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Cheerfulness or serenity ( Heiterkeit ) is one of the most important themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Throughout his writings, from first to last, he can be found wrestling with conceptions of cheerfulness and promoting a cheerful mode of philosophizing. Despite the importance and recurrence of the theme of cheerfulness in Nietzsche’s entire œuvre, there have been relatively few studies specifically devoted to it. An important debate on cheerfulness has recently taken place in the literature on Nietzsche between Robert Pippin and Lanier Anderson and Rachel Cristy. Both sides of the debate have explored Nietzsche’s practice of cheerfulness in direct relation to Montaigne. According to Pippin, Nietzsche never succeeds in writing with the kind of cheerfulness of Montaigne. In contrast, Anderson and Cristy have contended that both Nietzsche and Montaigne conceive of cheerfulness as a complex, non-naïve spiritual state or attitude that is to be cultivated through the practice of philosophy as a way of life. According to Anderson and Cristy, this is a deep form of love of life that both Nietzsche and Montaigne practice and perhaps achieve at least in part by and through writing. In this essay, we aim to contribute to this debate by offering a threefold argument. First, we argue that Nietzsche conceives of cheerfulness not only as a psychological ideal, as a desirable state or attitude of the spirit, but also as an aesthetic ideal, as a desirable quality or style of thinking and writing (sections 1–2). Second, we argue that, in addition to Montaigne, Ralph Waldo Emerson is an equally important but neglected influence on Nietzsche’s conception and practice of cheerfulness (section 2). Third, by reconstructing Nietzsche’s self-presentation as a cheerful thinker and writer in the 1886 prefaces and in Ecce homo (1888), we conclude that it is possible to argue that starting from his middle writings Nietzsche thinks and writes cheerfully in some of his works, including a number of his most significant texts (section 3).

The Catastrophe of the Ascetic Ideals from an Intercultural Perspective. Science, Asceticism and Nihilism in GM III 27. This article aims to clarify the meaning and strategic position of the parentheses on the development of philosophy in India in GM III 27. Nietzsche’s reference to the philosophical development in India reveals his intercultural considerations and helps clarify the relations between science and ascetic ideal as a moment of the historical-genealogical reconstitution of European nihilism. I argue that honest forms of atheism and science contain the core of the ascetic ideal and that the critique of nihilism is therefore inevitably self-referential. Nietzsche’s intercultural view sheds new light on important current philosophical questions such as the scope of Giorgio Agamben’s homo-sacer -project and on the prospects of non-European philosophical perspectives.

Having started with a harsh critique of the “contemptible money economy” (UM III, SE 4), Nietzsche subsequently travelled back in time in order to discern the origins of its values and to formulate goals that would “transcend money and money-making” (UM III, SE 6). Having traced the “greed of the moneymaker” back to the ressentiment of the “ascetic priest” (GM III 10–5), Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry culminated in his discussion of the slave revolt in morality. A particular feature pertaining respectively to the domains of material debts and moral guilt was their reliance on an enduring revaluation of values. The manner in which Nietzsche connects the moneymaker’s world of material debts to the priest’s domain of the slave morality reveals a number of striking structural parallels to Plato’s, and to some extent Aristotle’s, discussion of the uneasy accommodation between democracy and moneymaking. Highlighting and exploring these similarities, which remain largely overlooked in the current scholarship, adds to our understanding of Nietzsche’s undertaking.

Interpreting Nietzsche’s writings on agency and responsibility through the lens of non-sovereignty generates interpretive and political-theoretical contributions. More specifically, I advance three arguments. First, Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of moral responsibility denaturalizes modernity’s conception of individual sovereignty and responsibility, by providing a naturalistic account of agency. Agency and responsibility are neither Kantian presuppositions of practical reason nor pieces of folk psychology to be abolished, but are normative, social, and historical achievements, and thus non-sovereign. Second, this implies a theory of responsibility that is simultaneously more and less demanding than moralistic accounts: while, because agents are not autonomous, they do not bear sole responsibility for their lives, they are called upon to be responsible to and for the world, by maintaining the conditions of possible agency and flourishing. Third, Nietzsche provides both generative resources and cautionary tales for political theories of non-sovereign agency. While non-sovereign responsibility holds emancipatory and potentially democratic implications, Nietzsche’s explicit political writings demonstrate the risk that, rather than tempering existential resentment, this account could generate and intensify a resentful anti-political authoritarianism. Just as non-sovereignty provides a useful framework for making sense of tensions within Nietzsche’s thought, Nietzsche’s post-moral theory of agency and responsibility brings forward tensions, provocations, and paradoxes that must be engaged by theorists of non-sovereignty.

