Volume 107, Issue 3

Abstract: This essay aims to provide a reconstruction of the antecedents to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental schematism in the pre-critical period. To this end, the work’s common thread is based on an analysis of the following issues: the delimitation of a jurisdiction of metaphysics, the transition from the concept of construction in the mathematical context to the constructive processes of the imagination, subsequently applied to all pure concepts, the difference between the intellectus archetypus and the intellectus ectypus , outlined in MSI, and the relevance of this distinction to the particular type of mediation operations that will later take place within the development of the theory of transcendental schematism.

Abstract: In the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant claims that Galileo Galilei, Evangelista Torricelli and Georg Ernst Stahl caused a scientific revolution in experimental physics (B xii). In this paper, I advance the historical thesis that Kantʼs claim refers precisely to three passages from Discursus et demonstrationes mathematicae (Galilei), Lettera a Filaleti Di Timauro Antiate (Torricelli), and Beweiß von den Saltzen (Stahl). This historical thesis provides evidence for a newer systematic interpretation, which says that the topic of the second preface is not epistemological, but rather methodological.

Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant criticizes Baumgarten’s definition of metaphysics as the science of the first principles of human knowledge ( Metaphysica § 1). He maintains that this definition doesn’t consider the distinction between sensible and pure knowledge. Instead of this definition, Kant provides a new one in the first Critique : metaphysics is the system of pure reason (KrV, A 841/B 869). This definition is first anticipated eleven years before in the Inaugural Dissertation , where metaphysics is defined as pure philosophy (MSI, AA 02: 411). Kant presents the Dissertation as a proof of the propaedeutic that must precede metaphysics, and so anticipates the idea that will be fully developed in the Critique of Pure Reason . In this paper, I will argue that the new definition of metaphysics in the Inaugural Dissertation must be seen as the text’s very important result, establishing the Dissertation ’s status as a propaedeutic to metaphysics and as a specific step in the development of the Critique of Pure Reason .

Abstract: The critical Kant no longer advanced the view that man can achieve his happiness with the aid of prudence. In the Critique of Practical Reason Happiness is a part of the highest good, which presupposes the existence of God. Rather than prudence, it is morality alone by which man can contribute to realizing the highest good. In his Anthropology , Kant discusses issues which are relevant for each philosophy of happiness, for example the importance of change as such.

Abstract: This commentary on Udo Thiel’s rich and inspiring book The Early Modern Subject consists of three parts. The first part expresses agreement with Thiel’s claim that the early modern philosophers use terms such as “conscientia”, “conscience”, “consciousness”, and “Bewusstsein” in order to refer to forms of “relating to one’s own self”. However, Thiel’s additional claim that the early modern philosophers were not much concerned with object consciousness is found wanting. The second part takes issue with Thiel’s understanding of the way in which René Descartes’s psychological usage of the term “conscientia” is innovative. It is argued that Descartes does not arrive at the psychological meaning of the term by abstraction from its moral meaning. Instead, Descartes only widens the application of the term in one of its established ancient meanings. The third part presents objections to Thiel’s higher-order reading of Cartesian conscientia .

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to challenge the notion of subjectivism involved in Udo Thiel’s and in other reconstructions of Locke’s account of personal identity. Although subjectivism is often taken to be the hallmark of Locke’s position, it is not entirely clear how we should understand this characterization. Thus, I will first address some general worries about this label. In a second step, I will discuss possible ways of construing Locke’s account as subjectivist and show how they rely on objective and intersubjective features. I shall conclude with a plea to drop this label with regard to Locke altogether.

Abstract: This paper takes Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject : Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume as an example of a study that aims to provide an account of a particular philosophical development, and discusses both the methodological requirements and the philosophical commitments connected with this ambition. In a first step, I distinguish between two fundamentally different ways of thinking about philosophical development, viz. externalism and internalism with regard to historical developments in philosophy, and I consider two ways of defining the two respective positions. Next, I specify certain methodological decisions that are relevant when writing a study on a particular philosophical development, and I characterize Udo Thiel’s book with respect to them. While no definitive position is taken with regard to the issues raised, the paper does advocate a reflective approach to them.

Abstract: This paper deals with how to understand David Hume’s theory of personal identity. Udo Thiel endorses a view that resembles the Sceptical Realist interpretation to some extent while taking issue with its ontological implications. Thiel argues that Hume’s so-called bundle theory of the mind is not a theory about its real essence but rather only a theory about our idea of the self. Thiel thus argues for an epistemological reading of the bundle theory and rejects the mainstream reading as unjustifiably ontological. In this paper, I challenge Thiel’s view by discussing some textual and philosophical evidence against it.

Abstract: Responding to comments on The Early Modern Subject, this paper focuses on a strictly limited range of issues: methodology, Descartes on consciousness, and Locke and Hume on personal identity. 1) Ursula Renz’s comments prompt an explanation of the notion of development in historical studies of philosophy. 2) Contra Christian Barth, although it is difficult to determine what kind of self-relation consciousness is for Descartes on the basis of the texts, it is argued that a higher-order reading is a more plausible interpretation than a first-order reading. 3) It is shown that Locke’s account of personal identity can usefully be characterized as ‘subjectivist’, in spite of Martin Lenz’s objections. 4) And finally, in consideration of Falk Wunderlich’s comments, the paper argues against both a traditional ‘ontological’ reading and a ‘sceptical realist’ interpretation of Hume’s bundle theory of the mind.