V-to-Focus) head movement of verbal elements, and further refines it by showing that these two types of movement do not concern two specific types of heads (i.e., operator for the C domain versus non-operator for the T domain; Roberts 2001, Head movement. In Mark Baltin & Chris Collins (eds.), The handbook of contemporary syntactic theory , 113–147. Oxford: Blackwell), but can affect either of them.

Based on data from extraction, embedded V2, and complementizer stacking, this paper proposes a c P/CP-analysis of CP-recursion in Danish. Because extraction can be shown to be possible from relative clauses, wh -islands, and adverbial clauses, and given that long extraction is successive-cyclic, an extra specifier position has to be available as an escape hatch. Consequently, such extractions require a CP-recursion analysis, as has been argued for embedded V2 and for complementizer stacking. Given that CP-recursion in embedded V2 clauses does not allow extraction, whereas other types of CP-recursion do, we suggest that embedded V2 is fundamentally different, in that main clause V2 and embedded V2 involve a CP (“big CP”), whereas all other clausal projections above IP are instances of c P (“little c P”). The topmost “little” c ° has an occurrence feature that enables extraction but bars spell-out of its specifier.

In this paper, we test the Cumulative Effect proposed by (Haegeman et al. 2014. Deconstructing the subject condition in terms of cumulative constraint violation. The Linguistic Review 31(1). 73–150). In particular, we focus on the role of factors of external syntax in the modulation of subject opacity to extraction, addressing different constraints presented in (Haegeman et al. 2014. Deconstructing the subject condition in terms of cumulative constraint violation. The Linguistic Review 31(1). 73–150). Two sets of formal acceptability judgments are presented. In the first experiment, we address the opacity of subjects from a broad point of view, in order to assess whether subject DPs are more resistant to extraction than other DPs. The results confirm that subject constituents are more opaque to extraction than object constituents. In the second experiment, we address the impact on the modulation of the Cumulative Effect of three different constraints individually: the Freezing Principle, the Inactivity Condition and the Edge Condition. We did that through the manipulation of two different factors: the position of the extraction site and the predicate type. The results do not confirm the predictions made by the Cumulative Effect, since the interaction between different factors does not appear to be additive and incremental. We discuss the implications of these results for the existing theories of subject islands and address an alternative perspective, recently proposed by (Bianchi, Valentina & Cristiano Chesi. 2014. Subject islands, reconstruction, and the flow of the computation. Linguistic Inquiry 45(4). 525–569), according to which the opacity of subjects is a function of the syntax semantics interface.

Research on bilingual grammars from a formal perspective has often come under the guise of mainstream generative grammar. Since the inception of Chomsky’s (1995 et seq.) Minimalist Program (MP), many scholars have adopted the notion of formal features representing abstract grammatical information that can be associated with lexical items. To model changes in bilingual grammars due to the acquisition of particular forms, the attrition of information by means of incomplete acquisition or the lack of usage throughout the course of the lifespan, or due to intense contact with another grammar, the mechanism known as feature reassembly (e.g. Lardiere 1998) – whereby abstract grammatical information in the form of formal features can be detached and reassigned to other lexical items – has enjoyed a great deal of success in the literature. In this article we argue that in spite of this success, the analysis of aspects of bilingual grammars can be improved upon by replacing the notion of feature reassembly with the satisfaction of constraints. Here we provide conceptual and empirical evidence arguing for the adoption of constraint satisfaction in place of the feature reassembly mechanism. Finally, in addition to constraint satisfaction we also make the case for adopting a parallel model of cognition and language for the bilingual mind, which is strongly supported by recent psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies.

Vyvyan Evans’ The Language Myth argues that Chomsky’s program of Universal Grammar (UG) is “ completely wrong,” and it has attracted much recent discussion, some of it laudatory. We set out what we take to be its many serious errors, including: (i) a misunderstanding of the empirical character of the evidence that Chomsky and other generativists have adduced for UG, in English as well as in many other languages, coupled with a mistaken claim that the theory is unfalsifiable; (ii) a confusion of superficial typological universals, or features present at the surface of all of the world’s languages, with UG features that are apparent only under analysis; and (iii) a failure to appreciate the significance of Fine Thoughts (the things one cannot say in natural languages, even though it would be clear what they would mean) as critical evidence of UG, and of the difficulties presented by them for the kinds of “language-as-use” and related empiricist theories that he favors. Indeed, Evans also (iv) fails to address the issues of competence and constraints that are raised by Fine Thoughts and that are a central concern of UG; and (v) conflates UG with a computational theory of mind, a Fodorean conception of modules and a Pinkerean interest in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.