Band 110, Heft 3

Wolff advocates the mathematical method, which consists in chains of syllogisms that proceed from axioms and definitions to theorems, for achieving scientific certainty in branches of philosophy like ontology and physics. By contrast, in ‘The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Use’ Kant significantly limits the efficacy of this method in philosophy. In this paper I investigate an under-examined result of the Discipline: Kant’s claim that his system of philosophy does not contain “dogmata”. By identifying “dogmata” in Wolff’s system of physics, I argue that, for Kant, they are propositions that uncritically deploy ideas of reason. I conclude that the Discipline extends criticisms raised in the Transcendental Dialectic to any erroneous use of the mathematical method in philosophy.

Kant’s emphasis on the immorality of lying even to a murderer at the door who is asking about a victim hidden inside has drawn criticism ever since. The example originally given by Constant has been read as the thread of morality by totalitarian ruthlessness. In order to defend the importance of Kant’s moral philosophy, many critics have tried to update his position by taking into account the threat of modern totalitarianism. Nonetheless, this article tries to argue that Kant is right, especially since the rise of post-truth politics. Sincerity towards oneself and towards others remains the basis of democracy: we have to admit what seems to be the truth regardless of our feelings about it.

This article concerns the unsolved riddle of the continuum of the extension of time and space. It becomes solvable if one takes the two different relationships that can exist between extension and point as a basis: the primary relationship in the synthetic continuum and the secondary relationship in the analytical continuum. Time and space can then be deduced from the primary relationship between extension and point as each special extension. And this deduction corresponds exactly to the synthesis of time and space that Kant seeks to develop.

When interpreters orient Kant’s philosophy of time in relation to McTaggart’s distinction among different ways of characterizing a temporal order, they claim that he is best described as endorsing an A series position according to which there is a metaphysically privileged present that determines the past and the future. Whether Kant might also be understood as a proponent of the B series - according to which there is no privileged present, but rather time is comprised of relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneity - has not been discussed in the literature. I argue that, for Kant, the appearances can be described as an A series, while the phenomena are to be understood as a B series, neither of which is more fundamental than the other. Contra a common approach in the literature that neglects a metaphysical difference between appearances and phenomena, I argue Kant’s transcendental idealism about time is best understood in relation to his account of appearances and phenomena.

In this paper, I focus on Kant’s doctrine of figurative synthesis. Figurative synthesis is the result of the activity of productive transcendental imagination. This is the chief problem of the so-called “second proof step” in Kant’s deduction of the categories according to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason . The pure original synthetic apperception forms in the inner and outer sense - i. e. in time and space - by self-affection structures of order that make it possible to cognize empirical objects. The order of space and time through figurative syntheses (formal intuitions) must be distinguished on the one hand from space and time as forms of intuition and on the other hand from the order of the manifold given in space and time (intuition of particular contents). This clarifies the differences and relations between the constitutive noetic faculties of our knowledge apparatus.

The empiricist needs to explain the origin, in perception, of the idea of time. Kant believed the only answer was a kind of idealism about time. This essay examines Hume’s extensionalism as a possible answer to Kant. Extensionalism allegedly accounts for the experience of time via the manner of presentation of experiences, rather than the content of experience.

The theory of space-time developed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his (1786) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is connected to Leonhard Euler’s proof of invariance under Galilean transformations in the “On Motion in General” of the latter’s 1736 Analytical Mechanics. It is argued that Kant, by using the Principle of Relativity that is the output of Euler’s proof as an input to his own proof of the kinematic parallelogram law, makes essential use of absolute simultaneity. This is why, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he observes that “our theory of time explains as much a priori knowledge as the general theory of motion displays.” (KrV, B 67) In conclusion, it is shown that the same proof-method, under a different definition of simultaneity, leads to the parallelogram law of the “Kinematic Part” of Einstein’s 1905 “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”.

I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).