Volume 93, Issue 1 -

I provide a documentary study of all testimonies (literary, epigraphical, numismatic, archaeological) relevant to the archaic legislation and to the forms of political organization in this Greek colony in pre-Roman and Roman period. In particular, to better understand the constitutional structures of Elea in pre-Roman era, I based on the comparison with Phocaea, Massalia and Naples documentation. Finally a significant number of local Greek and Latin inscriptions demonstrate for Velia (and not only for Tarent, Neapel e Rhegion as Strab. VI 1, 2 C 253 assumes) the survival of Greek magistrates and institutions – e.g. the gymnasiarchie and the mysterious pholarchie – into the first century AD, within the framework of a Romanised Italy.

Solon′s stasis law is part of his political reforms. The interpretation of the law is much disputed. Many scholars consider it an attempt to nip civil war in the bud because rival aristocrats had to expect that the majority of the Attic citizens would oppose them. An examination of the early references for stásis demonstrates that this word could sometimes refer to a civil war but often it merely denotes a conflict or a splitting of community in two groups in a controversial political situation which could be decided by a voting to avoid a violent conflict. In this context the stasis law is not an appeal to the citizens to take up arms in case of a civil war, but can be interpreted as obligation to take part in a voting. The context in which the law is handed down suggests a connection to charges carried out by the Areopag. Trying to establish a tyranny, fighting for a high office or delivering a harsh political conflict, the Areopagites were obliged to take sides for or against the charged person. Hence, the stasis law could be seen as a less formalised predecessor of ostracism. Possibly as the voting had not proved its worth at the Areopag, Cleisthenes applied the decision to the assembly of the people and substituted the obligation to voting for a minimum quorum.

The article aims (firstly) to show that Alexander′s view of the world was forged by the concepts of Greek philosophical (scientific) geography. These theoretically founded ideas were (secondly) controlled and modified during his campaigns against the Persian Empire and beyond, which thus became also a geographical expedition.

Our sources draw an inconsistent picture of Parmenion: On the one hand he is portrayed as a throughout loyal general whom the king trusted from the crossing of the Hellespont to the summer of 330, when he left him stationed in Ekbatana with a large force and the royal treasures, and to whom time and again he assigned important and honourable jobs, and on the other hand as a vacillator and ignoramus, nay in the case of Alexander′s illness as an intriguer, whose advices, if they had been followed, would have disgraced the king, would have diminished his glory and could even have been fatal. Reproaches of that kind are very often traced back to Kallisthenes, but in fact have been invented only after Alexander′s death.

To realistically assess Punic politics and strategies in the second Punic war it is necessary to detach oneself from the pro-Roman point of view of our sources and their limited focus on Hannibal. Not only he, but an entire elite shaped the Carthaginian war strategy, which was decided upon and coordinated by the government in Carthage. Their main premise was to avoid war on African soil at all costs. Therefore they focused their efforts on ensuring the supply of Punic troops in Italy and on enlisting support from allies in Italy and elsewhere. Until Roman victories in the Iberian Peninsula and Carthage′ s obligations towards her Italian allies overstretched the available resources, Carthage managed to hold together this strategic system. The Carthaginian war aim of achieving a Mediterranean balance of power grew more and more distant as the war continued. Rome, on the other hand, relying on her superior reserves in manpower, won a complete victory.

By giving Antiochus III the status of a “friend and ally of the Roman people”, the Romans drew him into the framework of their diplomacy, thus making him liable for observing Roman diplomatic principles and practices. This follows from the Roman understanding that Roman friends were obliged to have the same friends and enemies as the Romans and, therefore, to refrain from attacking other Roman friends. The Romans applied this system in both the west and the east. It is erroneous, therefore, to say that the Roman approach to friendship changed once the Romans moved into the eastern Mediterranean, particularly in connection with the Illyrian wars, as some have argued. Nor is it viable to view Roman friends as Roman clients, because having a client required a commitment, whereas Rome had no obligations to her friends unless – for specific reasons, which are also examined in this article – she made treaties with them.

