Volume 107, Issue 2

Abstract: The main thesis of this article holds that the theory of personhood as a relation of the self to itself is a fundamental structure not only of Kant’s practical but also of his theoretical philosophy. The first section discusses Kant’s theory of duties to oneself as an obligation of homo phaenomenon to homo noumenon . The focus is on §§ 3, 11, and 13 of the “Tugendlehre”. The second section analyses Kant’s theory of personhood in the Paralogism chapter, in the solution of the third antinomy, and in the transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason , and refutes some arguments against the claim that there is such a theory. A third section combines the former results and outlines their consequences for the debate on the unity of reason from Fichte to Henrich.

Abstract: Despite his outright rejection of grace as commonly understood in historical religion, Kant accords a prominent role to grace within his own “natural religion”. His vindication of grace rests on a practical, strictly rational argument based on two premises: man’s “natural inability” to meet the requirements of virtue and the uncompromising authority of moral law. In spelling out this argument, this paper shows that Kant’s theory of grace belongs rightfully in his doctrine of the postulates of practical reason. It also highlights common misconceptions of Kant’s view, specifies the different functions of grace distinguished by Kant, and explains the nature of grace as a mystery.

Abstract: In the course of his philosophy, in various contexts, Kant comes to reject three theses about existence: (i) that the thoroughgoing determination of a thing implies its existence, (ii) that existence is a real predicate or determination of a thing, and (iii) that existence is the complement of inner possibility or essence. Kant’s target here is Baumgarten, who advocates these theses as the criterion , classification , and definition of existence. In this article I seek to clarify Kant’s elusive theory of existence through its opposition to Baumgarten. I will show that Kant’s refutation of (i)–(iii) does not stand alone but is grounded on his own definition of existence as (absolute) positing. Thus contrary to common practice, Kant’s negative claims about what existence is not cannot be understood in isolation but must be taken as jointly dependent on Kant’s positive claim about what existence is . I will show that theses (i)–(iii) fail because they presuppose that existence contributes to the intension or content of a concept, whereas according to Kant existence in fact posits a (non-empty) extension of the concept.

Abstract: The article comprehensively examines Kant’s conceptions of organisms, animals, nature’s agency, and apparent design in essays and physical geography Nachschriften from the 1750s to 1790s: manuscripts “Holstein”, “Kaehler”, “Dönhoff”, and “Dohna”. The methodological distinctions between empirical science and pure, transcendental philosophy, and between popular, worldly philosophy and scholastic philosophy, are crucial for understanding his use of teleological principles in the geography course. Kant applies teleological principles to nature in a rather ‘direct’ fashion in these lectures, although this should not be taken to mean that he considers the teleological judging of organisms to be incompatible with judging them mechanistically.

Abstract: In this paper, I propose that Kant’s Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (TG) and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus (TLP) be read as ironic texts. I will argue that both Kant and Wittgenstein deliberately deploy a literary device, i.e. irony, in order to express their ambiguous attitudes towards metaphysics and philosophy. Both texts are to be regarded as critiques of metaphysics; nevertheless, they stop short of straightforwardly rejecting metaphysics. Irony thus captures the love-hate attitude held by Kant and Wittgenstein toward philosophy. Irony might even serve as a means of critique of philosophy; it might serve as a self-reflexive and self-critical activity for both Kant and Wittgenstein – perhaps as a means of catharsis for their (empty) aspirations for metaphysical knowledge. Irony, however, preserves the possibility of an incomprehensible metaphysical insight (for Kant) or an ineffable metaphysical feeling (for Wittgenstein). This feeling constantly eludes our understanding (Kant) and language (Wittgenstein). I will argue that irony resides in the concept of a Kantian pre-critical symbol. In its multiple significances, the concept of a symbol preserves the possibility of a multiplicity of meanings. Thus irony finds shelter within this multiplicity. In this way, it can both deny and entertain the possibility of the revelation of a metaphysical picture over and above every given sign. Thus the sign becomes a symbol open to interpretation. Both the pre-critical Kant and the Wittgenstein of the TLP were held captive by such a metaphysical picture. I will conclude that the critiques of pure reason (Kant) and language (Wittgenstein) presuppose a critique of the symbolic pictures that held Kant and Wittgenstein captive.

Abstract: In this contribution, the author develops a new interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s casuistic example in the Critique of Practical Reason , where Kant considers whether there are circumstances in which it would be permissible to embezzle a deposit. For this purpose, the author discusses two recently published articles on the subject by Konrad Cramer (1999) and Jens Timmermann (2003) and gives an explanation of how Kant’s maxim test should be understood. The contribution also reveals that Kant’s analysis of this case is fully justifiable.