Depiction and imagination
-
Jiri Benovsky
Abstract
Depiction and imagination are intimately linked. In this article, I discuss the role imagination (as well as inference and knowledge/belief) plays in depiction, with a focus on photographic depiction. I partly embrace a broadly Waltonian view, but not always, and not always for Walton’s own reasons. In Walton’s view, imagination plays a crucial role in depiction. I consider the objection to his view that not all cases of depiction involve imagination – for instance, documentary photographs. From this discussion, two points will emerge: first, we will see that it is an unnecessary mistake to insist too heavily on the fact that photographs are produced in a mechanical way (as opposed to, say, paintings), and second, we will see that the notion of “imagining-seeing”, as it is articulated by Walton, is perhaps too strong and does not entirely do justice to the external character of the role imagination plays here. Focusing mainly on photographs, I then illustrate the view I want to advocate by a series of different cases, where the nature of the role that imagination, knowledge/belief, and inference play in depiction will become apparent.
References
Benovsky, J. 2012. Photographic representation and depiction of temporal extension. Inquiry 55(2): 194–213.10.1080/0020174X.2012.661583Search in Google Scholar
Benovsky, J. 2014, The limits of photography. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22(5): 716–733.10.1080/09672559.2014.923015Search in Google Scholar
Carroll, N. 1995. Critical study: Mimesis as make-believe. The Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178): 93–99.10.2307/2219853Search in Google Scholar
Carroll, N. 2008. The Philosophy of Motion Pictures. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.Search in Google Scholar
Hopkins, R. 1995. Explaining depiction. The Philosophical Review 104(3): 425–455.10.2307/2185635Search in Google Scholar
Hopkins, R. 2012. Factive pictorial experience: What’s special about photographs? Noûs 46(4): 709–731.10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00800.xSearch in Google Scholar
Husserl, E. 1907. Ding Und Raum: Vorlesungen 1907. 1991 Edition. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.10.28937/978-3-7873-3244-1Search in Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason. P. Guyer and A. Wood (trans.)Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.Search in Google Scholar
Levinson, J. 1998. Wollheim on pictorial representation. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56(3): 227–233.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0014Search in Google Scholar
Nanay, B. 2010. Perception and imagination: Amodal perception as mental imagery. Philosophical Studies 150(2): 239–254.10.1007/s11098-009-9407-5Search in Google Scholar
Peacocke, C. 1987. Depiction. Philosophical Review 96(3): 383–410.10.2307/2185226Search in Google Scholar
Phillips, D. 2009. Photography and causation: Responding to Scruton’s scepticism. British Journal of Aesthetics 49(4): 327–340.10.1093/aesthj/ayp036Search in Google Scholar
Scruton, R. 1981. Photography and representation. Critical Inquiry 7:3.10.1002/9780470696651.ch6Search in Google Scholar
Walton, K. 1984. On the nature of photographic realism. Critical Inquiry 11(2): 246–277.10.1086/448287Search in Google Scholar
Walton, K. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.10.2307/2108134Search in Google Scholar
Walton, K. 1997. On Pictures and photographs: objections answered. In: R. Allen and M. Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy. 60–75. Clarendon Press: Oxford.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198159216.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Wollheim, R. 1987. Painting as an Art. Andrew M. Mellon Lectures in Fine Arts, National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. Cambridge.: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Wollheim, R. 1998. On pictorial representation, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56(3): 217–226.10.2307/432361Search in Google Scholar
©2016 by De Gruyter Mouton
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Nature’s affordances and formation length: The ontology of quantum physical experiments
- Back to the 3 R’s: Rights, Responsibilities and Reasoning
- Depiction and imagination
- The pleasure of the non-conceptual: Theory, leisure and happiness in Hans Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Nature’s affordances and formation length: The ontology of quantum physical experiments
- Back to the 3 R’s: Rights, Responsibilities and Reasoning
- Depiction and imagination
- The pleasure of the non-conceptual: Theory, leisure and happiness in Hans Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology
