Volume 9, Issue 2 - Human Rights and the Human Minds

In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

This is a critical comment on an Article by Joshua Greene in which he uses brain studies and contemporary psychological findings in order to settle the dispute between consequentialist and deontological theories. I first summarize Greene’s main claims and later raise several objections to them. In contrast to Greene, I argue that consequentialist theories are bound to use first order intuitions and their soundness depends on the degree to which they yield practical guidelines that are intuitively plausible. Further, I differ with Greene and contend that deontological theories are not merely rationalizations of first order intuitions; in fact, their findings often conflict with such intuitions. Last, I argue that the mere fact that deontological judgments are emotional or, more accurately, are processed in those parts of the brain that are responsible for emotions, does not affect their soundness.

Traditional interpretations of legal doctrine have seen the actus reus and the mens rea as independent elements of a crime. Here it is argued that various puzzles surrounding the nature of intent and of attempt can be better addressed if we reject that idea. Following Williamson’s account of knowledge, it is suggested that the two are inseparable. The crime consists in the performance of an intentional act. It follows that an act has been performed and that the performer is in a certain mental state. But these cannot in general exist independently of each other.

The morality of killing in war, which has been the subject of debate among philosophers and legal scholars, focuses on two main approaches: the “traditional” and the “revisionist.” The traditional approach argues for symmetry: soldiers of both sides are liable to be killed, whether or not the war they fight is just; civilians are immune from being harmed whether or not they are responsible for the evil against which the just side fights. Recently this approach has been challenged by a revisionist viewpoint, which derives the morality of killing in war from facts concerning the responsibility of individuals for wrongful threats. Killing soldiers, who fight a just war, is morally impermissible, whereas in certain cases killing civilians who are involved in an unjust aggression is permissible. The present study uses an experimental survey to examine whether moral attitudes toward targeting individuals in war are shaped by the factors underlying this debate: the cause of the war, the status of the targeted individuals as soldiers or civilians, and their involvement in the war effort. Respondents comprised a representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel. Our findings reveal a complex interplay between the factors, demonstrating the relevance of each factor to moral judgments. Notably, participants did not consider decisions on the battlefield to be independent of the justification of the war, a result which is consistent with the revisionist approach. We discuss the potential consequences of our findings on the understanding of commonsense morality and on the law. We also suggest that concepts derived from the social-psychological literature concerning moral self-regulation may help explain some of our findings.

Some constitutional accounts, in particular in the U.S., emphasize government attitudes to harming rights. Up till now, such accounts have primarily concentrated on intention to harm rights and on government acts of illicit intentions. However, such accounts have neglected a large scope of government attitudes that indicate indifference to harming rights rather than intention. In our article we use insights from experimental philosophy to develop an account of the role of indifference in constitutional law. We propose that the results of the Knobe Effect experiment show that the correlation between intent and indifference can be explained by the idea that indifference shows a lack of respect for the value or for the person harmed. Indifference, therefore, manifests a similar wrongness in terms of moral attitude as intent. The implications in terms of constitutional law are substantial. In principle, government actions manifesting indifference toward harming rights should be reviewed on the same lines as government actions based on intention to harm rights.

There is a growing body of work illustrating that we can motivate individuals to donate more to charities by nudging them through various behavioral techniques. Yet, there is very little discussion of whether we should motivate individuals by using these types of techniques. In this paper, I explore this under-examined matter. I begin by surveying the various ways in which individuals can be nudged to donate to charity. I then consider whether we should nudge people in these ways. I explore this matter by considering whether nudging interferes with an individual’s autonomy and, if it does, whether this is morally impermissible. I argue that, in some cases, nudging will interfere with an individual’s autonomy. I spell out which cases these are. I then argue that whether interfering with an individual’s autonomy through nudging, as a means of alleviating poverty (and, in turn, promoting human rights), is impermissible will depend on whether we have perfect or imperfect duties to aid the poor. I close by suggesting that, at least for the time being, the moral permissibility of nudging poverty alleviation is indeterminate.