Volume 4, Issue 2

Late 2009, the Microsoft Corporation terminated its sales, distribution and upgrading of Microsoft Office Accounting. This article presents an ethical analysis of the way in which Microsoft Corporation effected its decision to withdraw the product with special emphasis on how consumer expectations were formed, maintained and handled throughout the lifecycle of the accounting software in question. The analysis proceeds from initial reflections on and arguments for the ethical significance of consumer expectations – an area which has until recently only received little attention in moral analysis.

In most discussions of the social justice implications of new genetic technologies, enhancements are considered to be highly contentious. This is particularly so when we speak of enhancements that benefit the recipient in positional terms and enhancements that are germ-line and which can be passed on to future generations. I argue that the egalitarian reluctance, as displayed by Max Mehlman (2003:2005), to permitting enhancements is overblown. Recent writings from Buchanan (2008) and Farrelly (2004) highlight a more positive, context-dependent, role for permitting the socio-economically advantaged the freedom to gain access to enhancements, including enhancements of traits associated with positional or competitive advantage. I argue that this reasoning also (necessarily) applies to germ-line enhancements or, at least, to 'effective germ-line enhancements.' In other words, I argue that such enhancements should be more seriously considered in terms of this positive context-dependent role. Nevertheless, this support is not unqualified. I critically re-examine concerns regarding the notion of the genetic underclass and I raise some worries about the possible adverse consequence of such a regulatory framework on sustaining the required egalitarian ethos. Importantly, such worries (and suggestions to address them) will be focused on the adverse effects of inequalities, rather than germ-line enhancements themselves.

The Aarhus Convention lays down a legislative framework for participatory rights in environmental matters and potentially has wide-ranging application in and across the European Union and its Member States. This analysis identifies how these participation requirements can or may be imposed upon the European Commission as it sets about developing a regulatory framework for nanotechnologies. It then proceeds to identify a set of practical guidelines regarding public participation and nanotechnologies that could guide and assist the Commission in its current work on nanotechnology regulation. It is also suggested that these guidelines could provide an appropriate basis for assisting in the development of a suitable regulatory framework for new technologies in the future.

During the last decades several tools have been developed to anticipate the future impact of new and emerging technologies. Many of these focus on ‘hard,’ quantifiable impacts, investigating how novel technologies may affect health, environment and safety. Much less attention is paid to what might be called ‘soft’ impacts: the way technology influences, for example, the distribution of social roles and responsibilities, moral norms and values, or identities. Several types of technology assessment and of scenario studies can be used to anticipate such soft impacts. We argue, however, that these methods do not recognize the dynamic character of morality and its interaction with technology. As a result, they miss an important opportunity to broaden the scope of social and political deliberation on new and emerging technologies.In this paper we outline a framework for building scenarios that enhance the techno-moral imagination by anticipating how technology, morality and their interaction might evolve. To show what kind of product might result from this framework, a scenario is presented as an exemplar. This scenario focuses on developments in biomedical nanotechnology and the moral regime of experimenting with human beings. Finally, the merits and limitations of our framework and the resulting type of scenarios are discussed.

The question what is bioethics is a controversial area of debate amongst practitioners of bioethics, not least because it sets out disciplinary boundaries to practise the subject, which involve deeper assumptions about how one should approach and practise the subject. There are at least four ways of answering the question “what is bioethics?” that raise the controversy aforementioned. These can be identified in the following ways: (1) what has the word bioethics come to mean? What limits of scope should we place on an answer to what is bioethics?; (2) what discipline does bioethics involve? Does it involve a single disciplinary perspective or does it involve many disciplines?; (3) are there different cultural principles or values to be contested in bioethics?; and (4) conclusions - what methodological approach should we adopt in answering the question what is bioethics?

The paper discusses Dr. Floris Tomasini's paper “What Is Bioethics: Notes toward a New Approach?”. Based on Tomasini's account of methodological and ethical pluralism, the paper explores the demarcation problem of bioethics and suggests a full methodological laissez-faire.