Volume 4, Issue 1 - Special issue: Empedocles’s metaphysics, Guest editor: Anna Marmodoro

Empedocles posits six fundamental principles of the world: Love, Strife and the four elements ( rhizōmata ). On the cosmic level, he describes the interaction of the principles as an eternal recurrence of the same, i.e. as a cosmic cycle. The cycle is subject to a time-table the evidence for which was discovered by Marwan Rashed and has been edited by him in 2001 and 2014. The purpose of the present paper is to show that this timetable is based on the numerical ratios of the Pythagorean tetractys .

This essay argues that Empedocles envisaged the elemental “roots” fire, water, earth, and air as having their own life cycles and undergoing their own transformations like virtually everything else in his system except Love and Strife. Empedocles conceives of the elements’ destruction and generation in terms of their losing and recovering their distinctive qualitative identities as they intermingle through Love’s agency and grow apart through Strife’s. This result makes it possible to understand the crucial verses Physika I.234–36 as Empedocles’ general description of the dual processes involved in the generation and destruction of all specimen compounds.

How is it that Empedocles’ world is is an organized system of diverse entities and how does this system of maintain regularity over long periods of time? I suggest that it is the impulses and thoughts of the roots and of Love and Strife that answer these questions. Love and Strife, working within the laws of nature provide the major structural aspects of the cosmos: the circular motion of the whirls created by the opposing forces produce the masses of roots that are worked up into the heavenly bodies and the living things that populate the cosmos. It is useful to conceive of Empedocles as a proto-power-structuralist. The basic ingredients of the world are ontologically prior to the medium sized objects of sensible experience: it is not the case that there are underlying Aristotelian subjects with properties and attributes depending on those subjects.

When Empedocles uses a divine name for one of the items in his ontology, does this serve merely as a poetic metaphor or does it mean that the item in question is a god, with personal agency and intentions? In Empedocles’ poem, most things are described as if they were intentional agents and seem to function as such. Is there anything in the universe that does not have a mind or does not engage in intentional action? In this paper I argue that Empedocles was talking of a universe in which all the components, without exception, are living beings with mental capacities and that their power is the power of agents, acting voluntarily, not of inanimate forces acting mechanically. There is nothing in Empedocles’ ontology that could be described as inert matter, and there are no inanimate things.

In Empedocles’ zoogony, an original set of single-specialism organisms – solitary hands, eyes, etc. – combined into complex organisms, of which the fittest survived. A less recognized anticipation of (one strand of) the Darwinian tradition relates to the superorganism theory: what is naturally selected for is not the individual and/or its kin, but, as most manifestly in insect colonies, the cooperative group. Empedocles’ Love likewise works by promoting co-operation, whose emergence in complex organisms reflects her growing power, and the periodic world-organism, Sphairos, her ultimate triumph. This latter divinity is not a homogeneous blend of the elements, but a single self-sufficient superorganism.