The article is divided in three main parts. The first part shows that the first three chapters of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) give a genealogical account of the emergence of reason in human history, and that this account involves the claim that reason is a development of human engagement with social rules: Nietzsche understands the emergence of reason as the emergence of a normative space of reasons. The second part interrogates Nietzsche’s conception of value, purpose, and meaning in order to show that he is not a proponent of any version of “bald naturalism”: he does not equate what is “really real” with a natural world of causation devoid of value, purpose, and meaning. The third part of the article shows that, although Nietzsche’s perspectivism does not assign to the space of reasons the status of a purely autonomous realm of justification, he does not dismiss rational normativity, or the space of reasons, as merely illusory. Nietzschean genealogy is shown to be a reflective questioning of our values that investigates the reasons behind our deeper normative commitments.

The Birth of the Philologist from the Spirit of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy. Nietzsche’s Inaugural Lecture On the Personality of Homer . This essay highlights Schopenhauer’s decisive and unexplored role in Nietzsche’s Über die Persönlichkeit Homers (1869). Following Schopenhauer’s negative assessment of the study of history, Nietzsche criticizes F. A. Wolf’s organic systematization of the sciences of antiquity (inspired by Schelling and Hegel) and foregrounds the aesthetic dimension of philology. Contrary to Wolf, Nietzsche believes that historical investigation is subordinate to the essential pedagogical function of philology; and only through its aesthetic component can philology establish which literary works of antiquity are to be considered truly “classical.” The debate on the Homeric question after the publication of Wolf’s Prolegomena ad Homerum (1795) illustrates that philologists have paradoxically become opponents and “destroyers” of the ideal of antiquity. Nietzsche shows how a methodological approach inspired by Schopenhauer’s philosophy can revive the relationship between philology and art. Nietzsche’s arguments to counter Wolf’s thesis about the problem of Homer’s personality implicitly rest on Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. In particular, through Schopenhauer’s conception of genius, Nietzsche rehabilitates the individuality of the poetic author of the Iliad and Odyssey, even though this poet does not correspond to the one referred to as “Homer” in antiquity.

Nietzsche presents a challenging conception of aesthetics. One of the most well-known discussions on this issue is presented by Heidegger in Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst (1936/37). In discussing Nietzsche’s aesthetic theory, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s reception of Kantian aesthetics is only ever indirect and necessarily mediated by Schopenhauer. His conclusion hinges on what he considers to be a widespread misinterpretation of Kant’s theory of the beautiful, a misinterpretation that begins with Schopenhauer but characterizes all of Kant’s followers, especially Nietzsche. In this paper, I will consider Nietzsche’s position toward aesthetics from a different perspective, namely in the space between Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s position. The argumentation departs from Nietzsche’s early critique of teleology; his first approaches to aesthetics in Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872); and his position on the concept of causality and morality. As a careful interpretation of GM III 6 will make clear, Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche misinterprets Kant is made questionable by the fact that Nietzsche here distinguishes Kant (especially his emphasis on universalism and impersonality as central features of aesthetic judgments) from Schopenhauer’s approach and proposes an artist-based aesthetics in which it is rather Stendhal’s idea of beauty as “une promesse de bonheur” which expresses the human need for illusions in Nietzsche’s conception of aesthetics.

Zarathustra initially describes churches as the stale caves of world-denying priests. However, following his encounter with the eternal return of the same, Zarathustra overcomes this resentful atheism. The pure sky that Zarathustra desires above all else, a sky emptied of the gods, is not visible again through the holes in ruined church roofs, but really thanks to these holes. The pure sky is an image of the world liberated from the teleological time of theistic providence, indeed even from the divine necessity that pantheism attributes to the world. Yet for all that it is god-less, the pure sky is acknowledged to be a gift of the same metaphysical-Christian history of God that it only seems to negate: the sky’s pure eye peers through holes in church roofs. Zarathustra, though an “old atheist,” can now love “even churches.” I call this Zarathustra’s affirmative atheism. I also link affirmative atheism to the conception of eternal recurrence as a self-abolishing anti-teaching. In the eternal return, Zarathustra’s atheism is finally indistinguishable from a history of churches and therefore negates itself. But although it is not a new teaching, affirmative atheism points to something novel. This is an atheism that can no longer be taught in doctrines but must be lived as fate.

