Volume 15, Issue 4

Should rights be publicly or privately enforced in the case of digital piracy? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of illegal non-monitored channels raise important issues for the design of anti-piracy policies. We study the impact of these demand-side policies in two enforcement settings (namely, public and private enforcement settings) with an outside adoption option for users of an illegal non-monitored channel. Our results show that public enforcement generates higher monitoring and lower price levels, and also higher legal welfare than private enforcement. However, we identify potential conflicts of interest between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of the illegal non-monitored channel is low. Introducing supply-side policies, i.e. policies targeted to suppliers of illegal content, we find that they may have unexpected impacts and can damage legal welfare. We also identify situations in which the two policies are substitutes or complements.

We study the impact of net neutrality on the content market with endogenous product differentiation. We show that when the Internet service provider is allowed to offer different connection qualities to content providers, it has incentives to favor contents that have a broader market feature. This biases content providers towards choosing those broader products, which may result in too little product differentiation in the content market. By eliminating the possibility of discrimination, net neutrality can reduce such distortion in the content market, and induce more efficient product choices. Net neutrality also raises social welfare if the extent of discrimination is relatively small compared to the extent of product differentiation.