Volume 29, Issue 1

This article engages with A’s “Crop Rotation” in Either/Or —the “boredom” essay—as a source for serious thought on the modern crisis of faith. Exploring A’s portrayal of the modern subject as isolated and self-enclosed, a “bored” condition linked to its radical autonomy and self-directed existence, it suggests that A’s explanation for this condition still holds today: modern humans’ self-assertion (and hence self-isolation) emerges as a response to a profound loss of meaning. Through an existential reading of A’s essay, it highlights A’s notion of “demonic pantheism” as illuminating what lies behind boredom, namely, a relatable experience of disillusionment following the loss of meaning—in other words, “existential doubt” or a crisis of faith.

This study shows that, for Kierkegaard, the crisis of faith plays an essential role in the life of faith. To demonstrate this, it compares pseudonym Johannes de silentio’s portrayals of religious crisis in Fear and Trembling with similar sketches in Strengthening in the Inner Being , an edifying discourse published on the same day as Fear and Trembling. Kierkegaard agrees with de silentio that the life of faith is tethered to struggle, but unlike his pseudonym, who is baffled by the source of Abraham’s bold trust, Kierkegaard is more confident about identifying that which gives him strength: an inner, divine affirmation.

This paper argues that Kierkegaard uses “spatiation”—a typographical mode of emphasis—to conceptualise human existence and simultaneously call into question the givenness or stability of a concept of existence. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript , spatiation serves as a potent visual of the problem of existence. By conceptualising existence as spatiating, Climacus at once emphasises and dissolves his concept to encourage thinking about what it means to exist without resolving the difficulties of actual existence. While largely overlooked in Kierkegaard scholarship, taking into account spatiation thus offers insights into Kierkegaard’s influential foregrounding of existence and his existentially oriented approach to philosophising that seeks to engage his readers as existing and embodied individuals.

This paper will give a secularized account of the role that intersubjectivity plays in an individual’s despair. I will investigate the dynamics that might bring one individual to actively try to bring another into despair by working their way into the other’s self-relation. I will argue that such dynamics result from defiance, which is a form of despair, and will illustrate my point using Faust’s relationship to Margarete as an example. However, I will also keep in mind that despair is a “dialectical” sickness and that one’s defiance, when confronted to its own limits, might have to shift in order to subsist.

In this paper, we re-evaluate Kierkegaard’s theory of life stages (or spheres) and suggest an alternative interpretation. This alternative approach to the stages will serve as a corrective to problems arising from interpretations promoting an ethical-religious stage, or which elide distinctions between stages entirely. To support this interpretation, we will examine the role polarity plays within the stages, the necessity of respecting the boundaries Kierkegaard draws between stages, and advocate for a greater recognition and appreciation of religiousness A within the broader theory. Our hope is to reveal new avenues for understanding Kierkegaard’s ethics, while also contextualizing the pseudonyms in a way that brings greater clarity and consistency between their respective contributions and his broader oeuvre.

Interpretations of Vigilius Haufniensis’ analysis of anxiety in the literature can be mainly classified into two models. One holds that anxiety is a phenomenological companion to freedom, whereas the other explains it through the phenomenon of frailty or volitional weakness. Curiously, however, scholars holding one model rarely mention the other. I suggest that this results in a partial understanding of Haufniensis’ concept of anxiety. Building on these two popular models, I argue for a more holistic reading that anxiety is rooted in the human’s structural freedom that is not absolute but limited, qualified by three conditions of evil—ignorance, the possibility of frailty, and the possibility of defiance.

For Kierkegaard, the problem of evil is the existential challenge of our entanglement in evil, suffering, and sin. Sin is not a “negation” but a “position,” not a moral wrongdoing or lack of virtue, but a distinctive condition in which humans live. Nor is evil simply a lack or absence of good, but the weakening, obstruction, and destruction of good. This paper traces Kierkegaard’s account of evil and sin in his major writings in terms of despair, boredom, and fear. Sin and evil do not question God’s love, but rather become the occasion for God to create good out of evil, life out of death, being out of nothing.

This article explores the psychological phenomenon of the transgenerational transmission of trauma. Søren Kierkegaard’s conception of original sin serves as a template for the argument. After outlining the complex psychological process of trauma transmission, the article gleans insights regarding the transgenerationality of trauma as found in Kierkegaard’s thinking. With a focus on The Concept of Anxiety , the article highlights parallel structures of displaying and penetrating original sin and the transmission of trauma. The article argues that the Christian perspective on salvation proves to be a substantial dialog partner for the secular understanding of posttraumatic healing.