This article describes the role Don Quixote plays as a character and as a novel in Nietzsche’s work. Against the background of German romanticism’s reception of the novel, and by identifying the status of the novel, its characters, its author (in his duplicity) and its reader, I argue that Don Quixote plays a problematic role in Nietzsche’s writings: his character is at once the paradigm of the metaphysical individual caught in metaphysical illusions, the mocked receptacle of the ressentiment of readers and of Cervantes himself, but Don Quixote also represents the experience of a deep suffering (which I call “transcendental”), revealing the world outside the simulacra of metaphysics. This investigation leads us to draw parallels between Don Quixote and Christ, but also Zarathustra, and to rehabilitate a certain form of suffering, inherited from a certain understanding of Christ, in the work of Nietzsche.

In this essay, I examine Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche, focusing centrally on his understanding of the Nietzschean “body.” Nietzsche’s status as the culminating figure of Western metaphysics depends on the notion that the body, in Nietzsche’s thought, is the last Western subject. I confirm Heidegger’s sense of the importance of the Nietzschean body, and, in particular, the centrality of the word “incorporation” ( Einverleibung ), to a proper understanding of Nietzsche. I argue, however, through a critique of Heidegger’s own understanding of “incorporation” in Nietzsche’s work, that an investigation of the body in Nietzsche does not reveal him to be an unwilling participant in the metaphysical tradition beyond which Heidegger seeks to move; rather, we should see in the Nietzschean body a human finitude that has more resonances in Heidegger’s own thought than Heidegger would care to admit. Ultimately, I show, an investigation of the actual dynamics of the Nietzschean body, as read through the careful tracing of the word “incorporation” to which Heidegger invites us, yields a fundamentally delimited body that operates according to what we might call a kind of physiological asceticism.

Luce Irigaray’s writings on Nietzsche’s philosophy belong to the groundbreaking interpretations of his work and they also confirm the continued relevance of his philosophy. Unlike most male-centric philosophers, Nietzsche not only saw that sexual difference was becoming one of the major philosophical issues of our age. He was also keenly aware of how it permeated our philosophical tradition with its dualistic models, which is one reason for Irigaray’s interest in it, as has been widely discussed in feminist/queer philosophical research into her Nietzsche interpretation. Another common denominator of Nietzsche and Irigaray are their philosophies of the body. Interpreters of Irigaray have pointed out how her conception of embodied, sexuate being calls for a new way of philosophical thinking (Grosz), and Stegmaier interprets the liberation from prejudices we encounter in Nietzsche’s works as a “liberation of philosophy.” How can the liberation of philosophy be understood in the way we practice philosophical thinking? In the following interpretation of Irigaray’s book The Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche (1980), I show how it offers a theory and a practice of embodied philosophical thinking, which I will discuss in light of new phenomenological methodologies of embodied thinking (Gendlin, Petitmengin). Irigaray’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy in Marine Lover is both critical and constructive as apparent in her interpretation of Dionysus and Ariadne. On the one hand, this couple represents for her the patriarchal tradition of philosophy that she claims Nietzsche is still stuck in, and on the other hand, it also represents a liberation from resentment and misogyny in relations of the sexes. The notions of listening to oneself and to the other, being touched and tearing, enable such a liberation, both on the level of relations of the sexes and on the level of philosophical dialogues and thinking that Dionysus and Ariadne also represent. The water/ocean in the title of Marine Lover indicates how this is a philosophical text that displays an explicit processing and articulation of feelings, emotions, and affects in philosophical thinking.

Hans Vaihinger and the Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv. The Letters to Richard Oehler . Hans Vaihinger’s letters to Richard Oehler document the ideological constellation in the context of the First World War. Unconcealed enthusiasm for the war, associated national-chauvinist resentment, and pronounced anti-communism immediately after the war clearly emerge. At first sight, this may be surprising, since Vaihinger is generally regarded as a progressive liberal pacifist. As this article attempts to make clear, however, it is also evident in Vaihinger’s case that the First World War and its immediate aftermath led – at least temporarily – to quite questionable intellectual attitudes even among declared pacifists. In this respect, Vaihinger’s letters to Nietzsche’s cousin, librarian at the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar and later convinced National Socialist Richard Oehler are evaluated as revealing documents of contemporary history.

