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The aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of the mirror as a methodological tool, with which Plato discusses reflection and describes the mimetic phenomena. The notion of the mirror first presents Plato’s view on the metaphysical division of the world. It then accounts for Plato’s hostility towards the poets and reveals that the ideal polis is the product of a special kind of philosophical mimesis. I argue that Plato’s own mirror is the dialogues he writes, and the perfection of his mimetic activity is juxtaposed to the hazardous imitations of the poets.

Hylomorphism is almost universally claimed to be a staple doctrine of Aristotle. In this paper, I discuss a wide range of texts from the dialogues of Plato that straightforwardly display hylomorphism. Both Plato and Aristotle rest their cognitive realism on their hylomorphism. The crucial difference between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and Plato’s is that Aristotle believes that hylomorphism supports and is supported by essentialism whereas Plato does not. Plotinus presents arguments against Aristotle’s essentialism at the same time as he defends Platonic hylomorphism and his cognitive realism.

This paper presents a reading of Metaphysics  Z.10–11 according to which both chapters outline two main  definienda : forms and material substances or compounds, each of which is governed by its own peculiar constraints. Forms include formal parts alone; furthermore, they are the main definable items and enjoy the strictest possible unity. However, this does not preclude Aristotle from upgrading material compounds (whose essence is stated in hylomorphic terms) to the status of definable items in their own right. Z.10 explains this contention by making the compound’s sensible functional matter dependent on its form. This dependence affords the resulting compound an unusually tight form-matter relationship, strong enough to ensure its definability, despite falling short of the highest kind of unity that only forms display.

At EN VII.6 1149 a 24- b 3, Aristotle offers an argument for the conclusion that akrasia due to thumos is less shameful than akrasia due to epithumia . The reasoning in this argument is obscure, for Aristotle makes two claims in particular that are difficult to understand; first, that in some way thumos “hears” reason when it leads to akrasia , and second, that thumos responds to what it hears “as if having syllogized” to a conclusion about how to act. This paper argues that previous attempts to understand these two points have failed. It offers an account of the first difficult claim, but concludes there is not enough material in the text to determine what Aristotle means when he says thumos responds “as if having syllogized”. Nevertheless, the paper ends by offering an account of this remark that is Aristotelian in inspiration, even though it admittedly goes beyond anything that can be gleaned from the text.

Commentators usually understand the Epicureans to take friends and friendship to be worthwhile because they help us to eliminate and/or manage our bodily and/or mental pains and thus come closer to achieving tranquility. However, this understanding leaves unexplained why friends and friendship might be worthwhile to an advanced Epicurean with few or no pains to manage or eliminate. In this paper, I remedy this deficiency by offering three explanations for why friends and friendship could and maybe would remain worthwhile even to the Epicurean who achieves tranquility. Along the way, I explore some problems with each explanation and consider ways to overcome them. Notwithstanding these problems, I conclude that friends and friendship could and perhaps would be worthwhile even to the Epicurean with few or no pains.