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We argue that Bohrian complementarity is a framework for making new ontological sense of scientific findings. It provides a conceptual pattern for making sense of the results of an empirical investigation into new realms or fields of natural properties. The idea of “formation length” engenders this mutual attunement of evidence and reality. Physicists want to be able to ascribe ontological features to atomic constituents and atomic processes such as “emission”, “impact”, or “change of energy-state”. These expressions supposedly refer to “local” forms of physical change that in sum constitute the possibility of there being a “global” (for example an atomic) system of possible states. We argue that it is only because we can act it out in the design of experiments that we can make sense of the link between classical and quantum theoretical systems. We need the notion of formation length in order to express the principle that the atom is a causal unity. This not in the sense of being the ground for a particular kind of causality, but in the sense of unifying the grounds for the variety of causal manifestations that constitutes the atom.

Kant’s motto for enlightenment, Sapere aude! , captures important aspects of how the best of Enlightenment thought was radical in the literal sense of probing the roots of fundamental concepts, principles and institutions, in both the natural and in the moral sciences. Here I re-examine a fundamental Enlightenment innovation that has been lost beneath the academic and administrative fray: A sound reconception of how to identify and to justify basic, universally valid moral principles without appeal (whether pro or contra ) to moral realism, to ‘motivational sets’ or to our human responsiveness and responses. Kant’s motto for enlightenment thus also holds for our knowledge and understanding of the Enlightenment, and of enlightenment. Kant’s critique of our finite, limited but vitally important powers of rational judgment identifies central aims, methods and skills of liberal education which are increasingly important in our globalizing, yet also destabilizing world, in which these aims, methods and skills go unremarked even by advocates of active learning, of the liberal arts and of their vital roles in today’s rapidly changing world.

Depiction and imagination are intimately linked. In this article, I discuss the role imagination (as well as inference and knowledge/belief) plays in depiction, with a focus on photographic depiction. I partly embrace a broadly Waltonian view, but not always, and not always for Walton’s own reasons. In Walton’s view, imagination plays a crucial role in depiction. I consider the objection to his view that not all cases of depiction involve imagination – for instance, documentary photographs. From this discussion, two points will emerge: first, we will see that it is an unnecessary mistake to insist too heavily on the fact that photographs are produced in a mechanical way (as opposed to, say, paintings), and second, we will see that the notion of “imagining-seeing”, as it is articulated by Walton, is perhaps too strong and does not entirely do justice to the external character of the role imagination plays here. Focusing mainly on photographs, I then illustrate the view I want to advocate by a series of different cases, where the nature of the role that imagination, knowledge/belief, and inference play in depiction will become apparent.

The article discusses the place of leisure in Hans Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology, focusing on “Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit” (2007). According to Blumenberg, the tradition of philosophical anthropology unjustly reduces human rationality to the attempt of self-preservation. Not only is the actual process of anthropogenesis better described as led by a logic of prevention, not of preservation. Sedentary life, product of preventive behavior, not only secures survival but grants leisure as the condition of culture. Yet cultural practices, although an eminent product of human rationality, cannot be explained by the logic of either self-preservation or prevention. Blumenberg thus argues that within philosophical anthropology, rationality can best be explained in is orientation towards happiness, an orientation encompassing not only preventive, conceptual forms of reason, but also contemplative, non-conceptual uses, such as in myth and mysticism. As the condition for articulating a self-understanding more adequate than self-preservation or prevention, leisure thus assumes a central place in determining human nature. It is in leisure that rationality is experienced as a source of happiness.