After meeting in Zurich, Nikos Kazantzakis and Elli Lambridi undertook a number of Nietzsche pilgrimages in Switzerland together in 1918, beginning with a trip to Silvaplana. At the time, Kazantzakis had written a thesis on Nietzsche and had translated The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–85) into Greek, while Elli Lambridi was enrolled in a PhD in philosophy at the University of Zurich writing on Aristotle. They continually debated the nature of the philosopher-type in relation to Nietzsche and Dionysianism, and this philosophical engagement is the central topic of this paper. Lambridi envisaged a Dionysian philosopher fully engaged in an ethical and natural life within a community of others and also envisaged a derived politics of affirmative communal responsibility. Kazantzakis considered that the philosopher should take a much more Apolline, spiritually focused and solitary path, continually ascending toward heroic self-redemption. As well as examining their recorded exchanges, this paper also addresses the fictional resumption of their relationship in The New People , a novel which Lambridi wrote some time after Kazantzakis’ death. In the novel, they resume their discussion of the philosopher-type in 2118, in an eternal recurrence event. In the end, the male character, Petros, learns that the grounding event of a Dionysian Nietzscheanism is an instinctive promise of responsibility for the future of others.

A century and a half after the Kulturkampf in Germany, and three decades after James Davison Hunter’s account of the “culture warriors,” this book review examines what Nietzsche might have to say to us today about our understanding of the past and our relation to the future. It considers two studies of the four essays of Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen taken as a whole, one study of Nietzsche’s second essay on history, one on Nietzsche’s general conception of decadence and culture, and a collection of essays on Nietzsche’s views of history and memory. Taken together, these studies not only complement (rather than contradict) each other in respect of their readings of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen and the question of culture, they also throw light on other aspects of Nietzsche by reminding us of the rootedness of Nietzsche’s thought in the outlook of Weimar classicism and highlighting the vitalist aspects of Nietzsche’s thought. The review concludes that Nietzsche is more timely than ever, not least because of his critique of education, as well as his attention to such key themes as identity politics, Erinnerungskultur , and museumization; it is still possible to agree with Nietzsche’s sentiments as expressed in a motto from an early notebook of July 1862: “I prefer the past to the present; but I believe in a better future.”

Nietzsche and Medicine. Especially in times of a pandemic, dealing with terms such as health, illness, healing and medicine is of particular interest. Three recently published books are devoted to the problem of medicine in Nietzsche’s work. In addition to impulses for contemporary medical-ethical debates, this review articles discusses Nietzsche’s relationship to the ancient philosophy of medical self-care, the concepts of suffering, illness and health as well as the influence of the contemporary natural sciences on Nietzsche’s understanding of medicine. Nietzsche’s view of medicine has already been the subject of several other recent publications: in addition to the publications that deal directly with Nietzsche’s understanding of medicine, I will also discuss those focused on the effect of Nietzsche’s scientific reading on his work as well as publications on the topics of illness and health and on the role of ancient dietetics, therapeutics and self-care within Nietzsche’s thinking.

Nietzsche’s relationship to the literary output of his time and his later influence on it is the theme unifying the two anthologies and the monograph under review. While Nietzsche’s stature among philosophers is now secure and uncontested, his philosophical reception in the early years was delayed and overshadowed by his literary reception: enthusiastically endorsed by writers, he was disparaged as a Dichterphilosoph by academic philosophers. But by aligning Nietzsche with positions in contemporary philosophy, commentators now underappreciate Nietzsche’s literary style(s) and his desire to be seen as one of the great literary stylists and innovators. These studies redress that imbalance. They raise the larger question of what constitutes philosophy and suggest that his philosophizing breaches the divide that some place between the disciplines of philosophy and literature, particularly in an era of great academic specialization. Their goal is to show the importance of literature for Nietzsche, both in his capacity as a reader and as an author, and they approach this question from an interdisciplinary angle, combining aspects of literary science and philosophical history.

Nietzsche as Reader. This collective review summarizes and critically reflects on the results of four recent publications. On the one hand, this involves a typology of the specific mode of reception with which Nietzsche often incorporates seemingly selective readings into his thought and subsequently allows them to become productive in his writings; on the other hand, I am also dealing with the exceptional importance of Italian philology for current research into the influences on Nietzsche. The German-Italian conference volume Corrispondenze estetiche focuses on Heinrich Heine’s influence, but it also discusses in a sophisticated way the tension between the two authors in the context of the history of nineteenth-century aesthetics. Vivetta Vivarelli’s study discusses the motif of eternal recurrence in various references to contemporary poetry, while Benedetta Zavatta presents the ultimate study of Nietzsche’s reading of Ralph Waldo Emerson.