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The task of this paper is to offer an interpretation of Kant’s notion of proportionality between morality and happiness, which is fundamental to his conception of the highest good. Kant claims that the complete good of humans as both natural and rational beings is a proportionate relation between virtue and happiness. He takes this to mean that nature is purposively designed so it accords with morality, which is only possible in a divine world where God secures this responsiveness. The paper shows various difficulties with this claim and argues that they can be resolved by a nuanced interpretation of what Kant might mean by “happiness”. This finally leads to a conception of proportionality modeled on Kant’s aesthetics.

This article seeks to reevaluate Kant’s treatment of prudence in his ethics, challenging prevalent interpretations that relegate prudence in Kant to mere technique (skill). Scattered across Kant’s texts, there are indications that prudence (practical judgment) fulfills an essential function in Kant’s ethics: by negotiating the contingencies of an uncertain world, prudence adapts the moral imperative to mutable circumstances. However, Kant is convinced that despair is inevitable for humans, when confronted with the inherent uncertainty and indifference of the natural world. The only remedy against this despair for Kant is faith in a providential God: Kant introduces reliance on God’s providence to reconcile human practical reason with chance and nature’s capriciousness. The article thus underscores the inseparable link between human prudence and God’s providence for living a moral life in the Kantian sense.