Volume 4, Issue 3 - The Convergence of the Physical, Mental and Virtual

Under what conditions can robots become companions and what are the ethical issues that might arise in human-robot companionship relations? I argue that the possibility and future of robots as companions depends (among other things) on the robot’s capacity to be a recipient of human empathy, and that one necessary condition for this to happen is that the robot mirrors human vulnerabilities. For the purpose of these arguments, I make a distinction between empathy-as-cognition and empathy-as-feeling, connecting the latter to the moral sentiment tradition and its concept of “fellow feeling.” Furthermore, I sympathise with the intuition that vulnerability mirroring raises the ethical issue of deception. However, given the importance of appearance in social relations, problems with the concept of deception, and contemporary technologies that question the artificial-natural distinction, we cannot easily justify the underlying assumptions of the deception objection. If we want to hold on to them, we need convincing answers to these problems.

Information and communication technologies (ICTs), with their increasing and widespread utilization in daily life, may exert an important impact on brain performances. The development of their use for improving several cerebral processes, by abolishing the brain/machine interface, is envisaged and is subject to debate. The scientific research on brain implants and brain gene transfer aiming to restore central nervous system functions, altered by disease or trauma, may contribute to this debate. Indeed, the advances that are enabling non drug-mediated approaches for direct interventions on the brain are raising the possibility not only of restoring neural functions for therapeutic purposes, but also of monitoring, controlling and ultimately modifying from the outside these functions for enhancement. This paper gives an overview of the state of the art of brain implants and brain gene transfer for neurological diseases with a particular emphasis on Parkinson’s disease and a forecast on their possible application for other conditions. In doing so, the authors, who are neuroscientists working in the field of gene transfer for neuropsychiatric diseases, aim to establish a scientifically, medically and technically realistic framework to open up discussion on relevant ethical issues in this domain.

This comment responds to a remark made by Meloni et al concerning brain implants and brain-gene transfer—that we ought to give primacy to ethical issues inherent to medical utility rather than speculating on issues of potential misuse. It foregrounds the benefits, burdens and risks as well as how to validate consent to the use of such novel and uncertain techniques. It asks how legal claims would be handled in the absence of historical casuistry—constructs of responsibility and culpability for resultant harms. Finally, it confronts the practical question of how decisions about who receives state-of-the-art treatments are addressed, deliberated and articulated. Are we looking at a new “boutique neurology” or widely accessible applications requiring substantive changes in the health-economic infrastructure and better preparedness in practice and policy?

This paper discusses current clinical applications and possible future uses of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) as a means for communication, motor control and entertainment. After giving a brief account of the various approaches to direct brain-computer interaction, the paper will address individual, social and ethical implications of BCI technology to extract signals from the brain. These include reflections on medical and psychosocial benefits and risks, user control, informed consent, autonomy and privacy as well as ethical and social issues implicated in putative future developments with focus on human self-understanding and the idea of man. BCI use which involves direct interrelation and mutual interdependence between human brains and technical devices raises anthropological questions concerning self-perception and the technicalization of the human body.

In this article, four different practical experiments in robotics and human/machine merger are firstly described and then considered with regard to their ethical implications. Results from the experiments are discussed in terms of their meaning and application possibilities. The article is written from the perspective of scientific experimentation, opening up realistic possibilities to be faced in the future rather than giving conclusive comments on the technologies employed. Human implantation and the merger of biology and technology are key elements.

This comment responds to Kevin Warwick’s article on predictability and responsibility with respect to brain-machine interfaces (BMI) in action. It compares conventional responsibility for device use with the potential consequences of phenomenological human-machine integration which obscures the causal chain of an act. It explores two senses of “responsibility”: 1) when it is attributed to a person, suggesting the morally important way in which the person is a causal agent, and 2) when a person is accountable and, on the basis of fairness about rewards and sanctions, has a duty to act responsibly and accept liability. The comment suggests that, in the absence of absolute knowledge and predictability, we continue to engage in practical forms of reasoning about the responsibility for BMI-use in ways which are inclusive of uncertainties about the liability of persons versus devices and those who create them.

This comment reminds us that technological developments can redraw the boundaries of our concepts, introduce new ones and change interpretations, and it asks to what extent the BMI experiments covered by Kevin Warwick’s article have such implications. The distinction between human enhancement and improvement is raised and the fact that consenting to uncertain and unforeseeable outcomes is always challenging. But why is it more challenging to consent to an intelligent implant, although it may change emotions, personality and even identity, than consenting to other interventions that risk one’s life? Our bodies and psychological states undergo enormous changes over time, some of which affect freedom of action. Natural functions of the brain can be as much of a threat to freedom of action, personality and identity as a BMI or drug use. How we are to understand the “I” is an ongoing philosophical puzzle, but an intelligent implant may well be acceptable if natural brain function no longer does what the “I” wants it to do.

This comment responds to Kevin Warwick’s article on the uses of implants. It foregrounds how human frailty can undermine the promise that new ICTs will assist the vulnerable and deliver better services, safety and security. For example, the type of data in an RFID implant could readily be used to identify and eradicate certain kinds of individuals. We need to question the priority of values in our societies, and there is a need for swift critical thinking, looking beyond the mantra of “convenience” in order to sort out what the real societal benefits could be. Ethical deployment and use of ICTs hinges on the implementation of accountable, open, transparent and responsive government, the rule of law and justice, and societal respect for human dignity and equality.

This reply is a response from Kevin Warwick to the comments made by Holm and Voo, Chadwick and Lodge to his article in this issue.