The roman republican senate managed to fund war expenses by means of a tax, called tributum ex censu , which covered the needs of its armies, such as foodstuff, clothing and soldiers′ pay. This paper will deal with the actual payment of military salary, which fell under the responsibility of the quaestor and its officials, as well as the tribuni aerarii . However, the historical evidence on their primitive activities remains rather obscure, particularly in the roman antiquarian tradition, as their functions might have been obsolete already at the time.

The present paper raises the question concerning the model of Sallust′s controversy between Caesar and Cato about the punishment of the Catilinarian conspirators. According to communis opinio Sallust follows the Thucydidean debate about Mytilene, according to Willy Theiler′ s hypothesis he follows another controversy transmitted by Diodorus ( bibliotheke XIII) and ascribed by some to Ephorus, by others to Timaeus. The conclusion reached is that Sallust′ s antilogy as well as the debate transmitted in Diodorus is based on Thucydides, but that the manner and respect of their imitations is rather different in either case.

This paper re-examines the sources reporting on the campaigns of Asinius Pollio in 40/39 BC, and reviews the scholarly debate about the targets and aims of his campaigns. In the debate a new source is introduced, the passage on Pollio′s conquest of Salona, from the medieval Historia Salonitana of Thomas the Archdeacon of Spalatum (Split). The analysis shows that the passage from Thomas does not correspond with any known source and it suggests that he used a more substantial report on the siege and capture of Salona, probably from the textual tradition of the Vergilian scholia , which sprung from the lost commentary of Aelius Donatus. The existence of this textual tradition about Pollio′s campaign in central Dalmatia in the Vergilian scholia and the “Epitomes” of Florus, in conjunction with Horace′s mention of Pollio′ s Dalmatian triumph, makes it more certain that Pollio campaigned in central Dalmatia.

The extraordinary discovery of human remains in oven No. 10 in front of the main military camp of Haltern provides archeological evidence for the existence of Germanic warrior groups (usually characterized as “bands of followers”) during the early Roman Empire. Scientific analysis of the bones demonstrates that warriors from various tribes not only joined together for military operations, but also sometimes traveled long distances to do so. For various reasons, an exact dating of the placing of the remains is not possible. It can thus only be surmised that they are connected with the events of the year 9 A. D. or of subsequent times.

In the following paper, the Eἰς βασιλέα, an anonymously-written speech found in the corpus of the works of Aelius Aristides, is interpreted as a mirror for princes, with special attention paid to principles of good governance. It delineates the ideal of a responsible, fair and level-headed sovereign, and focuses on the notion of power employed for the common good of the sovereign′s subjects. The anonymous orator makes extensive use of literary topoi originally developed by Xenophon and Isocrates, as well as those recommended in Menander′s rhetorical handbook. Notably puzzling in the speech is the complete absence of individual traits of the addressee.

On the background of traditional numismatic typology and of a late republican to imperial literature, in which Britain as well as India played an important topic role symbolizing Roman claims to world-rule, the billon coinage of Theodosius the Great reflects the beginning of the latter′s dynastical propaganda. In 383 the emperor had his father, of late officially declared national Roman deity in the eastern dominions, depicted on his cruise to/from Britain during his insular campaigns of 368/69. His victories seem to have been propagated as a manifestation of divine provision for the future rule of his house. This was expressed in accustomed terms of ancient world-age ideologies: According to the divine plan, with the completion of a world-era of 300 years – in terms of number-symbolism attested by the Tau -cross – after the ‘final’ subjugation ob Britain by Agricola in 83, Arcadius as the grandson of Theodosius the Elder was destined to ascend the throne in 383. The rejection of the new eastern typology by Gratian, as well as it′s only limited acceptance by Valentinian II, attest that the foundation of a new eastern dynasty strongly offended the House of Valentinian. Magnus Maximus may well have exploited the resulting strain between West and East as well as the contested dynastical propaganda of his alleged relative Theodosius for his own aspirations to supreme power.