Volume 14, Issue 2 - International Courts and the Quest for Legitimacy

The Article addresses some of the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of the international human rights judiciary. It lays out some aspects of a theory of legitimacy for the international human rights judiciary that seem relevant to addressing two challenges: First, it is difficult to justify the human rights judiciary by appeal to standard accounts of why states agree to subject themselves to treaties. What is the problem the international human rights judiciary is meant to help solve? Second, the human rights judiciary seems undemocratic and even antidemocratic when it overrules domestic, accountable legislatures. Such international judicial review is therefore sometimes thought to be normatively illegitimate, at least regarding democracies.

Many international courts have developed into institutions of public authority; this begs the question of their legitimation. This Article addresses their democratic legitimation and argues that Articles 9-12 of the E.U. Treaty provide a promising blueprint for its conceptualization, fusing theories focused on representation, participation and deliberation. This fusion points the way towards conceiving and developing the democratic credentials of institutions beyond the state in general. Soft law used by international judges, their election, procedure and reasoning will appear in a new light.

This Article develops an understanding of authority as the ability to establish content-laden reference points that participants in legal discourse can hardly escape. Situating authority between coercion by force and persuasion through argument, it carves out recognition and constraint as constitutive elements of authority. Delegation - a conditional grant of authority from principals to agents - is typically taken to account for the authority of international courts and tribunals (ICTs). But the Article argues that delegation is at best only the starting point of ICTs’ authority. The dynamics of the legal discourse stabilize authority and account for its further growth. The conception of authority that emerges from the discussion herein is less one of a command that demands blind obedience than a reference point that redistributes argumentative burdens. Communication is authority’s medium. Taking a step back from immediate normative questions, the Article shows what it takes for ICTs to have authority. It presents the communicative dynamics that build up ICTs’ authority and showcases the discursive resources ICTs themselves use to induce deference. The Article suggests in conclusion that a better understanding of what it takes for ICTs to have authority will also advance questions about such authority’s normative legitimacy.

Public legitimacy consists of beliefs among the mass public that an international court has the right to exercise authority in a certain domain. If publics strongly support such authority, it may be more difficult for (democratically elected) governments to undermine an international court that takes controversial decisions. However, early studies found that while a majority of the public trusts international courts, this was based on weak attitudes derivative from more general legal values and support for the international institutions. I reexamine these claims with data for European courts, the International Criminal Court, and the International Court of Justice. First, using Google search data and media-analysis I find that, at least in Europe, information-seeking about international courts has increased and is at similar levels to national high courts and prominent international institutions. Second, trust in international courts remains strongly correlated with trust in international and domestic institutions. Countries in which more individuals trust their national courts are also countries in which more individuals trust international courts. Individuals who trust their national courts more are also more trusting of international courts. This undermines at least some interpretations of the credible commitment argument: in the minds of the general public, international courts may not be substitutes for poorly performing domestic courts, but extensions of a functioning rule of law system that they already trust.

How can international courts better establish their legitimacy? We can better answer this question by first focusing on what scholars have learned about how national courts build legitimacy over time. The literature suggests that national courts strategically build legitimacy by balancing their own policy preferences with those of their audiences. In so doing, they attempt to avoid instances of court curbing that can diminish legitimacy over the long run. Applying a similar strategy may be more difficult for international courts for two key reasons: (1) they serve audiences with more diverse preferences than national courts; (2) they are less likely to be able to predict which rulings will result in significant backlashes from these audiences.

International courts strive to enhance their legitimacy, that is, they would like the members of the international community to perceive their judgments as just, correct and unbiased even if they do not agree with their specific content. This Article argues that international courts take into account the actors they interact with, the norms they apply, and the conditions they operate under as they try to enhance their legitimacy. It demonstrates strategic behavior towards that end in the judgments of two prominent international courts - the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). International courts interact with states under their jurisdiction and with their national courts. International courts try to preserve their legitimacy vis-à-vis states; at the same time, they want to signal that states will comply with them even if they issue judgments states disagree with. International courts can cooperate with national courts and gain legitimacy from interacting with legitimate national courts. The norms that international courts apply constrain their ability to maneuver their judgments in ways that can help their legitimacy, but at the same time help legitimize their judgments. International courts use various tactics to shape their reasoning in order to improve their legitimacy. The behavior of international courts is scrutinized by the domestic public within each state. That public has certain agendas, priorities and preferences. The domestic public’s agenda is a condition that the court must respond to, but sometimes courts can also shape that agenda to their benefit.

This Article explores the relationship between the legitimacy of international courts (ICs) and expansive judicial lawmaking. We compare lawmaking by three regional integration courts - the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ). These courts have similar jurisdictional grants and access rules, yet each has behaved in a strikingly different way when faced with opportunities to engage in expansive judicial lawmaking. The CJEU is the most activist, but its audacious legal doctrines have been assimilated as part of the court’s legitimate authority. The ATJ and ECOWAS have been more cautious, but there is little to suggest that this caution has enhanced the legitimacy of either court. The ATJ has avoided serious challenges from governments, but its rulings have had little political impact. Conversely, the ECCJ’s circumspection has not shielded it from political opposition to its adjudication of clearly-established human rights. This pattern is at odds with the oft-voiced conventional wisdom that expansive judicial lawmaking undermines judicial legitimacy. Our modest goal in this Article is to problematize that claim and to posit an alternative hypothesis - that ICs spark legitimacy challenges due to the domestic political effects of their decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are expansionist.

International courts are an integral component of the international legal system. These courts have been proliferating over time and increasingly working to ensure state compliance with the rules of the international regulatory regimes they join. However, these courts face a fundamental challenge: while they can rule against governments in violation of the regime’s rules, they cannot enforce those decisions. Working from the first principle that the regulatory regime is designed to help resolve collective action problems among the signees, this Article proposes a formal model of international court influence that helps to explain the extent and limits of international court influence on national government behavior.