Neoliberalism has come to be understood not only as an economic system, but as a mode of existence that understands the self as primarily the bearer of human capital. This paper contrasts the neoliberal ideal of selfhood with Kierkegaard’s notion of the self as developed in The Sickness unto Death. Using Kierkegaard’s typology of despair as an analytical framework, I argue that the neoliberal subject displays an impoverished grasp of the various elements that, for Kierkegaard, are constitutive of the self, and shows serious deficiencies in its understanding of what it means to live a meaningful life.

In the 1830s and 1840s, there was a decisive conflict between the Danish followers of Hegel and his opponents. The latter criticized Hegel’s philosophy for being overly abstract and having lost touch with reality. Kierkegaard is given credit for this criticism and for establishing a new philosophical direction that rejects abstraction and focuses on the concrete experience of the individual. The present article argues that there was nothing particularly new about Kierkegaard’s rejection of abstract philosophy and his attempt to emphasize actuality and life. In fact, the conflict was wider and extended to many other Danish thinkers at the time who were critical of precisely this point in Hegel.

Among the many discussions Kierkegaard had with his Copenhagen contemporaries, his dispute with the Icelandic theologian Magnús Eiríksson over Kierkegaard’s theory of faith is particularly noteworthy. In the various drafts that Kierkegaard developed in response to Eiríksson’s critique, one finds insightful remarks not only on „the absurd“ and „the paradox“ as foundational concepts of Kierkegaard’s theory of faith, but also on the different perspectives of the various pseudonyms in this respect within the intricate tapestry of his writings. Notably, these drafts were omitted from the authoritative Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s works, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter ( SKS ), and have remained largely untranslated into other languages. In this workshop report, Kierkegaard’s drafts are made accessible and presented in their entirety for the first time in German translation.

The Austrian-Bohemian writer Franz Werfel (1890 – 1945) was part of a group of writers and thinkers that were inspired by Søren Kierkegaard’s works. While some attention has been paid to Werfel’s religious thinking, there’s a lack of studies that treat his at the time highly successful literary works. After discussing the context in which Werfel’s reception took place, this paper analyzes three novels in which Werfel implicitly refers to Kierkegaardian concepts. At stake is the idea of becoming (or failing to become) a self and the ensuing types of despair or fear, concepts that also captivated Werfel’s literary contemporaries such as Max Brod and Franz Kafka.

So far, the philosopher Charles De Koninck (1906 – 1965) has most commonly been considered as a proponent of the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. However, his contact with modern and contemporary philosophy also contributed to shape his thought. This paper presents his reception of Kierkegaard’s philosophy by first analyzing the textual evidence in his works, indicating a presence of Kierkegaard in his writings. This is followed by a discussion of the similarities between their respective definitions of philosophy and their common views on philosophical anthropology, thus indicating a correspondence between the Dane and De Koninck’s respective philosophies.

In this article I offer an introduction to Hans Lassen Martensen’s review of Heiberg’s New Poems , published in 1841. In his treatise On the Significance of Philosophy of 1833, the poet and philosopher Johan Ludvig Heiberg presented a diagnosis of what he perceived as the cultural crisis of the time. In his view, Danish society was afflicted by a frivolous and nihilistic worldview. A Hegel enthusiast, Heiberg thought that the cure for the crisis lay in a new philosophical perspective, capable of finding the universal and infinite within the particular and finite. But this was only possible to communicate through literature and, more specifically, through what he called speculative poetry. In the following years, Heiberg and his friend and colleague Martensen developed the notion of this new genre. This didactic campaign culminated with the publication of Heiberg’s New Poems , especially the piece “A Soul after Death,” accompanied by the review composed by Martensen.

In this article I offer an English translation of the first two installments of Hans Lassen Martensen’s review of the New Poems by Johan Ludvig Heiberg. The review was published in three installments in the periodical Fædrelandet in January 10 – 12, 1841. This is the first translation of Martensen’s review into English. I provide an introduction to the text in the foregoing article in this volume of the Yearbook , titled “Martensen’s Review of Heiberg’s New Poems and the Discussion on Speculative Poetry and the Crisis of the Age.”