Volume 8, Issue 3

In the sciences the outside evaluation of past performances of universities, faculties, departments, research groups and of individuals has become more and more frequent, nearly incessant. It could be said that the sciences are afflicted with “Evaluitis”, a creeping and widespread illness. Besides the obvious costs that arise for those being evaluated and for those doing the evaluation there are additional costs that weigh heavily but are usually disregarded: incentives are distorted systematically and ossification is promoted. Furthermore, the whole decision approach is wrongly conceived. For these reasons there are too many and too thorough evaluations. A useful alternative is an appropriate design of institutions guiding incentives and a careful selection of persons - who thereafter should be free to pursue their tasks.

Public complaints about the growth, complexity and volatility of tax legislation abound. Against this background, the present article gives an account of the quantitative development of tax legislation in post-war Germany. We find that the legislative output did not increase over the decades. In general, the output is higher during the 12 months before a federal election than during the first 12 months after. Furthermore, the legislative output is not affected by a split majority in the upper and lower houses. Finally, we find that an increasing fraction of this legislation is passed in December. This growing “December fever” reduces the available time to adapt for taxpayers, tax-lawyers, and tax authorities and is a plausible explanation of the growing discontent with tax policy.

From a public finance perspective, the article discusses alternative allocation policies for public broadcasting. Referring to a scheme for the optimal procurement of public goods two solutions are shown to be optimal, depending on the initial situation: Assuming a public service mission, public broadcasting is to be treated as a pure public good. Thus, it should be funded via a compulsory levy. Payers should include total population above a specific age. However, questioning the public service mission, public broadcasting represents a club good, which should be funded via voluntary contributions of actual users. To accomplish this, country-wide digitalization is necessary, which will be realized in Germany not before 2010.

From a public finance perspective, the article discusses alternative allocation policies for public broadcasting. Referring to a scheme for the optimal procurement of public goods two solutions are shown to be optimal, depending on the initial situation: Assuming a public service mission, public broadcasting is to be treated as a pure public good. Thus, it should be funded via a compulsory levy. Payers should include total population above a specific age. However, questioning the public service mission, public broadcasting represents a club good, which should be funded via voluntary contributions of actual users. To accomplish this, country-wide digitalization is necessary, which will be realized in Germany not before 2010.

The European Union’s Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation contracts. The article presents an evaluation of calls for tenders with respect to ecological services in agrarian landscapes in a case study area in Germany. Results from two auctions clarify that differentiated offers were made by the farmers in the model-region. This comprises a practical potential for a more efficient use of public funds by the use of auctions compared to a uniform premium, as it is used in current agri-environmental programs.