Volume 9, Issue 1 - Human Rights and the Human Mind

It seems fair to say that human rights law takes the human as given. Human beings are particular kinds of entities with particular kinds of psychologies and propensities, and it is the job of human rights law and human rights enforcement to govern that kind of entity, be it through sanctions, education, incentives, or other mechanisms. More specifically, human rights law takes human brains as given. If humans were different kinds of beings, both the mechanisms of getting compliance and possibly the very rules themselves would be different. The purpose of this essay is to very tentatively start to tie together thinking in neuroscience, bioethics, and human rights law to ask whether human rights law should take the nature of human beings, and more specifically, human brains, as given. I sketch the alternative possibility and examine it from a normative and (to a lesser extent) scientific perspective: instead of merely crafting laws and setting up structures that get human beings such as they are to respect human rights, that the human rights approach should also consider embracing attempts to remake human beings (and more specifically human brains) into the kinds of things that are more respectful of human rights law. This is currently science fiction, but there is some scientific evidence that moral enhancement may one day be possible. I call the alternative “moral enhancement to respect human rights law.” To put the aim of the essay in its mildest form it is to answer the following question: if it becomes possible to use enhancement to increase respect for human rights and fidelity to human rights law (whatever you think is constitutive of those categories), and in particular in a way that reduces serious human rights violations, is it worth “looking into?” Or, by contrast, are the immediate objections to such an endeavor so powerful or hard to refute that going in this direction should be forbidden.

The paper highlights how our knowledge about the manner the human mind works and people behave in social interactions may contribute to our understanding of employment discrimination and provide effective ways to address it. It calls for a rigorous empirical study of the mechanisms generating different forms of discrimination against disadvantaged groups and the implications that follow for law and policy. The paper’s focus is theoretical, criticizing the current state of research on employment discrimination and calling for an integrative approach to the research in this area. In particular, the paper criticizes the lack of mutual communication among the various disciplines that study discrimination. Over-reliance on one type of methodology limits scholars’ ability to address nuances of most discriminatory settings. We criticize the “one policy fits all” approach, in which discrimination against all types of disadvantaged groups is viewed as capturing all types of discrimination as well as the lack of truly accounting for the interplay between deliberative and automatic modes of reasoning. The paper suggests that adopting an integrative perspective would raise awareness among policy-makers and employers to variations in the effects of social categories on hiring, promotion, and firing practices.

There is an ongoing debate over the ethical permissibility of using biomedical enhancement interventions. This debate has generated a variety of concerns; one worry that stands out in this regard is the question of coercion. Curiously, although pointed out by many, this concern has not received close scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to begin addressing this conceptual gap. In order to explore this concern, I employ Alan Wertheimer’s understanding of coercion. According to Wertheimer’s account coercion involves a wrongful threat in which one has little choice but to succumb. Moreover, the wrongfulness of the threat stems from the fact that it violates the coercee’s rights. I suggest that if one accepts this account, it follows that coercing people to enhance would be impermissible. Using this framework, the paper assesses the claim that competition over jobs, goods, and positions coerces people to enhance. I argue, however, that competition pursued within a proper legal framework cannot be coercive since it neither involves a wrongful threat nor violates a person’s rights. Nonetheless, I propose that although competition is not coercive, enhancing because of competitive pressure can be morally problematic as it could restrict personal autonomy and harm well-being. The paper explores strategies the State could devise in order to address both these concerns. The paper then examines whether there are noncoercive permissible ways to induce people to cognitively enhance. Using a number of hypothetical cases, I delineate criteria that could be used to determine whether a particular enhancement should be considered mandatory or otherwise encouraged. Specifically, I consider the circumstances under which it would be justified to use incentives and penalties in order to induce people to enhance.

The central ambition of human rights advocacy is to get people to care, who might otherwise not, about the suffering of others. To accomplish this, human rights advocates often appeal to moral intuitions by telling stories that evoke moral outrage, indignation, or guilt. Are these sorts of appeals a good way to promote human rights? The conventional wisdom suggests that they are. But perhaps the conventional wisdom is incomplete – perhaps human rights advocates should treat moral intuitions with skepticism rather than uncritical embrace. In this brief essay, I argue that appeals to moral intuitions are problematic because moral intuitions can lead people to make decisions that are suboptimal from the standpoint of the human rights regime’s goals. I attempt to show, in other words, that one of the great assets of the human rights regime – its ability to harness our strong intuitive reaction to the suffering of others – is also one of its great limitations. To make this argument, I draw from the mind sciences literature on moral decision-making. The latest research in this domain suggests that our moral intuitions are fallible. A number of studies have shown, for example, that moral outrage and indignation can cause people to make decisions that they would not defend under cooler conditions. I focus on three particular sorts of moral judgment biases and explore their implications for human rights advocacy. I then evaluate two different normative claims one might make about these moral judgment biases and offer several concluding thoughts.

A rich body of literature on employment discrimination exists. Theoretically, discriminatory practices are explained by taste-based discrimination, differences in the bargaining ability of applicants or statistical discrimination. Global experimental research tends to show significant anti-minority attitudes in the hiring process, specifically at the entry stage into the engagement cycle – when an application and resume are sent to the prospective employer. These field studies often employ “correspondence tests,” in which identical, fictitious resumes are sent to employers with differences only in the racial, gender, religious or national origin of the applicant (e.g., the name of the applicant). Yet, the literature is lacking in at least three areas: First, evidence from correspondence tests has primarily focused on middle-range wage earners, and little research exists on low-wage or high-wage earner positions. Second, research has looked at employment discrimination that excludes certain groups, but has neglected possible prejudice that “locks” such groups into unqualified or underpaid positions. Finally, there may also be a place-based effect – in which diverse communities are less discriminatory than more homogeneous communities, or vice versa. In this paper, we report on two population-level experiments with seven independent correspondence tests that were conducted in the Israel labor market, both designed to fill these three lags in the literature. We tested the likelihood of (a) Israeli-Arab lawyers versus Jewish lawyers being asked to job interviews at Israel’s largest law firms ( n = 178); and (b) Mizrahi Jews versus Ashkenazi Jews being asked to job interviews, in any one of the registered security firms ( n = 369). We compared which groups are more likely to be called for interviews and then meta-analyzed the results using standardized differences of means. Our findings suggest significant overall employment discrimination against both Arab-Israelis and Mizrahi Jews, whose applications are overall less likely to be both acknowledged by the prospective employers and asked for interview – despite the applicants having identical qualifications. However, we find that the effect in low-wage jobs is conditional on geographic location, with evidence to suggest that in some regions there is no preference toward either ethnicity. We find no support for a locking effect. We discuss the findings in the broader theoretical context, but suggest that a more granular application of the theory is called for, which takes into account community dynamics and the level of localized ethnic integration.