Volume 63, Issue 3

Dogmatic debates in early Christianity shaped philosophical discourse just as Greek philosophy offered the conceptual tools to engage and, accordingly to crystalize early Christian practice, into a formal system of belief. Thus, in the recently-published The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics , Johannes Zachhuber notes that “Patristic thought as a whole can be identified as a Christian philosophy.” Following suit – though not without nuance – this paper suggests treating Patristic scriptural exegesis as an exercise of speculative philosophy, as evidenced in Augustine’s interpretation of the figure of the cross at Eph 3.18, where the cross progressively becomes a simple yet compelling paradigm of divine manifestation. This paradigm can be framed according to Augustine’s mature articulation of the ‘ontological principle’ of manifestation in s. 165: “From the depth which you cannot see rises everything that you can see.” By engaging in scriptural exegesis, within a gestalt where Wisdom, sacred and profane alike, merge in the incarnate God manifest in Christ, Augustine articulates unprecedented philosophical principles.

In a relational epistemology and ontology, we are allowed to speak freely about the existence of atoms, chairs, love, and God, on the condition that we are prepared to give an account of the relations we have to them. At first sight, Caputo seems to endorse such a relational view. When it comes to concepts like democracy, hospitability, justice, and God, though, Caputo argues that the relations we have to the realities to which these concepts refer inhibit us to speak of their existence. They are events which insist, but do not exist. In this article, it is argued that the differences between the relations of human beings to existing X’s and the relations of human beings to insisting X’s are not as fundamental as to make a distinction in principle between insistence and existence. In our relational view, insistence is a particular instance of existence.

Zusammenfassung Dieser Beitrag fokussiert den von Hans Jonas in Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz. Eine jüdische Stimme als Antwort auf die Theodizeefrage skizzierten Mythos und setzt ihn in Beziehung zu Fiktionalitätsdiskursen. An die Darstellung und Erläuterung des Mythos schließen sich Ausführungen zu den ihm zugrundeliegenden Quellen (u. a. Gnosis, Kabbala, Hegel) sowie zu Jonas’ eigenen Reflexionen zur Textgattung und zu den Kernaussagen des Mythos an. Nach einer christlich-theologischen Würdigung der jonasschen Religionsphilosophie wird der Mythos unter Bezugnahme auf Fiktionalitätsdiskurse betrachtet und auf Berührungspunkte mit jüdischen, christlichen und gnostischen Weltentstehungs- und Welterklärungserzählungen aufmerksam gemacht.

This paper investigates the concept of missio Dei at Willingen and beyond, and identifies its most remarkable feature which regards God as the initiator and subject of mission, thereby redefining missio ecclesiae with three striking characteristics: first, all places of the world including both the immediate neighborhood and the uttermost parts of the earths; second, all spheres of life such as society, politics, economy and culture; and finally, all events of the time such as catastrophes in the history. In so doing, this paper clearly discovers that missio Dei is here approached primarily in a differentiation from or a sharp contrast to missio ecclesiae from the start, and that, for that reason, the concept of missio Dei at Willingen and beyond has not been fully trinitarian, though it often mentions the triune God. And it also discovers that it goes further either toward an emphasis on culture on the one hand, or toward that on the world on the other hand. Such being the case, this paper suggests that it is necessary to consider the implications of the doctrine of the Trinity for mission more fully to reconfigure the concept of missio Dei . Due to some limits, this paper does not deal with this issue full-fledgedly, but intends to suggest a couple of guidelines for doing so. First, we need to approach missio Dei quite differently, that is, primarily not in relation to missio ecclesiae but in relation to processio Dei , that is, the procession of the triune God. Second, noting that, since the early church, missio Dei has been understood primarily in relation to processio Dei , we need to keep in mind that we could not discuss missio more fully without dealing with processio , and vice versa . If we have these two guidelines in mind, the concept of missio Dei would be much more abundant and fruitful. Further studies on some particular implications of the doctrine of the Trinity for mission need to be done in missiology and also theology in general in the near future.

In this article, I propose a different reading of Foucault’s newly published work than suggested by the publishers and in initial reviews. I question the claim that it represents the fourth volume of the History of Sexuality and rather propose to regard it as an intended second volume. Comparing Foucault’s final plan of publication of the series with the background and stated purpose of Les aveux de la chair , I hold that it is part of a different philosophical project than volumes two and three. Foucault wrote Les aveux de la chair to explore the roots of modern power in the experiences that early Christianity occasioned. This makes the work relevant for current theology and the philosophy of religion.

In his Encyclopedia , the late Hegel makes the highest demands on truth and justification from the first paragraph onward. With this, Hegel takes up the skeptical challenge and believes that he can overcome this problem. However, it is not easy to see how Hegel tries to meet this challenge in the Science of Logic , which plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s encyclopedic project. The present article argues that the question of the justification of the claim to truth is a fruitful perspective for the interpretation of the Science of Logic . For this purpose Hegel’s answer to the Agrippan Trilemma is examined, which P. Franks analyzed as a basic problem for Classical German Philosophy . One possible interpretation of Hegel sees him solving the skeptical trilemma at the beginning of the Logic . The article argues against this possibility that the Logic of the Concept contains Hegel’s actual solution. This solution consists in (1) that the concept represents the principle of logic and (2) that the concept itself must be presented in the form of an apagogical argument. Finally, the article gives a reason why Hegel sees an analogy to the ontological argument in this attempt of an ultimate justification.