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The aim of this paper is to give an interpretation of the free and harmonious play of faculties. The dominant interpretations focus on how the imagination is free from the determination of understanding, but say little about the harmony that can exist between imagination and understanding; thus, in this paper an attempt is made to account for the free and harmonious relationship between these two faculties. Some of Kant’s lectures are reviewed to show the inclinations of the power of imagination and understanding, respectively. As the power of imagination is inclined towards making many representations, understanding is necessary to truncate the multitudes of those representations, so that unity of the representation is achievable. Taking inspiration from the traditional board game of Go, it is possible to draw an interpretation of the play of faculties that takes into consideration both the freedom and the harmony that is present within the play.

Kant’s account of the sublime makes frequent appeals to infinity, appeals which have been extensively criticised by commentators such as Budd and Crowther. This paper examines the costs and benefits of reconstructing the account in finitist terms. On the one hand, drawing ona detailed comparison of the first and third Critiques, I argue that the underlying logic of Kant’s position is essentially finitist. I defend the approach against longstanding objections, as well as addressing recent infinitist work by Moore and Smith. On the other hand, however, I argue that finitism faces distinctive problems of its own: whilst the resultant theory is a coherent and interesting one, it is unclear in what sense it remains an analysis of the sublime. I illustrate the worry by juxtaposing the finitist reading with analytical cubism.

When we judge something to be beautiful, do we identify an inherent feature of the object, or only our subjective response to it? This paper argues that, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgment occupies a middle ground. Such judgments are based upon affective responses to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, pure aesthetic judgment is subjective insofar as it concerns our feeling ourselves to be engaged in a certain task; it is objective insofar as the task we are engaged in is cognition of an object, and the faculties that we are feeling to be at work are the cognitive faculties of the understanding and the imagination. This paper locates this interpretation in the text of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment in the third Critique and uses it to make sense of many otherwise opaque features of Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment.

In a series of works published over the last thirty years, Rudolf Makkreel accomplished what can be called a hermeneutical rehabilitation of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Such a rehabilitation has been formulated in explicit opposition to the negative hermeneutical image of Kant’s aesthetics which originated in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and according to which the subjectivization of aesthetics perpetrated by Kant reduced aesthetic judgments to a mere communication of feelings, sanctioning thereby their hermeneutical irrelevance. In this essay I do not intend to evaluate the legitimacy of Makkreel’s considerations about the hermeneutical importance of Kant’s Third Critique. Rather, I aim to question the pertinence of those considerations for Gadamer’s criticism of Kant, specifically in relation to the notion of sensus communis, which plays a central role both in Gadamer’s and Makkreel’s analyses.

Though the notion of common-sense (Gemeinsinn) plays an important role in Kant’s aesthetic theory, it is not immediately clear what Kant means by this term. This essay works to clarify the role that common-sense plays in the logic of Kant’s argument. My interpretive hypothesis is that a careful examination of the way common-sense functions in Kant’s account of judgments of taste can help explain what this notion means. I argue that common-sense names the capacity to discern the relation between the cognitive faculties by means of a feeling, and I conclude that this understanding of common-sense lays the groundwork for an account of the unity of judgments of taste. I conclude that attending to Kant’s notion of common-sense is especially important because it highlights the anthropological significance of Kant’s account of beauty.

Kant’s account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment has been extremely influential, prompting extensive discussion of the psychology, affect, moral significance, and relevance to artistic representation of the sublime on his provocative view. I focus instead on Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime in connection to his theoretical critical project, namely his attempt to characterize human cognitive powers and to limit human pretensions to knowledge of the supersensible. I argue, first, that his account of the psychology of the sublime is designed to explain not just its affective character (its displeasure-pleasure), but also to address challenges concerning the coherence of an experience of something as transcending one’s cognitive abilities. Thereby, I argue moreover, Kant provides an alternative, demystifying account of mystical experiences, in which humans might take themselves to intuit that which is beyond human understanding or reason, and thus to claim that they have special cognitive access to the supersensible, transcending the limits Kant claims to establish for human cognition. Kant’s account of the mathematical sublime is not merely so reductive of mystical experience, however; it also, I suggest, describes the aesthetic of Kantian critique itself.